The mega-paradigm A paradigm for linguistics?

4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? 103 problems, Kuhn is careful to identify his position as distinct from a traditional position held by philosophers of science, that “scientific knowledge is embedded in theory and rules; problems are [simply] supplied to gain facility in their application” 1996 :187. Kuhn argues that such “localization of the cognitive content of science is wrong” 1996 :187. In contrast to the traditional position, he describes the relationship of theory and problems as follows: After the student has done many problems, he may gain only added facility by solving more. But at the start and for some time after, doing problems is learning consequential things about nature. In the absence of such exemplars, the laws and theories he has previously learned would have little empirical content. Kuhn 1996 :187–188 Beginning with elementary problems and then moving into increasingly complex ones, the student learns to pick out from among presumably infinite possibilities the particular categories that the theory uses and thereby identifies as relevant. Kuhn suggests that scientists generally “solve puzzles by modeling them on previous puzzle-solutions, often with only minimal recourse to symbolic generalizations” 1996 :189–190. In so doing, they learn “from problems to see situations as like each other, as subjects for the application of the same scientific law or law-sketch” 1996 :190. That sort of learning is not acquired by exclusively verbal means. Rather it comes as one is given words together with concrete examples of how they function in use; nature and words are learned together. … what results from this process is “tacit knowledge” which is learned by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for doing it. Kuhn 1996 :191 Kuhn emphasizes the perspective-building role of problem working, stating: The resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like each other … is, I think, the main thing a student acquires by doing exemplary problems, whether with a pencil and paper or in a well-designed laboratory. After he has completed a certain number, which may vary widely from one individual to the next, he views the situations that confront him as a scientist in the same gestalt as other members of his specialist’s group. For him they are no longer the same situation he had encountered when his training began. He has meanwhile assimilated a time- tested and group-licensed way of seeing. Kuhn 1996 :189

4.1.6. The mega-paradigm

Many of Kuhn’s critics have assumed that by ‘paradigm’ Kuhn intended the idea of a Grand Unified Theory. Considering the polysemy involved in his writings, their per- spective regarding the relationship between paradigms and theories is understandable. However, the relative attention some critics give to theories of a grand and unified nature is unfortunate. In assuming he is only addressing mega-theories, they have failed to recognize Kuhn’s interest in change at both macro and micro levels. Kuhn considers change at these extremes to differ only in degree, with little or no difference in the kind of processes involved. In the 1970 Postscript, he writes: Partly because of the examples I have chosen and partly because of my vagueness about the nature and size of the relevant communities, a few readers of this book [ 1962 edition] have concluded that my concern is primarily or exclusively with major revolutions such as those 104 4. Code Model Linguistics: Patch or Abandon? associated with Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, or Einstein. A clearer delineation of community structure should, however, help to enforce the rather different impression I have tried to create. A revolution for me is a special sort of change involving a certain sort of reconstruction of group commitments. But it need not be a large change, nor need it seem revolutionary to those outside a single community, consisting perhaps of fewer than twenty-five people. It is just because this type of change, little recognized or discussed in the literature of the philosophy of science, occurs so regularly on this smaller scale that revolutionary, as against cumulative, change so badly needs to be understood. Kuhn 1996 :180–181; italics added Kuhn’s comments regarding “revolutionary, as against cumulative change” are especially important to note here, for his distinction between the two types of change contributes significantly to his position on incommensurability as will be discussed in section 4.1.8 . Kuhn is not suggesting that all change within science is of a revolutionary nature. He states: “Normal research, which is cumulative, owes its success to the ability of scientists regularly to select problems that can be solved with conceptual and instru- mental techniques close to those already in existence” 1996 :96; italics in original. Such cumulative change may retain commensurability. In contrast, revolutionary change contributes to incommensurability Kenneth A. McElhanon 1998, personal communication.

4.1.7. Disciplinary maturation