is “substractibility problem”, and consequently the resource is prone to over exploitation or destruction Berkes 2006. This situation is called “tragedy of the
commons” by Hardin 1968. However, the term “commons” used by Hardin is meanwhile widely acknowledged to describe a “tragedy of open access” Stillman
1975 in Berkes 1985; Birner and Wittmer 2003. A growing analysis on commons was evolved after this influential inquiry see Berkes 1985; Ostrom 1990; Feeny
et al. 1990. The use of common-pool resource may also present negative externalities
to those who do not benefit from such use. The benefits obtained by the appropriators may not be fitting to the social cost. Coral mining for house building
can be detrimental for coral reef’s functional use as coastal protection which may result in coastal erosion. Destruction of coral reef due to illegal fishing practices
can contribute to weakening spawning aggregation for various reef fish and biota. These two problems are identified as the “commons dilemma” Ostrom 1990. It
reflects a “social dilemma” that occurs when the short-term self-interest of individuals result in sub-optimal benefits at the aggregate of social level Rudd
2001. Olson 1965 has investigated this issue that is widely known as “the Logic of collective action”.
2.3 Institutions Governing Common-Pool Resources
The problems associated with common-pool resources can be alleviated if it is governed in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of resource use
over time. An institution to govern common-pool resource has to deal with the threats of overuse and of free riding. Common-pool resource can be governed by
users or external authorities. No matter who governs a particular common-pool resource, it is critical to regulate at least two broad aspects, namely 1 access to
the resources, in order to lift free riding problem, and 2 rules governing resource use, in an attempt to elevate overuse problem and destructive utilization Ostrom
1990; Feeny et al. 1990; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003. The following analytical framework is useful in investigating factors affecting
common-pool resource use Figure 6. One of the factors is the institutions governing resource use Dolšak and Ostrom 2003. This framework shows that in
solving social dilemmas and conserving ecosystem goods and services call for individuals comply with formal or informal rules, fulfilling short-run costs for long-
run societal gain Rudd 2001. Here institutions are defined as systems of formal
management and informal social norms North 1990; Ostrom 1990. Institutions will shape incentives and actions taken by individuals.
Figure 6 Factors affecting common-pool resource use.
Source: Dolšak and Ostrom 2003
Property Rights
The study on institution and resource management emphasizes the importance of property rights. Property right offers incentives for the right holders
to access, withdraw, as well as manage the resources. Property is “a claim to a benefit or income stream”, whereas a property right is “a claim to a benefit that
some higher body – usually the state – will agree to protect through assignment of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream”
Bromley 1992. Generally, it is understood that at least there are four categories of property
rights within which common-pool resources are held, namely open access, private property, communal property, and state property or state governance
Feeny et al. 1990. Moreover, another way of explaining property rights is the bundle of rights Schlager and Ostrom 1992. Property-rights regimes in a given
area can be distinguished among diverse bundle of rights that may be held by the users of a resource system. The bundle of rights includes use rights i.e., access
and withdrawal rights, rights to exclude others, rights to manage, and the right to sell. Moreover, it defines a property-rights schema ranging from authorized user,
claimant, proprietor, and owner Table 2. Different bundles of property rights affect the incentives individuals face,
the types of actions they take, and the outcomes they achieve. Authorized users possess no authority to devise their own rules of access and withdrawal.
Because authorized users do not design the rules they are expected to follow,
Resource characteristics
Economic environment
Political environment
Legal environment
Technology Characteristics
of resource users
Institutions governing
resource use Resource
use
they are less likely to agree to the necessity and legitimacy of the rules. Claimants, owners and proprietors have rights of management, thus face
stronger incentives than do authorized users to make current investments in resources, including on governance structures.
Table 2 Four classes of property rights holders in relation to their bundles of
rights
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized
User
Access and withdrawal
X X X X Management X
X X
Exclusion X X Alienation X
Source: Schlager and Ostrom 1992: 252.
Local Institutions and Self-Governance
Organizing collective action and building institution governing common-pool
resource use must resolve a common set of problems. These consist of “coping with free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new
institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules” Ostrom 1990: 28-29. In investigating how to address commons dilemma, the main
objects of attention of scholars are generally on local communities, institutions, resources, and outcomes Agrawal 2001. These studies investigate how some
groups of individuals succeed in breaking out the trap inherent in the commons dilemma and are able to build and endure self-governance ibid; Berkes 1985.
Ostrom 1990 reviews several small-scale commons cases, to formulate eight design principles for successful common-property regimes. These principles
fall into two clusters: one that deals with access, group boundary and resource boundary issues; and the second cluster deals with decision-making for joint use,
including issues of representation, monitoring, sanctions, conflict resolution and legal recognition. These factors are provided internal to a given group, such as
able to communicate, develop trust, and share vision of a common future. In addition, external factor outside them is also noteworthy, such as autonomy to
change institutional structures Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994. In general, common-property theory acknowledges that, “Hardin’s tragedy often results, not
from any inherent failure of common property, but from institutional failure to control access to the resource, and to make and enforce internal decisions for
collective use” Berkes and Folke 1998: 7.
Nevertheless, pure communal property systems and community-based resource management are always embedded in state property systems and
derive their strength from them. The user community is dependent on the enforcement and protection of local rights by higher levels of government. Even
those community groups with well-functioning local management system are dependent on the central government for legal recognition of their rights and their
protection against outsider Berkes and Folke 1998. This corresponds to one of Ostrom’s design principles, namely a nested enterprise or legal recognition that
provides a linkage of local institution with higher institutions. Therefore, the sharing of resource management responsibility and authority between users and
government agencies, or co-management, is increasingly important.
