Revolutionary response to the problem of abstraction

198 5. Developing an Alternative only being differentiated by dimensional perspectives. Referring to a work by J. M. Woodger, Burke writes: 95 Structure, [Woodger] says, is the word which applies to an organ when considered from a three-dimensional set of coördinates, the three dimensions of space. Function applies to the same organ considered from a four-dimensional set, the three spatial coördinates plus the time coördinate. One naturally makes different observations in accordance with the number of coördinates he selects to make them by—but this shift in the basis of his abstracting involves no legitimate material for a quarrel as to whether “structure determines function” or “function determines structure.” The man who settles the issue in favor of structure or function will have massively solved a pseudo-problem resulting purely from the fact that one can assemble and classify data from many points of view. Burke 1954 :94 Properly understood, the problem of abstraction is a separate issue from that addressed in the typical functionalformal debate. That issue is better described as a matter of philosophical perspective. As mentioned in section 4.4.2.2.4 , Lakoff and Johnson address the abstract, dis- embodied notion of language employed in linguistics. Labeling the general approach objectivist linguistics, they write: According to the myth of objectivism, objects have properties in and of themselves and they stand in relationships to one another independently of any being who understands them. When words are written down they can be readily looked upon as objects. This has been the premise of objectivist linguistics from its origins in antiquity to the present: Linguistic expressions are objects that have properties in and of themselves and stand in fixed relationships to one anoth- er, independently of any person who speaks them or understands them. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :204 The philosopher of language V. N. Voloshinov has more specifically addressed the approach, calling it abstract objectivism. Berge explains: The abstract objectivist view can, in the light of the history of modern linguistics, be considered the traditional way of seeing things. The prototypical abstract objectivist sees language as a relatively stable, finite, and invariant system of signification, that is either as a unifunctional, adult-type system which is the goal of socialization, or as a social institution Saussure’s ‘langue’, or as a universal innate mental grammar Chomsky’s ‘competence’, or even as a pure form Hjelmslev’s ‘schema’. The relation between signification system and utterances is seen as an either-or opposition: either one studies language systematically i.e., as a signification system, or one doesn’t study it at all. In this view, language is then something which precedes communication. Berge 1994 :616

5.2.2.1. Revolutionary response to the problem of abstraction

One would be remiss to suggest that revolutionary linguists don’t employ abstraction. Obviously they do. But as stated previously, abstraction, per se, is not the issue. Rather, from the perspective of revolutionary linguists, the issue is the tendency to hypostatize language. 96 This involves the abstract disembodiment of the language system, the 95 Unfortunately, Burke provides no reference or information concerning Woodger, except to mention that Woodger addresses the quarrel over structure and function in biology. 96 Hypostatize: “to attribute real identify to a concept” Mish 1983 :594. 5. Developing an Alternative 199 reification of that abstraction as some version of langue, and finally, the isolation of langue and parole. To describe revolutionary linguists as rejecting the isolation of langue and parole would be somewhat misleading, as it would imply that they uphold the langueparole distinction. It is better to describe their position as involving an integrated notion of language, so that the concerns previously dichotomized in langue and parole are considered inherently inseparable. This is not to suggest that revolutionary linguists abandon the notion of language as involving a system. But in their view, that system is not disembodied; it cannot be disem- bodied. Accordingly, they consider the system to inherently involve and handle change and variation. They consider the system to be grounded in language use, rather than being isolated from that use. To that extent, their interest is in the system of human language, which they consider to inherently involve communication. In terms of philosophical perspective, the field is a bit divided. As discussed in sec- tion 4.4.2.2.4 , Lakoff and Johnson, in their development of cognitive semantics, intend to counteract objectivist linguistics with experientialist linguistics. It should be noted, how- ever, that Lakoff and Johnson are intently interested in questions of epistemology. Accordingly, they are concerned with the epistemological issues surrounding objecti- vism, perhaps more so than they are with issues more typically addressed by linguists. This concern is strongly reflected in their development of experientialism. Hopper, with emergent grammar, and Langacker, with cognitive grammar, seem much less concerned with the classic problems of the philosopher. Both of these linguists seem to have rejected abstract objectivism in favor of versions of process philosophy. Bothamley concisely defines process philosophy as follows: [The term process philosophy refers to] any of a variety of theories emphasizing that the basic reality in the universe is not objects or substances but processes. Objects are mere tem- porary bodies in the general flux, and are not sharply separated from one another; and real time is continuous and not an accretion of instantaneous moments. Process philosophy can be seen in Heraclitus of Ephesus writing c.500 BC, and its leading modern exponents include William James 1842–1910, Henri Bergson 1859–1941 and Alfred North Whitehead 1861– 1947. Bothamley 1993 :432; see James 1909 It has been suggested that a similar perspective has been evident in the interests of pidgin and creole specialists e.g., Bickerton 1981 , the focus being on the emergence of contact languages in the context of language variety, rather than upon defining the langue of the respective speech communities Kenneth A. McElhanon 1999, personal communication. Finally, Berge notes that “skeptics” of the abstract objectivist position tend to share a common perspective. He writes: Common to the skepticist view is the radical critique of the abstract objectivist opposition between the system of signification and the utterances derived from the system. 200 5. Developing an Alternative The skepticists challenge this opposition in three different and not necessarily compatible ways. In all three, communication plays a more important role in research and reflection on language than in the abstract objectivist tradition. Berge 1994 :616 Berge describes the three ways in which skeptics oppose abstract objectivism as: 1. Language as communicative behavior 2. Communication as determining language 3. Communication and language as complementary phenomena 1994 :616–618

5.2.3. The problem of meaning