Code model presuppositions The Code Model Decoded

3. The Code Model Decoded 81

3.4. Code model presuppositions

The definition of communication provided in David Crystal’s book A Dictionary of Linguistics Phonetics was quoted previously as an example of an appeal to the code model. John Lyons’ definition of communication, similarly quoted, illustrated use of the code model in an explanation of semiotics. While Crystal’s and Lyons’ definitions are not necessarily representative of all linguists who employ the model, they do serve as a concise and authoritative means of identifying code model concepts. Crystal writes: communication n. A fundamental notion in the study of behavior, which acts as a frame of reference for LINGUISTIC and PHONETIC studies. Communication refers to the trans- mission of INFORMATION a ‘message’ between a source and receiver using a signalling system: in linguistic contexts, source and receiver are interpreted in human terms, the system involved is a language, and the notion of response to or acknowledgement of the message becomes of crucial importance. In theory, communication is said to have taken place if the information received is the same as that sent. Crystal 2003 :85 Lyons writes: There are certain concepts relevant to the investigation of all communication-systems, human and non-human, natural and artificial. A signal is transmitted from a sender to a receiver or group of receivers along a channel of communication. The signal will have a particular form and will convey a particular meaning or message. The connection between the form of the signal and its meaning is established by what in a rather general sense of the term is commonly referred to in semiotics as the code: the message is encoded by the sender and decoded by the receiver. Looked at from this point of view, natural languages are codes, and they may be compared with other codes in all sorts of ways …. The problem lies in deciding what prop- erties of the codes, or of the communication-systems in which they operate, are significant for the purpose of comparison and what properties are either insignificant or of less importance. Lyons 1981 :17–18 While these definitions do not overlap in every detail, they nevertheless stand as classic appeals to the code model. Several presuppositions concerning communication are embodied in these and other appeals to the code model quoted in this study. Of course, it is impossible to actually see a linguist’s presuppositions. A linguist may write about his presuppositions in literature he authors, which may be useful, but that is not the only means of “observing” presuppositions, nor is it necessarily the most accurate. As suggested in section 2.3 , it can be more productive to observe the meta- phorisms and expressions employed. While these metaphorisms and expressions are in themselves simply statements, they nevertheless embody presuppositions. When such statements are shared and supported by a community, their collective effect identifies axioms held by that community. With code-model based statements, the collective effect allows one to identify these as metatheoretical conceptual axioms, that is, statements defining or evoking metatheoretical concepts which are generally accepted as true by the community of linguists employing them. While not all-inclusive, the following list of such axioms reflects basic code model presuppositions demonstrated in linguistic literature: 82 3. The Code Model Decoded • Natural languages are codes defining the correspondence between sound and meaning. • Languages i.e., codes are systematic, distinctive, and have an existence independent of any given speaker or hearer. • Speaker and hearer must share a code in order for successful communication to proceed. • The text conveys meaning. 45 • The speakerauthor of the text encoded a message when he produced the text. • Those receiving the text decode the message when they hearread the text. • Communication is successful when the message received is the same as that sent. • Communication may be inhibited by noise. • The speaker and hearer are connected via the channel of communication. • Communication requires intention by the speaker and response by the hearer. • The linguists’ problem lies primarily in defining the code and secondarily in defining the processes of transmission and reception. 46 In considering this list, one must keep in mind that while the linguistic community is a group, it is a group of individuals. Accordingly, while group behavior is shared, it is expressed individually. While there is no single instance of individual behavior which perfectly represents the normative behavior of the group, the individual expressions do not negate the collective affect. In order to show that the basic list of code model axioms provided here does indeed reflect the metaphors and expressions employed by a group, each axiom is presented again in outline form, respectively followed by selected excerpts from quotations cited elsewhere in this study. While the quoted statements represent variety in expression of detail, they collectively provide strong support for the axioms listed. • Natural languages are codes defining the correspondence between sound and meaning. 