4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 159
Saussurean paradigm, and not simply with the most recent cynosure of generative linguistics. Because it depends upon the notion of a shared code, the code model cannot
adequately account for variation in a speech community. Because it depends upon the notion of a fixed code, it cannot adequately account for variation in individual usage.
And since it describes communication as simple encoding and decoding events, it does not recognize the relevance of context at all. Of course, each of these issues is of major
concern to sociolinguists.
The code model of communication has the sociolinguist start “with one hand tied behind his back.” To begin with, he is not equipped with an adequate model upon which
to construct his inquiry, and yet the majority of traditional linguistics is defined around that model. As a result, when he explores areas outside the predictions and explanations
afforded by that model, he finds himself having to justify his inquiry and discoveries to the larger community.
Consider, for example, the following quotation from Wardhaugh 1986
.
The competence-performance distinction just mentioned is one that holds intriguing pos- sibilities for work in linguistics, but it is one that has also proved to be most troublesome,
particularly when much of the variety that is so interesting within language is labeled ‘perfor- mance’ and then brushed to one side by those who consider ‘competence’ to be the only valid
concern of linguists. The language we use in everyday living is remarkably varied. In fact, to many investigators it appears that it is that very variety which throws up serious obstacles to
all attempts to demonstrate that each language is at its core, as it were, a homogeneous entity, and that it is possible to write a complete grammar for a language which makes use of
categorical rules,
i.e., rules which specify exactly what is—and therefore what is not— possible in the language. Everywhere we turn we seem to find at least a new wrinkle or a small
inconsistency with regard to any rule one wishes to propose; on too many occasions it is not just a wrinkle or inconsistency but actually a glaring counter-example. When we look closely
at any language, we will discover time and time again that there is considerable internal variation, and that speakers make constant use of the many different possibilities offered to
them. No one speaks the same way all the time, and people constantly exploit the nuances of the languages they speak for a wide variety of purposes. The consequence is a kind of
paradox: while many linguists would like to view language as a homogeneous entity and each speaker of that language as controlling only a single style, so that they can make the strongest
possible theoretical generalizations, in actual fact that language will be seen to exhibit considerable internal variation, and single-style speakers will not be found or, if found, will
appear to be extremely ‘abnormal’ in that respect, if in no other.
Wardhaugh 1986 :5
This quotation comes only four pages after Wardhaugh’s assertion that people employ a code in communicating, and that this code is something we may call a language
1986 :1. Note, as well, that Wardhaugh has directed his argument against generative
linguistics, rather than identifying the core struggle as being with anomalies of the code model itself. Such anomalies will be addressed in some detail in chapter
5 .
4.4.1.4. Functional-Typologists
Functional-typological linguistics is represented here through the work of Talmy Givón. Being a functionalist, Givón disagrees with formalists in regard to the origins and
160 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
structure of the code. Nevertheless, he continues the Saussurean tradition in treating language as a code.
Having provided a rather critical review of transformational-generative tenets 1984
:6–9, Givón positions himself in contrast to that tradition. He describes his approach to syntax as having “developed gradually as a rejection of all the tenets of the
transformation-generative tradition,” 1984
:9; see 6–9. He then introduces his own approach as follows:
It feeds on the functionalism inherent in Jespersen, Bolinger and the Prague School. It draws from Greenberg’s typological approach to the study of structural and functional universals. It
embraces a more Piagetian mentalism which views language and communication as part and parcel of cognition. It is inherently developmentalist in recognizing the determinative role of
language acquisition, language change and language evolution in shaping extant language, culture and cognition. It is pragmatically-based and rejects formalism for formalism’s sake,
recognizing instead the open-ended, contingent and less-than-categorical nature of language, behavior and cognition. It strives to establish an empirically-motivated balance between the
relative roles of input and innards—or percepts and concepts—in language acquisition and communicative behavior, stressing pragmatic, constructivist interaction between environment
and mind. It views language in its biological-social-cultural context, refusing to artificially adjudicate between these three function-laden spheres. Finally, it is a determinedly empirical
approach, rejecting Chomsky’s “competence” as anything except a useful preliminarymethod- ological heuristic in approaching a complex data-base. It views data of language use, variation,
development, behavior, discourse processing and experimental cognitive psychology as part and parcel of one empirical complex. Within this complex, the study of sentencesstructures in
isolation certainly plays an important and methodologically prior role, but by no means a prime role, in understanding the vast network of phenomena called human language.
