10 2. Model as Metaphor
To provide a succinct paraphrase, behavior may reflect the subliminal pressure of metaphor.
This sense of ‘being embodied’ is somewhat distinct from the more traditional sense of the word. In that traditional sense one may speak of a metaphor as the embod-
iment of underlying presuppositions, whereby a metaphor has provided a form or a conventionalized means of expression for those presuppositions, facilitating their incor-
poration as a unified whole. Both senses of the term may be said to apply in the present discussion.
2.2. Metaphor in methodology
Analysts typically consider a model to be useful if several conditions are met. These include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:
1. The analysts share or are induced to share the perspectives and assumptions the model embodies.
2. If, during their own observation, they encounter the same phenomena experienced by other analysts advocating the model.
3. If they are satisfied with how the model can be used to explain their own analyses.
Analysts argue about those assumptions they do not share, those stimuli that they do not jointly experience, and the effectiveness of their respective models in serving their
purposes.
These three statements seem reasonable and unproblematic, but they remain incomplete. Investigations into the role of metaphor raise a fourth condition and concern.
Is the scientist ever capable of experiencing raw stimuli, or may he only experience perception, that is to say, “processed stimuli?”
9
This question will be addressed more fully in chapter
4 , but for now suffice it to say that metaphor may have a constraining
effect on the analyst’s conception of reality see Johnson 1987
; Kuhn 1996
:112, 191–
198; Lakoff 1987
; Lakoff and Johnson 1980
. One model can be claimed to have more value than does another. The question
remains, of course, as to how one will measure such value. The value ascribed is perspective specific, and thereby related to some model, including, perhaps, the one
being evaluated. One might propose an alternative to a traditional model, but an audience of traditionalists may overlook any opportunities the new model affords simply because
they have been trained to see things through the “lens” of the traditional perspective. In
9
As the briefest of examples, consider the matter of proof reading one’s own writing. Invariably, the reader finds it difficult to “catch” all errors, especially those of a typographical nature. But a second reader can often identify such
errors quickly. It would be foolish to suggest that the two readers experienced differing stimuli, but they obviously do experience different perceptions. The expectations born by the writer clearly affect his perceptions. While the
second reader may be similarly affected by expectations, those expectations may not directly overlap with those of the author. Accordingly, he is not predisposed to the same perceptions as the author.
2. Model as Metaphor 11
other words, the community may have certain “trained incapacities.”
10
As will be discussed in chapter
4 , such an evaluation is not a simple matter. Each community
defines its own set of problems, and therefore its own criteria for productivity and for evaluating that productivity see
Kuhn 1996 :94.
The question of productivity in models is related to their quality of reduction. Models involve generalizations, and generalizations are necessarily reductive. Lakoff and
Johnson point out that metaphorical structuring is always partial, not total. “If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of it”
Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :12–13. Indeed, metaphors may even be in conflict with one
another, even though they are used to speak of the same phenomenon Lakoff 1987
:305; Lakoff and Johnson
1999. Even a brief study of metaphor illustrates that contrasting metaphors will highlight different aspects of the phenomena to which they are applied.
Accordingly, individual metaphors will support different reductive strategies for the problems to which they are applied. This limitation is not necessarily problematic, but it
quickly becomes so in the context of reification. Lakoff provides a convenient example:
As Gentner and Gentner 1982
observe, there are two prevalent ways of metaphorically understanding electricity: as a fluid and as a crowd made up of individual electrons. Both
conceptualizations are needed. Those who understand electricity only as a fluid tend to make systematic errors in certain kinds of problems—those where the crowd metaphor works better.
Students who understand electricity only as a crowd of electrons tend to make mistakes on a different set of problems—those where the fluid metaphor works better. Understanding
electricity, at a certain level of sophistication, requires metaphors—more than one. Knowing how to solve problems in electrical circuitry involves knowing which metaphor to use in
which situation.
Lakoff 1987 :305
As a function of its reductive quality, Lakoff and Johnson note that metaphor may have a constraining effect on comprehension and experience, and subsequently behavior:
The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle will necessarily hide
other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept e.g., the battling aspects of arguing, a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other
aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor. For example, in the midst of a heated argument, when we are intent on attacking our opponent’s position and defending our
own, we may lose sight of the cooperative aspects of arguing. Someone who is arguing with you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable commodity, in an effort at mutual
understanding. But when we are preoccupied with the battle aspects, we often lose sight of the cooperative aspects.
Lakoff and Johnson 1980 :10
Building upon the general argument offered by Lakoff and Johnson, Ronald Langacker also comments upon the significance of metaphor in shaping linguists’
expectations:
10
The phrase “trained incapacities” has been attributed to both Veblen see Burke 1984
:91 and Paul Feyerabend Victor Vitanza 1995, personal communication, as well as to Stephen Rosen, a theoretical physicist, “head of a
project to study why some scientists’ careers founder” Goleman 1998
:52. Goleman provides no bibliographic entry for Rosen.
12 2. Model as Metaphor
What one finds in language depends in large measure on what one expects to find. Among the factors that shape these expectations is metaphor, whose pervasiveness and formative
influence in our mental life have been emphasized in a number of recent studies Lakoff and
Johnson 1980 ;
Lakoff 1987 ;
Turner 1987 ;
Lakoff and Turner 1989 . Metaphor plays an
important role in virtually all phases of scientific inquiry, and there is perhaps no field where this is more apparent than in linguistics. Of course, the indisputable power of metaphor does
not come without certain dangers. In particular, one has no guarantee that a seemingly apt metaphor will actually prove appropriate and helpful when pushed beyond the limited
observations that initially inspired it. An investigator who wishes not to be misled must make himself aware of the metaphors he uses and remain alert to both their limitations and the
continuous pressure they subtly exert.
Langacker 1991 :507
2.3. Approaching metatheory via metaphor