1. “Natural languages are codes” Lyons 1981 :17–18. 2. Natural languages “may be compared with other codes in all sorts of ways” Lyons 1981 :17–18. 3. Speakers employ a code in communicating Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 45 For convenience, the assemblage of acoustic signals passed between the communicative partners is referred to as a text. Crystal defines text as “A pre-theoretical term used in LINGUISTICS and PHONETICS to refer to a stretch of language recorded for the purpose of analysis and description. … texts may refer to collections of written or spoken material” 2003 :461. 46 The verb “defining” is used here simply for conciseness and convenience. The sense intended is primarily “to determine the limits or natures of; describe exactly” Neufeldt 1989 :115. 3. The Code Model Decoded 83 4. In human communication, the code is most often a language Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 5. Language is a “complex, multi-level code, rather than a relatively simple matching of sound sequences with lexical meanings” Givón 1989 :81. 6. “The grammar of the language is the system of rules that specifies [the] sound- meaning correspondence” Chomsky and Halle 1968 :3. 7. The grammar of a language “determines an intrinsic connection of sound and meaning for each sentence” Chomsky and Halle 1968 :3. 8. “The connection between the form of the signal and its meaning is established by … the code” Lyons 1981 :17–18. • Languages i.e., codes are systematic, distinctive, and have an existence independent of any given speaker or hearer. 9. Speakers may have access to more than one code Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 10. Codes may be mixed Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 11. Speakers may switch between codes during a single communicative event Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 12. Communication involves use of a signaling system, which in linguistic contexts is a language Crystal 2003 :85. 13. “The signal will have a particular form” Lyons 1981 :17–18. 14. Languages may be said to have an existence independent of any given speaker or hearer Wardhaugh 1986 :2. • Speaker and hearer must share a code in order for successful communication to proceed. 15. Addresser and addressee must share a code in order for communication to be successful Jakobson 1960 :353. 16. “Because the hearer employs the same system of rules to decode that the speaker employs to encode, an instance of successful linguistic communication occurs” Katz 1966 :103–104. 17. The phonetic representation “is decoded into a representation of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey to the hearer’s equivalent system of linguistic rules” Katz 1966 :103–104. 18. “The system or the grammar, to use a well-known technical term is something that each speaker ‘knows’ ….” Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 19. “Communication among people is possible because such knowledge [of the language they speak] is shared with others, although how it is shared—or even how it is acquired—is not well understood” Wardhaugh 1986 :2. 84 3. The Code Model Decoded • The text conveys meaning. 20. “Natural languages are vehicles for communication in which syntactically structured and acoustically realized objects transmit meaningful messages from one speaker to another” Katz 1966 :98. 21. “Communication through the medium of spoken language is concerned with the conveying of concepts by means of vocal noises” Lockwood 1972 :1. 22. The signal “will convey a particular meaning or message” Lyons 1981 :17–18. 23. “Ideas to be transmitted are represented by a code that undergoes transformations as speech events proceed from one level to another” Denes and Pinson 1993 :6 [orig. 1963:6]. • The speakerauthor of the text encodes a message when he produces the text. 24. The speaker’s message is encoded in the form of a phonetic representation of an utterance by means of linguistic rules Katz 1966 :103–104. 25. A speaker may “encode in language, through words and structures, his experience of processes of the external world and of the people and things that participate in them” Halliday 1978 :21. 26. The addresser sends a message to the addressee Jakobson 1960 :353. 27. An encoder may start with the content of his message and work through a linguistic process until it is expressed ultimately with sounds, non-verbal body movements, writing andor other signals Fleming 1990 :25; preliminary edition, quoted with permission. 28. The phonetic and syntactic structure of a linguistically produced acoustic phenomenon “encodes a speaker’s inner, private thoughts or ideas” Katz 1966 :98. • Those receiving the text decode the message when they hearread the text. 29. The phonetic and syntactic structure of a linguistically produced acoustic phenomenon may be decoded to generate an “inner, private experience of the same thoughts or ideas” as were held by the speaker generating the acoustic phenomena Katz 1966 :98. 30. A decoder may start with input from the linguistic expression and work through the process until he is able to decode the content of the message Fleming 1990 :25; preliminary edition, quoted with permission. 