108 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
To translate a theory or worldview into one’s own language is not to make it one’s own. For that one must go native, discover that one is thinking and working in, not simply translating
out of, a language that was previously foreign. That transition is not, however, one that an individual may make or refrain from making by deliberation and choice, however good his
reasons for wishing to do so. Instead, at some point in the process of learning to translate, he finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into the new language without a
decision having been made. Or else, like many of those who first encountered, say, relativity or quantum mechanics in their middle years, he finds himself fully persuaded of the new view
but nevertheless unable to internalize it and be at home in the world it helps to shape. Intel- lectually such a man has made his choice, but the conversion required if it is to be effective
eludes him. … for he lacks the constellation of mental sets which future members of the community will acquire through education.
Kuhn 1996 :204
Of the process of paradigm evaluation and its relationship to the incommensurability problem, Kuhn writes:
It makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two actual and competing theories fits the facts better. … This formulation, however, makes the task of choosing between paradigms
look both easier and more familiar than it is. If there were but one set of scientific problems, one world within which to work on them, and one set of standards for their solution, paradigm
competition might be settled more or less routinely by some process like counting the number of problems solved by each. But, in fact, these conditions are never met completely. The
proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case. …
they are bound partly to talk through each other. Though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The
competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs.
Kuhn 1996
:147–148
4.1.9. The conceptual arrangement of paradigms
Related to the misconception that by ‘paradigm’ Kuhn intended only “Grand Theories” is a common neglect of Kuhn’s suggestion that paradigms are to some extent
both hierarchically ordered and arranged via network-like connections 1996
:40–42. Kuhn’s suggestions in this regard are not explicitly stated in the
1962 edition; instead
they are embedded in the broader discussion of rules and the various uses of the term paradigm
1996 :41–43. Kuhn’s 1970 Postscript elaborates on the issue somewhat in
discussing the “numerous levels” of community structure and the usage of terms 1996
:177, 181. He alludes to the concept of levels and related lower level paradigms in such comments as the following: “Normally, the members of a mature scientific
community work from a single paradigm or from a closely related set. Very rarely do different scientific communities investigate the same problems. In those exceptional
cases the groups hold several major paradigms in common”
Kuhn 1996 :162.
It is significant that Kuhn chose the word ‘constellation’, defining ‘paradigm’ as a “constellation of group commitments”
1996 :181. In contrast to the simpler terms “set”
and “body,” which Kuhn could have employed in referring to group commitments, the term constellation evokes the idea of configuration, pattern, and arrangement.
Commitments to the disciplinary matrix are related and arranged; they are not simply a
4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 109
loose set thrown together in a haphazard manner. When hierarchical relationships are considered, the connections and dependent relationships between various theories and
models employed by a discipline become more clear. We speak of lower-level conceptual ‘paradigms’ i.e., commitments to respective theories and other components of the disci-
plinary matrix as they are currently unfolding and being developed. But at another level of investigation are superior-level ‘paradigms’, the commitments to collected though not
always formalized presuppositions i.e., metatheory under which a discipline is united, those collections of assumptions which more obviously relate to a shared ontology see
Edmondson and Burquest 1998 :13.
The concept of hierarchical ordering and conceptual relationship is crucial to the question of commensurability. Concepts which are hierarchically ordered are, in that
sense, both related and structurally dependent. That is, the more specific level nodes can be said to be accountable to and comparable under the higher level nodes in the
hierarchy. Paradigms which are ordered in such an arboreal fashion, i.e., branching from a major “trunk” do have a level of commensurability under shared nodes, but are
incommensurable between nodes of the same level or between inferior and superior levels. See figure
4.2 .
This is the basis of the common “apples and oranges” fallacy in argumentation. It is possible to discuss how two specific level units are related under a shared generic node.