Collaborative Management
Government is unable to manage resources on their own. However, the same is true for communities and resource users Silva 2006: 8. A community-
based approach can only resolve local problems that are restricted to locations where the project had been delivered, whereas the resource system itself is
regional in nature, which is also utilized by resource users beyond local level. This touches the issue of multi-scale resources that necessitates multi-scale
management. Most of resource management systems have some cross-level linkages and drivers at different levels, especially in a globalized world Berkes
2006. In responding the limitations of state-led and community-based
approaches, a collaborative management co-management approach is sought Dahuri et al. 2001; Satria 2002; Bengen 2004. Co-management is defined as
the sharing of responsibility and authority between the government and the community of resource users to manage natural resources Pomeroy and
Williams 1994; Sen and Nielsen 1996. Co-management institutions are rooted as cross-scale institutions, in order to resolve cross-level issues that are
pervasive in commons management Berkes 2006. A co-management arrangement varies according to the degrees of power-
sharing and integration of local and government systems Figure 7. Co- management involves the recognition of traditional or informal local-level
management systems. A certain degree of community-based resource management is a central element of co-management Pomeroy and Berkes
1996: 467; Birner and Wittmer 2004.
Within a co-management spectrum, there exists a community-based co- management, where resource users become directly and formally involved in the
management decision-making process through the delegation of regulatory functions to fishermen’s organizations, or to organizations especially designed for
management purposes where resource users retain central collective role of authority Jentoft 2000.
Figure 7 Spectrum of co-management arrangements.
Source: Sen and Nielsen 1996.
In promoting co-management that involves collaboration among multi-level of stakeholders, including exchanges of knowledge and communications, social
capital is a necessary condition, where trust and networks are embedded. By the same token, the collaboration network for co-management provides an arena
where social capital is enhanced Folke et al. 2005; Grafton 2005. The extent, to which social capital is defined in this study, will be elaborated in the preceding
section. Co-management is acknowledged to resolve resource management issues
that characterized in multi-scale systems. The approach underscores the collaboration of stakeholders, among others but not limited to government and
resource users. It is applied to various types of resources. Moreover, for coastal resources that have distinct characteristics, another approach to resolve the
complexity is through Integrated Coastal Management ICM.
Government based management
User group based management Cooperative
Consultative Instructive
Advisory Informative
User group management
Government management
Integrated Coastal Management
Integrated Coastal Management ICM is a societal approach to understand and resolve issues of ecological and social systems situated in the coastal and
marine area. The coastal zone is area of land-sea interface, which contains various habitats and ecosystems which are dynamic in nature, located in marine
and terrestrial environment; and is also characterized by competition for land and sea resources and space by various stakeholders, which often resulting in severe
conflicts and destruction of the functional integrity of the resource system Cicin- Sain and Knecht 1998; Bodungen and Turner 2001. Coastal and marine
resources, including coral reef, are characterized by multi-benefits, which lead to multi-users and multi-interests. This situation calls for ‘integrated’ nature of
decision making to achieve sustainability in social, economic, and ecological aspects.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998 defines integrated coastal management as “a continuous and dynamic process by which decisions are made for the
sustainability use, development, and protection of coastal and marine areas and resources” Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998: 39. The process is designed to
overcome the fragmentation inherent in single-sector management approaches, in the splits in jurisdiction among different levels of government, and in the land-
water interface. The main element of coastal governance is its integration across disciplines, stakeholder groups, and generations Constanza et al. 1998. The
term of integration in the coastal management embraces several dimensions: intersectoral integration, intergovernmental integration, spatial integration,
science-management integration, and international integration Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998.
Responding to multi-scale and uncertainty issues of social and ecological systems SES in the coastal and marine areas, there are at least two important
points that needs to be embedded into the ICM, namely: 1 scale matching, and 2 adaptive management. The scale matching refers to the fact that decision
making on environmental resources should be assigned to institutional levels that maximize ecological input, ensure the flow of ecological information between
institutional levels. ICM needs to be an adaptive and dynamic policy-making process, because it entails decisions and future directions that considering the
dynamic entities of resource dynamic, societal dynamic, policy dynamic, and the
increased knowledge on natural resources and on relationship between natural resources and human activities.
Thus, ICM process must be dynamic and adaptive, in which policy-making is an iterative experiment acknowledging uncertainty, rather than a static
“answer”, in order to cope with changing circumstances, increased knowledge of the behavior of coastal process and of human behavior, and changing
government policies Constanza et al. 1998; Turner and Bower 1999. This comes to the point that ICM shall be defined as an adaptive and dynamic policy-
making process acknowledging uncertainty, with the purpose of achieving sustainable use of coastal and marine resources.
ICM has been applied in both developed and developing countries. The ICM application in a country depends on some influential contexts or variables. At
least three important variables differentiate the ICM application in the North and South countries: 1 the governance capacity, authority and insitutional
structures; 2 the pace of coastal change, driven by population pressures; and 3 the prospects of sustained financial support for a coastal management
program, as is shown in Table 3 Olsen 2003.
Table 3 Differences between the North and South countries on the important
variables for success delivery of ICM program
North South
Governance capacity
Stable, harness rule of law; stringent zoning control
Low capacity and control Speed of
coastal change Restrained
High growth of unplanned urban development
Coastal management
funding Subsidies, incentives from
national and provincial government
No sustained source of core fund. Insufficient fund in provincial and
municipal government. Thus, rely on external funds.
Source: Olsen 2003.
Given the situation of ICM in developing countries, thus a coastal and marine management program in Indonesia needs to rely on the capacity of the
community or fisher folk on program deliveries, to achieve better sustainable development. This notion has long been promoted through co-management of
natural resources management Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Rudd 2001; Birner and Wittmer 2004.
2.4 Natural Resource Management and Social Capital Towards An Understanding of Social Capital