31. The message is encoded by the sender and decoded by the receiver Lyons 1981 :17–18. 3. The Code Model Decoded 85 • Communication is successful when the message received is the same as that sent. 32. “The success of the communication is affected by the degree to which the inferred message of the decoder matches the intended message of the encoder” Fleming 1990 :25; preliminary edition, quoted with permission. 33. “In theory, communication is said to have taken place if the information received is the same as that sent” Crystal 2003 :85. • Communication may be inhibited by noise. 34. Noise may inhibit the process of communication Nida 1964 :120–121. 35. “The ideal system is one which encodes just enough redundant information in signals to enable the receiver to recover any information lost as a result of noise” Lyons 1977 :45. • The speaker and hearer are connected via the channel of communication. 36. “There is no way that two nervous systems can be directly linked to each other, but language provides a means of encoding messages that can be transmitted in such a way that two or more systems can for all practical purposes achieve a linkup” Pearson 1977 :4. 37. “A signal is transmitted from a sender to a receiver or group of receivers along a channel of communication” Lyons 1981 :17–18. 38. Addresser and addressee must be connected via a physical channel and psychological connection Jakobson 1960 :353. • Communication requires intention by the speaker and response by the hearer. 39. Discussion of communication may be limited “to events in which a person purposely produces signs which communicate something to receptors” Nida and de Waard 1986 :11. 40. Communication “occurs when one organism the transmitter encodes information into a signal which passes to another organism the receiver which decodes the signal and is capable of responding appropriately” Ellis and Beattie 1986 :3. 41. The receiver’s “response to or acknowledgement of the message becomes of crucial importance” Crystal 2003 :85. • The linguists’ problem lies primarily in defining the code and secondarily in defining the processes of transmission and reception. 42. “The basic question that can be asked about natural languages is: what are the principles for relating acoustic objects to meaningful messages that make a natural language so important and flexible a form of communication” Katz 1966 :98. 86 3. The Code Model Decoded 43. “The goal of the descriptive study of a language is the construction of a grammar” Chomsky and Halle 1968 :3. 44. “The system or the grammar, to use a well-known technical term is something that each speaker ‘knows’, but two very important questions for linguists are just what that ‘knowledge’ is knowledge of and how it may best be characterized” Wardhaugh 1986 :1. 45. The linguists’ “problem lies in deciding what properties of the codes, or of the communication-systems in which they operate, are significant for the purpose of comparison and what properties are either insignificant or of less importance” Lyons 1981 :17–18. Two additional points should be made concerning this list of axioms and the quota- tions cited. The first is in regard to Shannon’s information theory. The second is in regard to literature which depends upon code model presuppositions, but which does not explic- itly appeal to the model. As was addressed in section 3.4 , there is a place within linguistics where information theory can be correctly applied; that is in the context of phonetics and its relationship to phonology. For example, Hockett writes: The Speech Transmitter converts the discrete flow of phonemes which comes to it into a continuous speech signal —a continuous train of sound waves. The code by which the Speech Transmitter performs this transduction is the phonetic system of the language. Hockett 1955 :5 Were his account more specific, Hockett would have additionally identified the coordinated movement of articulatory organs and the responsive movement of acoustic organs, which respectively produce and intercept sound wave signals. In such an account, the inventory of phonemes serve as the message alphabet, the particular assemblage of phonemes serve as primary message, the phonetic production rules stand in the position of code, and the articulated movements of the vocal organs are the signal alphabet, which are then directly related to the sound wave signal. Hockett writes: The phonetic system is the code according to which the Speech Transmitter converts its input a flow of phonologic units into sound waves; the same code governs the inverse operation of the Speech Receiver. Hockett 1955 :15 Note, however, that from the perspective of the transmission process, it is irrelevant how the message may be used in a semantic context. The message must be assembled from the set of possible messages, but remember that in this context the set of possible messages is the set of phonemes together with tones, pauses, and intonation. Through the code, this set of possibilities is related to the signal alphabet i.e., the range of artic- ulatory movements possible. The syntactic arrangements of phonological “words” may be of great importance to the human assembling the sequence of phonemes which will be supplied to the transmission device, but provided the assemblage of phonemes fits the requirements of the message alphabet, the syntactic arrangement of the semantic morphemes and semantic “words” is irrelevant to the process of transmission and 3. The Code Model Decoded 87 reception. 