Givón 1984
:9–10
To the extent that Givón is able to achieve these goals, his approach does attempt to integrate various elements of language and language use which have heretofore been iso-
lated. Furthermore, he does attempt to account for areas which are anomalous for code model linguistics, areas such as variation, context, and discourse processing. This does
not mean, however, that he has abandoned the code model or code model axioms. It is in fact clear that he has not. For example, he writes:
Syntax is the study of a unique and complex coding system. ‘Coding’ is a binary expres- sion designating two entities holding a peculiar semiotic relation, at least as far as language is
concerned: a The coded entity: Meaning, message, function
b The coding entity: Sign, code, structure Givón 1984
:29
As is the case with many sociolinguists see the preceding section Givón does not seem to realize the extent to which his struggle is against the code model of commu-
nication and its anomalies, rather than simply against the generative tradition. He does view language as a coding system and makes multiple appeals in that regard. In his view,
the problem is not with the notion of coding so much as it is with an overly simplistic coding system. As quoted previously from his Mind, Code, and Context: Essays in
Pragmatics,
Givón 1989
suggests that certain limitations of formal linguistics can be overcome by positing a more elaborate notion of code:
4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 161
In the discussion thus far I have deliberately followed a tradition that must now be transcended. That tradition, in discussing language as semeiotics ‘coding system’, has been
for a long time beclouded by almost total disregard for some rather fundamental facts concerning human language. Chief among those is the fact that language is a complex, multi-
level code, rather than a relatively simple matching of sound sequences with lexical meanings.
Givón 1989 :81
In Givón’s view it is necessary that the linguist account for coding in at least three areas. He writes:
If, for the moment, one sets aside the admittedly important socio-cultural, psycho-emotive and aesthetic functions of language, it is possible to recognize three major functional realms
which receive systematic and distinct coding in human language: a Lexical semantics
b Propositional semantics c Discourse pragmatics
Givón 1984 :30
Note, however, that he has also recognized important functions of language which do not fit within this proposed coding scheme.
It would seem at first glance that Givón demonstrates some awareness of information theoretic concerns. His discussion of the coding of discourse pragmatics is titled “Infor-
mation-theoretic preliminaries to discourse pragmatics” Givón 1984
:239. As is common among linguists, however, he does not differentiate information theory from the code
model. In that section on discourse pragmatics he makes the following statements:
The sentence—or proposition—is the basic unit of information processing in human language. Smaller units, such as words, may carry meanings which are represented in the lexicon. They
do not, however, carry information ‘message’ per se. Although they can stand for whole propositions and thus carry information, as in [the following example]:
[e.g.] a. Question:
Who did it? b
. Answer:
The butler. Further, information structure in human language most commonly involves units larger
than the single proposition. In this sense human communication is multi-propositional. Another name used to refer to it is discourse, which whenever appropriate we can then break
down into smaller hierarchic sub-units story, chapter, section, paragraph, etc.. Givón
1984 :239
Givón continues in the Saussurean tradition in maintaining the Saussurean notion of language as a shared coding system. Functional-typological grammar differs from its
siblings in the Saussurean paradigm via its focus of attention and in its rules for engaging the language and communication problem. While it attempts to engage certain anomalies
of the paradigm, it does not seem that Givón has identified those anomalies as being a function of the paradigm and the model of communication the code model that the
paradigm employs.
162 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon?
4.4.1.5. Inferentialists
