126 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
Makkai is basically sharing concern with Hymes that excess zeal over Kuhn’s proposals has spawned revolutionary hype and a resulting hysteria. Hymes wishes to tie
contemporary linguistics to ancient and contemporary folk linguistics see Hymes
1974a :2ff.; Makkai wishes to place the roots of contemporary linguistics in the inquiries
of the ancient Greeks. Perhaps the question of linguistic paradigms hinges, in part, on the age old distinction between lumpers and splitters. In other words, it is a matter of scope
see again Kuhn 1996
:177. If Makkai wishes to lump the entire history of linguistics into a single mammoth paradigm, then, in Makkai’s honor, “Long live the unity of
knowledge ”
71
Many others in the community of linguists, however, find it advantageous to serious- ly consider the presuppositions and metatheory shared by various communities and levels
of community structure. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this study, histori- ography may have as an objective “… to lay bare the sometimes unconscious
assumptions that linguists bring to their theories of language and to follow the consequences of those assumptions through the elaboration of the theories, often over
long periods of time”
Andresen 1987 :647. In that, the discipline may not only better
understand the past, but also better determine goals for future progress. Carefully applied, Kuhn’s theory may be a useful tool toward that end.
4.2.3. Linguistics and Kuhn’s idea of normal and revolutionary phases
In contrast to other components of his theory, such as incommensurability, Kuhn’s ideas regarding normal and revolutionary phases have not been particularly controversial.
For example, John Horgan, who withholds praise for some components of Kuhn’s theory, nevertheless endorses Kuhn’s notion of normal science. Having compared the
philosophies of Kuhn and Sir Karl Popper, he writes: “To say that the ideas of Popper and Kuhn are flawed is not to say that they cannot serve as useful tools for analyzing
science. Kuhn’s normal-science model accurately describes what most scientists now do: fill in details, solve relatively trivial puzzles that buttress rather than challenge the
prevailing paradigm”
Horgan 1996 :47; italics added. Nevertheless, having been lost in
the shadow of more controversial components, the idea of normal and revolutionary phases has not been well represented in the linguistic literature. Kuhn himself describes
the process via the analogy of a chess game, repeated here for convenience:
In so far as he is engaged in normal science, the research worker is a solver of puzzles, not a tester of paradigms. Though he may, during the search for a particular puzzle’s solution, try
out a number of alternative approaches, rejecting those that fail to yield the desired result, he is not testing the paradigm when he does so. Instead he is like the chess player who, with a
problem stated and the board physically or mentally before him, tries out various alternative
71
“Unity of knowledge” is, generally, the philosophical position that knowledge is one thing, that it is all equal and of the same essence. It implies that the unfolding history of human inquiry displays one continuous stream, increasingly
moving toward progress, rather than divergent streams or non-continuous streams punctuated by temporal periods and non-contiguous traditions.
4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 127
moves in the search for a solution. These trial attempts, whether by the chess player or by the scientist, are trials only of themselves, not of the rules of the game. They are possible only so
long as the paradigm itself is taken for granted. Therefore, paradigm-testing occurs only after persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise to crisis.
Kuhn 1996 :144–145
In an interview with Horgan, Kuhn noted that his repeated expression of normal science as “puzzle solving” and “mopping up” may have occasionally been interpreted as
negative or condescending, but he insists that his intention was only descriptive: “Maybe I should have said more about the glories that result from puzzle solving, but I thought I
was doing that”
Horgan 1996 :45.
In rendering his markedness-theory account of paradigms within scientific commu- nities, James McCawley implicitly addresses the phenomenon of Normal Science.
Unfortunately, in so doing, he implies that all new knowledge stands in conflict with an established paradigm. Within Kuhn’s chess analogy, the scientist may practice his
“game,” trying and discovering new “moves,” without ever questioning the rules of the game. That process is normal science. Revolutionary science has begun when the player
rejects the very rules of the game and tries to invent another. McCawley seems to suggest a more continuous process, whereby every new discovery is to be defined as revolu-
tionary. Obviously, every new discovery is new, but that does not necessarily make it revolutionary, at least not in the sense proposed and developed by Kuhn. In a series of
statements, McCawley writes:
What distinguishes a scientific community from other kinds of community, such as a religion or an artistic clique, is that the activity relevant to the identity of the community is the
acquisition and refinement of knowledge. I emphasize that the refinement of knowledge is essential to the status of a community as a scientific community: the life of the community
must include not only the accretion of new knowledge but the replacement of existing knowledge by better knowledge and the purging of old ‘knowledge’ that has been found to be
in error.
McCawley 1979 :224
Thus, at any moment in its history, a scientific community may have a ‘paradigm’ and yet harbor considerable disagreement among its members not only about matters on the ‘frontiers’
of the science, but even about points of the paradigm itself, and these disagreements need not reflect any ignorance or moral turpitude among the parties to the disagreement.
McCawley 1979
:226 Journals and professional meetings provide forums that are an essential part of the
business of extending and refining knowledge. Since a paper that merely reiterates points of the paradigm will be a waste of time for all concerned, a large proportion of the papers
presented in journals and at meetings will contain ideas which are not part of the paradigm, and which may perfectly well conflict with the paradigm.
McCawley 1979 :227
McCawley describes the “surface level” of an academic conference reasonably well, but there may be “deep structure” which he is failing to recognize. While it is true that no
one wants to present, or listen to, a paper which simply reiterates previously established material, it is not accurate to represent all, or even most of the papers presented at a
typical conference as being revolutionary. Indeed, it is more likely that most, if not all of the presentations will simply build upon the previously established rules of the game.
True, they may be describing and even establishing new “moves” and “strategies” within
128 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
the “chess game” of normal science, but if that is all that they do, then they can engage in that process without questioning or conflicting with the paradigm. In fact, they may be
strengthening the paradigm by these actions.
A scientific paradigm does not specify every action or perspective a scientist may entertain; accordingly, there may be a degree of divergence and competitive perspectives
between subcommunities, without there being any violation of the paradigm which unites them at a more fundamental level see
Kuhn 1996 :44ff.. To continue the analogy, rev-
olutionary science is in view when presenters begin changing the rules, or throw out the rules and invent a different game, perhaps even throwing out the “chess board” and
“pieces” in the process.
4.2.4. Linguistics and Kuhn’s incommensurability hypothesis
