Metaphor in metatheory Model as Metaphor

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2. Model as Metaphor

2.1. Metaphor in metatheory

While many linguists may be accustomed to using the code model in a literal manner, that is, regarding its components as if they relate directly to real world processes, the code model is just that, a model. No matter how comfortable one becomes with the use of a model, the model is never more than a metaphor for a real world process. Models are metaphors. Of course, such an assertion may seem extreme if we are thinking of metaphor in traditional terms. Christine Brooke-Rose provides a general definition that serves to summarize that traditional view. She writes that “metaphor … is any replacement of one word by another, or any identification of one thing, concept or person with any other” Brooke-Rose 1958 :23–24. 5 While this definition may resonate with the common view, that metaphor is simply analogy, such a definition may offer little assistance toward understanding the role of metaphor in science or toward establishing a methodology for investigating the impact of a particular metaphor. Is the code model simply a convenient means of expression—a “handy” way to reference communication—without having much impact on the actual development of theory? Does the model really impact linguistic theory and practice? Kenneth Burke offers a deeper explanation of metaphor. He suggests that metaphor is seldom, if ever, simply a convenient means of expression. Rather, “It is precisely through metaphor that our perspectives, or analogical extensions, are made—a world without metaphor would be a world without purpose” Burke 1954 :194. 6 Elsewhere Burke comments: Indeed, as the documents of science pile up, are we not coming to see that whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile metaphor? … The attempt to fix argument by analogy as a distinct kind of process, separable from logical argument, seems increasingly futile. Burke 1954 : 95– 96 Burke’s appeal to metaphor contrasts with the characterization offered by Brooke- Rose 1958 :23–24. Whereas Brooke-Rose describes metaphor as replacement of words 5 The definition offered by Brooke-Rose is much too broad to serve many contemporary authors addressing the topic of metaphor. For instance, her definition would also include paraphrase and metonymy, without isolating qualities peculiar to these types of expression. Readers interesting in additional reading on metaphor will also want to see Shibles 1971 and Ortony 1979 , in addition to Burke 1984 [orig. 1954 ] and Lakoff and Johnson 1980 , 1999 . While Shibles’ book obviously won’t provide coverage of more recent literature, it does provide an important annotated bibliography on metaphor. 6 Burke 1954 has been republished in second and third editions 3 rd edition 1984 . Burke’s material quoted in this study is the same in each edition. The 1954 edition is quoted here in order to highlight the chronological development of theory regarding the role of metaphor in structuring conceptual organization. 2. Model as Metaphor 7 and relational identification, a definition which restricts metaphor to the category of literary device, Burke suggests that metaphor is the means by which we shape our perspectives and analogical extensions Burke 1954 :194. As Burke describes it, metaphor serves in the conceptual framework of the analyst. He writes: “The heuristic value of scientific analogies is quite like the surprise of metaphor. The difference seems to be that the scientific analogy is more patiently pursued, being employed to inform an entire work or movement, where the poet uses his metaphor for a glimpse only” Burke 1954 :96. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson take the general position Burke offers even a step further, stating: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :5. At the surface, the definition offered by Lakoff and Johnson may seem similar to that of Brooke-Rose 1958 :23–24. However, the key verbs employed by these theoreticians are quite distinct. Brooke-Rose writes of “replacement” and “identification,” whereas Lakoff and Johnson are concerned with “understanding” and “experiencing.” They write: Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :3 By “poetic imagery” and “rhetorical flourish,” Lakoff and Johnson address the traditional view that metaphor is simply decorative, but that it is not necessary or in any way essential. In contrast, they suggest that metaphor does not simply involve figures of speech, but rather the essential conceptual structuring of thought processes. While the characterization offered by Brooke-Rose differs greatly from that offered by Burke and by Lakoff and Johnson, a continuum of sorts can be described between the two. All metaphor involves analogical extension. Therefore, with metaphor as an isolated rhetorical figure of speech at one pole and sets of interrelated metaphorical expressions reflecting conceptualization at the other, the position any particular metaphor assumes along that continuum may be described as a function of the extent to which the analogical extension employed reflects or determines conceptual organization. The poles may be conveniently characterized as “simple metaphor” and “conceptual metaphor” see figure 2.1 . 