47 The transmission device is not concerned with whether or not an adjective and noun are properly ordered for a “grammatical” sentence. It is concerned only with the phonological components from which the string is assembled. 48 This issue of the syntactic arrangement of phonological words is where Hockett eventually got his theory into trouble. Note that this was where he left the original domain of information theory and began to move into code model territory. Following Weaver’s suggestions Weaver 1949b , Hockett was attempting to extend the application of information theory from the domain of sound transmission and reception to the domains of grammar and semantic interpretation. Noting Shannon’s use of Markov processing in decoding an electronic signal, and following Weaver’s suggestion that Markov processing could be “particularly promising for semantic studies” Weaver 1949b :117, Hockett suggested that a similar process was employed in the “decoding” of a syntactic string of phonological words into their grammatical components. Crudely summarized, Markov processing is a process of elimination wherein successive decisions and possibilities are weighted according to respectively successive states. Hockett wrongly anticipated that such a process would provide a mathematical account of natural language grammar. His proposals regarding finite state grammar were based upon such assumptions. As Bothamley concisely reviews the history, “A finite state grammar models a sentence as a succession of ‘states’ progressing left-to-right. Each word chosen determines what can follow it. Chomsky proved that such a grammar could generate an infinite number of sentences, but could not cope with other aspects of language such as discontinuous structure” 1993 :204; see Chomsky 1957 , Hockett 1955 . Although information theory was abandoned as an account of grammar, it continues to prove useful in regard to phonetics. While use of the code model is not simply an appeal to information theory, some uses of the code model include an embedded appeal to information theory. Such embedded appeals are often confused by misapplied terminology, making them difficult to identify and evaluate. Nevertheless, that evaluation is important to an accurate understanding of code model concepts. When the embedded appeal is appropriately applied, it should be distinguished from the code model material which surrounds it. Consider, for example, the following quotation from Denes and Pinson, quoted 47 What, then, about tongue twisters? The fact that the human articulatory device is capable of pronouncing tongue twisters correctly when they are articulated slowly demonstrates that the problem with fast speech tongue twisters is not with the message alphabet, but with: 1 the coordinated movement of articulatory organs, and sometimes with 2 the brain supplying the instructions to the transmission device. A similar problem arises in fast typing, partic- ularly on an older model manual typewriter. Sometimes mis-typing occurs when the keys lock up because the machine is not designed to handle the typist’s speed. Other times mis-typing occurs when the typist’s fingers supply the wrong “word” or strike keys out of turn. 48 This is why a first-year-linguistics student can wrap his tongue around phonetics practice phrases, such as [aklokšt h p h tš h k h ], without having any true concern for how the word is used by native speakers. This is also how a phonetics teaching assistant can evaluate whether or not the student produced [aklokšt h p h tš h k h ] correctly during a quiz session. The teaching assistant has no more concern for how the word may be used by native speakers than did the student. The word [aklokšt h p h tš h k h ] is from the Chinook language spoken by an indigenous group in Canada. The word is said to mean “she carries it up from the beach” Floyd 1981 :76. 88 3. The Code Model Decoded previously in section 2.4 and cited above. In this quotation, the appeal to information theory is marked by underscoring for emphasis: We may … think of the speech chain as a communication system in which ideas to be transmitted are represented by a code that undergoes transformations as speech events proceed from one level to another. We can draw an analogy here between speech and Morse code. In Morse code, certain patterns of dots and dashes stand for different letters of the alphabet; the dots and dashes are a code for the letters. This code can also be transformed from one form to another. For example, a series of dots and dashes on a piece of paper can be converted into an acoustic sequence, like ‘beep-bip-bip-beep’. In the same way, the words of our language are a code for concepts and material objects. The word “dog” is the code for a four-legged animal that wags its tail, just as “dash-dash-dash” is Morse code for the letter “O.” … During speech transmission, the speaker’s linguistic code of words and sentences