4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 101
practitioners. Any study of paradigm-directed or of paradigm-shattering research must begin
by locating the responsible group or groups. Kuhn 1996
:179, 180; italics added
Here Kuhn uses the term ‘paradigm’ in the sense of ‘commitment’ and ‘metatheory’. He is arguing that, if one desires to study anthropologists, for example, and one finds a
group of anthropologists identifying themselves as neo-functionalists, then one may reasonably hypothesize that the members of this self-defined group share a paradigm.
Kuhn also acknowledges that a group may not call themselves anything. Such anonymity does not negate the existence of group commitments. It may simply indicate
that the said group represents the unmarked case. While identification of such com- mitments may be more difficult than for those of a named group, an analyst may still
discover shared behavior.
4.1.4. Disciplinary matrix
In coining and isolating the terms disciplinary matrix and shared examples, Kuhn attempts to isolate his definition of the conceptual commitments of a paradigm from the
means by which that paradigmatic perspective is learned. The four components of a disciplinary matrix are closely related and overlap to some extent. They include symbolic
generalizations, models, values, and exemplars
Kuhn 1996 :174–191.
By symbolic generalizations Kuhn intends “those expressions, deployed without question or dissent by group members, which can readily be cast into a logical form”
1996 :182. In some disciplines these expressions take the form of symbols and equations
while in others they are commonly expressed in prose. In either case they are used to formulate the laws and definitions embraced by the community. As has been mentioned,
some expressions look like laws of nature; others serve to define nature itself. Kuhn states, “They function in part as laws but also in part as definitions of some of the
symbols they deploy. Furthermore, the balance between their inseparable legislative and definitional force shifts over time”
Kuhn 1996 :183.
In addressing models, Kuhn includes both the ontological and heuristic varieties. He states that models supply the group with “preferred or permissible analogies and meta-
phors. By doing so they help to determine what will be accepted as an explanation and a puzzle-solution; conversely, they assist in the determination of the roster of unsolved
puzzles and in the evaluation of the importance of each”
Kuhn 1996 :184.
53
In discussing the third component, ‘values’, Kuhn suggests that they are “more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic generalizations or
models, and they do much to provide a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole”
Kuhn 1996 :184. “Probably the most deeply held values concern predictions:
they should be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones;
53
One may ask if, by “conversely,” Kuhn intends “as a consequence.” While that would be reasonable, it seems that here Kuhn is simply suggesting that the ‘models component’ is a “two-sided coin.” One side determines what will be
accepted as explanation and solution, while the other defines the puzzles and their importance.
102 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently satisfied in a given field; and so on”
1996 :185. Kuhn continues, “There are also, however, values to be
used in judging whole theories: they must, first and foremost, permit puzzle-formulation and solution; where possible they should be simple, self-consistent, and plausible,
[--]compatible, that is, with other theories currently deployed” 1996
:185.
54
In defining the fourth component ‘exemplars’, Kuhn points to the most tangible of the components. He defines exemplars as “the concrete problem-solutions that students
encounter from the start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on exam- inations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts”
1996 :187. He notes that technical
problem-solutions found in the periodical literature also serve this role. Of course, Kuhn is well aware that different communities employ exemplars in differing ways, as well as
employing certain exemplars peculiar to themselves. He comments, “More than other sorts of components of the disciplinary matrix, differences between sets of exemplars
provide the community fine-structure of science. All physicists, for example, begin by learning the same exemplars …. As their training develops, however, the symbolic
generalizations they share are increasingly illustrated by different exemplars,” so that while they share a particular equation, “only its more elementary applications are
common to both groups”
1996 :187. In other words, while the larger community may
share basic exemplars, particular modifications and applications will be increasingly community and subcommunity specific. The ways in which subcommunities use and
modify exemplars proves to be quite significant, for as Kuhn explains, scientific revolution typically begins at the subcommunity level.
4.1.5. Shared examples