8 2. Model as Metaphor Simple Metaphor ‹Œ Conceptual Metaphor Metaphor involves “changing a word properly applicable, but analogous to it from its literal meaning to one not …” Lanham 1991 :100. “If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :3. • Figures of speech used to highlight an attribute or characteristic, or used for rhetorical effect • Often one-to-one correspondence in replacement of a word by another • Limited scope, so that metaphor may be employed, but the choice of metaphors is not exclusive e.g., the ground is blanketed with snow; the ground is covered with snow , furthermore, metaphors are not necessarily missed if not employed e.g., the ground has snow on it • Used in organizing concepts, so that the concept is often learned through the metaphor or set of metaphors. Accordingly, presup- positions, perception, and behavior may be affected by common employment of the metaphor. • Often expressed through an interrelated set of metaphorical expressions • May be very difficult or seem unnatural to express the concept without appealing to the metaphor e.g., run out of time Examples: The spring of life A blanket of snow The plan unraveled Get to the heart of the matter Examples: ILLNESS IS ENEMY e.g., fight off a cold, he’s battling cancer TIME IS MONEYRESOURCE e.g., spend time wisely, run out of time ARGUMENT IS WAR e.g., I attacked his weak point, he shot down my argument Figure 2.1. A continuum with simple and conceptual metaphors at opposing poles In discussing simple metaphors, conceptual metaphors, and the interrelated sets of metaphorical expressions related to conceptual metaphors, it is useful to terminologically differentiate the various referents. Simple metaphors may be called by that name. Abstract conceptual structures, such as ILLNESS IS ENEMY , may be called conceptual metaphors, and particular expressions referring to such structures, such as “fight off a cold” and “he’s battling cancer” may be called metaphorisms, thereby differentiating such expressions from simple metaphors. In this manner of speaking, “fight off a cold” would be identified as an ILLNESS IS ENEMY metaphorism. 7 7 While Reddy 1979 does not employ the term conceptual metaphor in addressing the conduit metaphor, a classic conceptual metaphor of communication, he does suggest, via use, the term metaphorism. 2. Model as Metaphor 9 This study asserts that the code model of communication is, for most linguists, more than a simple metaphor. Rather, it is a conceptual metaphor to the extent that it reflects conceptual organization used by “mature” linguists who employ it and determines conceptual structuring for linguists “in training” who learn and adopt it. 8 Just as our everyday conceptual metaphors, such as ILLNESS IS ENEMY , are tacit and can only be inferred from the actual metaphorisms, so also the code model is tacit and can only be inferred from metaphorisms. Employing the nomenclature here proposed, one may identify a code-model based expression, such as “ideas to be transmitted are represented by a code” Denes and Pinson 1993 :6 [orig. 1963], as a COMMUNICATION IS CODING EVENT metaphorism. Depending upon the component of the model in focus, the code model may be said to reflect other metaphors as well, such as COMMUNICATION IS TRANSMISSION EVENT, and COMMUNICATION IS DECODING EVENT . While such nomenclature has become common in metaphor analysis see Barlow 1994 ; Lakoff and Johnson 1980 ; Reddy 1979 , it is not, however, common in model analysis see Gentner and Stevens 1983 . In the more traditional nomenclature of model analysis, a statement such as “ideas to be transmitted are represented by a code,” would simply be referred to as an appeal to the code model. This study will employ metaphor- analysis nomenclature when addressing more typical conceptual metaphors, such as the conduit metaphor as an integrated constituent within the code model. In addressing code- model based statements, however, the study will employ the more traditional model- analysis nomenclature , by simply describing code-model based statements as “appeals” to the model. Lakoff has introduced a useful concept, that of functional embodiment, that helps explain the significance of conceptual metaphors. A brief introduction to the idea of ‘functional embodiment’ is important here, for it contributes to an understanding of the role of metaphor in metatheory. Lakoff defines the concept as follows: Functional embodiment: The idea that certain concepts are not merely understood intellec- tually; rather, they are used automatically, unconsciously, and without noticeable effort as part of normal functioning. Concepts used in this way have a different, and more important, psy- chological status than those that are only thought about consciously. Lakoff 1987 :12; italics in original 8 Readers should also see Norman 1983 and Young 1983 , both of which discuss mental models, especially Young 1983 :38 discussing strong analogy and surrogate mental models. In some respects, the code model of communi- cation conforms to the characterization of mental models. Norman writes: Mental models are naturally evolving models. That is, through interaction with a target system, people formulate mental models of that system. These models need not be technically accurate and usually are not, but they must be functional. A person, through interaction with the system, will continue to modify the mental model in order to get a workable result. Mental models will be constrained by such things as the user’s technical background, previous experience with similar systems, and the structure of the human information processing system. Norman 1983 :7–8 10 2. Model as Metaphor To provide a succinct paraphrase, behavior may reflect the subliminal pressure of metaphor. This sense of ‘being embodied’ is somewhat distinct from the more traditional sense of the word. In that traditional sense one may speak of a metaphor as the embod- iment of underlying presuppositions, whereby a metaphor has provided a form or a conventionalized means of expression for those presuppositions, facilitating their incor- poration as a unified whole. Both senses of the term may be said to apply in the present discussion.

2.2. Metaphor in methodology