is transformed into physiological and physical codes—in other words, into corresponding sets of muscle movements and air vibrations—being reconverted into linguistic code at the listener’s end. This is analogous to translating the written ‘dash-dash-dash’ of Morse code into the sounds, ‘beep-beep-beep’. Denes and Pinson 1993 :6 [orig. 1963:6]; underscore added In their analogy between speech transmission and Morse code, Denes and Pinson’s appeal to information theory is not problematic, even though they do misuse the term code. Remember that in information theory, the code is not transformed. Rather, the code is the algorithm which defines the relationship between the message alphabet and the signal alphabet see section 3.2.3.1.4 . Denes and Pinson’s appropriate application of information theory in regard to phonetics does not, however, keep them from employing the code model in the remainder of the quotation. But since the quotation is drawn from a text on acoustic phonetics and related engineering concerns, their subsequent theorization has not been greatly hindered by their code model foundation. The applications to which they attend rely on the embedded information theory more so than on the code model material. Nevertheless, in Denes and Pinson’s view, the material here attributed to the code model and that reserved by information theory are integrally combined. The components are simply characterized via a speech chain analogy. Specifically, Denes and Pinson state that “ideas to be transmitted are represented by a code that undergoes transformations as speech events proceed from one level to another” 1993 :6. As Harris says of Saussure’s model, their model “represents communication as involving passage through a succession of phases arranged in linear progression along a track or pathway. In this succession there are no gaps” 1987 :213–214. The result is, indeed, a code model account of communi- cation. The chain analogy simply facilitates identification of the embedded information theoretic account of phonetic transmission. See figure 3.7 . 3. The Code Model Decoded 89 Figure 3.7. Diagram of a speech chain version of the code model, with an information theoretic account of phonetic transmission and reception embedded in the center “links” Rather than employing a speech chain analogy, many other linguists “lump” the grammatical, phonological, and phonetic “encoding” processes. These linguists also appeal to the information theoretic constituent in the code model, but they do not necessarily delimit the speech transmission components in the process of communication. Accordingly, they mix appropriate uses of information theory with inappropriate uses, creating confusion in the process. See figure 3.8 . Figure 3.8. Diagram of a typical version of the code model, with information theoretic components conceptually tangled with other components C=concept, S=sound pattern; see figure 3.4 An example of this type of embedding is illustrated in a quotation from Katz 1966 , also quoted and cited above. Katz’s general appeal does not differentiate the “encoding” of the meaning component of the communication process from the phonetic transmission component; they both fall within the notion of encoding and, respectively, decoding. Accordingly, the components of Katz’s account which could be delimited for handling by the information theory are conceptually tangled with other components. Recall Katz’s appeal to the “acoustic phenomenon whose phonetic and syntactic structure encodes a 90 3. The Code Model Decoded speaker’s inner, private thoughts or ideas” Katz 1966 :98. Despite the fact that Katz confuses information theoretic terms and substitutes code model usage in their place, the information theoretic domain can be identified. It is marked here with underscoring: Natural languages are vehicles for communication in which syntactically structured and acoustically realized objects transmit meaningful messages from one speaker to another. … The basic question that can be asked about natural languages is: what are the principles for relating acoustic objects to meaningful messages that make a natural language so important and flexible a form of communication. Roughly, linguistic communication consists in the production of some external, publicly observable, acoustic phenomenon whose phonetic and syntactic structure encodes a speaker’s inner, private thoughts or ideas and the decoding of the phonetic and syntactic structure exhibited in such a physical phenomenon by other speakers in the form of an inner, private experience of the same thoughts or ideas. Katz 1966 :98; underscore added [The speaker’s] message is encoded in the form of a phonetic representation of an utterance by means of the system of linguistic rules with which the speaker is equipped. This encoding then becomes a signal to the speaker’s articulatory organs, and he vocalizes an utterance of the proper phonetic shape. This is, in turn, picked up by the hearer’s auditory organs. The speech sounds that stimulate these organs are then converted into a neural signal from which a phonetic representation equivalent to the one into which the speaker encoded his message is obtained. This representation is