But it would be irrational to evaluate a specific unit on the basis of its conformity to another specific unit, and vice versa. That is, it would be irrational to criticize an orange
for being a poor representation of an apple. Criticisms of this type typically involve elevation of the specific criteria to the level of genus, followed by a criticism of other
specific units for their failure to conform to the elevated unit. In the fruit example, the apple species has been made the standard fruit genus level, by which all other fruits
species level are measured. Of similar error is the practice of evaluating the status of a generic category on the basis of its conformity to a specific unit. That is, the notion of
fruit genus is criticized for being too vague; the notion of fruit, it is argued, should be more orange-like.
110 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
Figure 4.2. Diagrammatic representation of arboreal and rhizomatic ordering of paradigmatic relationships
These logical limitations of argumentation do not, however, suggest that one cannot or should not prefer theoretical apples over theoretical oranges, or oranges over apples,
especially when a particular function is involved or characteristic is required. They may be equal in status, but are obviously distinct in content.
Paradigms which are conceptually related, but less hierarchically ordered, can be viewed as having rhizomatic connections i.e., not sharing a single “trunk,” but never-
theless related in various ways.
61
They are ordered and related, but their higher level nodes are related serially, rather than hierarchically. The higher level nodes are also
typically fewer in number and are often not explicitly addressed or formalized. Comparing such paradigms is less easy and is often less productive, for they share fewer
presuppositions. See again figure
4.2 .
It would be rare, of course, for paradigmatic relationships to exclusively follow one or the other of these two patterns. After all, paradigms only exist via the belief and
practice of humans in community, and humans rarely isolate themselves to the extent necessary for purely arboreal relationships to develop. As the diagrams indicate with
dashed lines, “limbs” within either type of structure may be related or “grafted” horizon- tally, yielding a complex set of relationships. But even with horizontal grafts in place, the
arboreal structure still differs significantly from the rhizomatic structure in the fact that all of the arboreal limbs share a dependence upon major limbs and a common trunk. If an
analyst fails to recognize the significance of these basic level nodes, then the arboreal structure may be misinterpreted as a rhizomatic structure. In such a misinterpretation the
analyst has observed the “tree” as if from its top. The density and complexity of its more
61
Whereas an arboreal structure involves a major trunk with limbs, a rhizomatic structure involves a running stem, from which various fairly autonomous structures develop. A rhizome is “a horizontal stem on or under soil, bearing
leaves near its tips and roots from its undersurface” Neufeldt 1989
.
4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 111
specific limbs then obscure his view of the basic-level limbs and trunk which unite the structure as a whole.
62
The question of commensurability is also tied to the strength of an individual’s and group’s conceptual commitments. If an individual is strongly committed to a particular
disciplinary matrix or paradigm community, then he or she is likely to find it difficult to consider the position proposed under an alternative paradigm. But if a researcher has no
commitments or only weak commitments to the disciplinary matrix or communities involved, then he or she may more readily give alternative arguments equal
consideration.
Within paradigm communities, a degree of receptivity is often practiced in consid- eration of sibling terminal nodes in a hierarchy, but is less common in comparisons of
higher-level nodes or terminal nodes that do not share a close genetic relationship. The higher the nodes concerned in the comparison, the more abstract are the commitments
being questioned. An individual may be cognizant of his commitments to a theory, but his commitments to a metatheory are more abstract, and therefore more elusive. And this,
of course, contributes to incommensurability. As philosopher Ian Barbour has suggested, “There can be complementary models [and theories] within [the disciplinary matrix of] a
paradigm, but paradigms are evidently not complementary; a person can fully share the outlook of only one tradition at a time”
1974 :147.
There are advantages to Kuhn’s having redescribed ‘paradigm’ as commitment to a disciplinary matrix. For example, identification of the various elements of the matrix
symbolic generalizations, models, values, and exemplars helps to facilitate a more detailed examination of how particular paradigms are related. Paradigms may not be
complementary, but that does not mean that the respective elements in the disciplinary matrices are the exclusive “property” of individual paradigms. While Kuhn does not
address such “element sharing” specifically, he does allude to it in discussing the ‘values’ component, stating that values are “more widely shared among different communities
than either symbolic generalizations or models”
Kuhn 1996 :184.
4.1.10. Objectivity versus intersubjectivity
