could only be done infrequently, because fishers, including reef watchers, focus more on fish for a living.
Some local leaders acknowledged that protection of sanctuary was something that is difficult to carry out. The benefits of sanctuaries were commonly
questioned. Ecological monitoring of the condition of sanctuaries was not performed. The improvement of coral reef ecosystem due to the protection of
marine sanctuary is not easily tangible and only occurs after a long time Fox et al. 2003a, 2003b. It entails biological aspects in which local people have limited
knowledge, and the support from the external assistance for these communities to distinguish the biological benefits is minimal.
Formal Recognition
The authority of the Taka Bonerate Marine National did not fully recognize the community’s regulation in protecting a community marine sanctuary. A certain
community does not have right to protect a particular area, impose levy to outsiders to enter, or capture offenders. Rules made by the community to govern
a community marine sanctuary cannot be accepted by formal law. The BTN-TBR has the duty to develop zonation in the area and protects the selected zones, and
thus community would only need to assist BTN-TBR in performing this duty. Nevertheless, a community marine sanctuary is too small to be ecologically
effective. Even though, the authority did not against this effort as it is actually useful as a learning process for the community Harianto 2004, pers. comm..
8.6 Problems in Rules Enforcement
Community marine sanctuaries had been established in four studied islands. At the beginning a high compliance of sanctuaries was attained, due to
the presence of external facilitators and the recent establishment of sanctuaries. The sanctuaries had been seen as a project-wide endeavor. Later on,
compliance on rules was not attained because communities are not able to overcome collective action dilemmas, including problems of credible commitment
and of monitoring individual compliance Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 1994. The creation of rules, execution of monitoring and functioning of sanction are
important to sustain an institution. They are regarded as a societal dilemma which relates to the calculation of benefits and costs. When they are not
resolved, then this institution is not likely to uphold.
The case studies show that the community had at the beginning resolved a social dilemma to promote a coordinated strategy to establish marine
sanctuaries, though it was promoted from external actors. Community recognition on a specific problem or issue is important in crafting rules and institution. The
external assistance facilitated the community in developing rules, sanctions and monitoring. They had recognized that such effort was needed, but the recognition
is difficult to retain, when considering benefits that can be reaped from the protected sanctuaries. Questions always arise that they need to closure the area
in order for coral reefs and other biota improved and that the resource use activities in the area will make it deteriorate. Nevertheless, the fishing grounds of
these fishers are vast and they can move from one fishing ground to another. On the other hand, upholding rules is depending on the action of other individuals. A
preferred strategy of any individual is to become free rider or to cheat. This strategy can only be prevented when a monitoring individual compliance is in
place.
Monitoring had been carried out by local people. In the case of islands in
Taka Bonerate, local reef watchers became enforcers of the externally-induced rules, and were supplied with facilities. Monitoring ceased when the external
assistance ended, and even was erratic after some time of enactment. In the case of Barrang Caddi Island, some local people were supposed to promote self-
supported monitoring.
Individual monitoring by each fisher toward other fishers is a higher-order
dilemma. “Unless the rewards received by the individual who monitors and sanctions someone else are high enough, each potential monitor faces a
situation where not monitoring and not sanctioning may be the individually preferred strategy even though everyone would be better off if that strategy were
not chosen” Ostrom et al. 1994: 48. Island-wide individual monitoring was not sustained over time or even at the beginning. Problems of recognition arose as
pointed above. The inhomogeneities in the appreciation of environmental values and sanctuary are persistent. Further, the information about sanctuary rules and
locations was problematic. Definite location of sanctuaries was difficult to retain, because mooring buoys were recurrently lost.
Nonetheless, erratic monitoring promotes little assurance on enforcement
rules and lower the likelihood of getting caught. Further, sanctions were not given to offenders, except only warnings. Even when an offender was seized, he was
brought to formal law enforcement, where punishment did not satisfy local people. There is no cost for breaking the rules. This situation makes rules
weaker, and local community then had a diminishing confidence that the rules and the institutional arrangements were actually worked and beneficial. Further,
this happens given that no ecological monitoring on sanctuaries were done or facilitated by the external assistance, to show local people the benefits of
continuing such management strategy. Seeing no or little benefits made monitoring not sustained. Even so, ecological benefits were only accrued after a
long time. This is a problem of uncertainty of natural resources.
Resource users assess the costs and benefits in managing natural
resources Uphoff 1986: 28. The lack of coincidence between benefits and costs is a major factor affecting the sustainability of protection of the sanctuaries.
Community has to bear costs to uphold rules and monitor the sanctuaries; while on the other hand, the benefits of coral reefs rehabilitation and fish stocks
replenishment in the area will only accrue after a long time. The benefits of marine biota and coral reefs rehabilitation are relatively hard to identify. It
requires regular ecological monitoring which entails quite demanding process and facilitation. This ecological monitoring was lacked or not existed.
Chapter 9 Agent-Based Modelling of Social Capital and