decoded into a representation of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey by the hearer’s equivalent system of linguistic rules. Hence, because the hearer employs the same system of rules to decode that the speaker employs to encode, an instance of successful linguistic communication occurs. Katz 1966 :103–104; underscore added In addition to these variations of the model as demonstrated in Denes and Pinson 1993 and Katz 1966 , both of which evoke the notion of codes and encoding for the various processes involved, Harris 1987 :206 notes an additional permutation: “Some versions e.g., Moulton 1970 :23 restrict the terms ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ to those parts of the circuit which correspond to Saussure’s ‘psychological’ sections. Thus the transmission from A’s brain to A’s speech organs, for example, would not count as part of the ‘encoding’ process.” Any account of communication which goes beyond the intended scope of information theory should be interpreted as an integration of constituent models, and not simply as an appeal to Shannon’s information theory. 49 The second point to consider in regard to code model presuppositions is that, while the outlined quotations above reference particular appeals to the code model, many other works of linguistic literature depend upon these same presuppositions, even though they may not make a concise appeal which can be conveniently quoted. As Crystal states, “Communication is a fundamental notion in the study of behavior, which acts as a frame of reference for linguistic and phonetic studies” 2003 :85. Considering it unnecessary to define presuppositions regarding communication, such works typically take the final 49 To the extent that Weaver incorporated conduit metaphorisms into his discussion of information Weaver 1949a , 1949b , this caveat should also be applied to Weaver’s account of communication. 3. The Code Model Decoded 91 code model axiom as their starting point, that is: The linguists’ problem lies primarily in defining the code and secondarily in defining the processes of transmission and reception. 92 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 4.1. A paradigm for linguistics? In view of chapter 3 , which discusses the origin of the code model and its adoption by linguists, and which identifies code model axioms common among linguists, one may be left with the following question: If the code model has had a significant role in the dis- cipline of linguistics, how is it that this role has been so scarcely addressed in the literature? Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory supplies grounds for an answer to this question. Simply put, he suggests a truism: scientists rarely feel the need to discuss or debate the presuppositions that they share. Once the reception of a common paradigm has freed the scientific community from the need constantly to re-examine its first principles, the members of that community can concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most esoteric of the phenomena that concern it. Kuhn 1996 :163–164 In other words, a group of scientists may take their own scientific principles for granted, so that they assume those principles are held in common, even if not addressed. Expressions of such principles may at one point look like laws of nature, while at another they serve to define nature itself. Kuhn states, “They function in part as laws but also in part as definitions of some of the symbols they deploy. Furthermore, the balance between their inseparable legislative and definitional force shifts over time” Kuhn 1996 :183. When the legislative role of principles shifts to a definitional role, the first principles become presuppositions. 50 Furthermore, Kuhn notes that the relative lack of concern and attention regarding first principles and the rules so defined continues only through a certain phase in the life cycle of a discipline. He writes: Normal science can proceed without rules only so long as the relevant scientific community accepts without question the particular problem-solutions already achieved. Rules should therefore become important and the characteristic unconcern about them vanish whenever paradigms or models are felt to be insecure. That is, moreover, exactly what does occur. Kuhn 1970 :47; italics added Kuhn’s paradigm theory proves to be a useful tool in the analysis of the code model and its significance within the discipline of linguistics. John Horgan provides a concise, non-technical summary of Kuhn’s thesis: The keystone of his model was the concept of a paradigm. Paradigm, pre-Kuhn, referred merely to an example that serves an educational purpose; amo, amas, amat, for instance, is a paradigm for teaching conjugations in Latin. Kuhn used the term to refer to a collection of procedures or ideas that instruct scientists, implicitly, what to believe and how to work. Most scientists never question the paradigm. They solve puzzles, problems whose solutions reinforce and extend the scope of the paradigm rather than challenge it. Kuhn called this “mopping up,” or “normal science.” There are always anomalies, phenomena that the 50 While principles are derivative, presuppositions are a priori.