Fishers’ Rules and Collective Action in Coastal Fishery

7.4 Fishers’ Rules and Collective Action in Coastal Fishery

Fishers’ rules and collective action on resource use are examined into two different parts. First are rules that address externalities in fishing. Second is collective action and rules on conservation. Fishers’ Rules in Response to Externalities Informal fishing rules are endorsed in the community studied Table 53, and they exist without any support from external assistance. These rules are in place to overcome externalities that associated in fishery Schlager 1994; Ostrom et al. 1994; Bavinck 2001. Three different externalities are experienced by resource users in the fishery Schlager and Ostrom 1993: 1. Appropriation externalities. It arises because fishermen ‘are withdrawing fish from a common stock without taking into account the effects of their harvesting upon each other’. 2. Technological externalities. Fishermen may interfere with each other physically in the fishing grounds, particularly because gear types are incompatible. 3. Assignment externalities. If ‘particular areas or spots of fishing grounds are more productive than others … problems arise over who should have access to the productive spots and how access should be determined.’ In order to resolve technological and assignment externalities, fishers endorse rules that particular fishing gears can only be utilized in particular locations or fishing grounds. These rules exist in all fishing communities studied see Table 53. Further, in order to resolve appropriation externalities, rules on quota fishing can be employed, but this approach is not performed by fishers. Blast and poison fishing, as well as purse seine gae, trammel net bagang rambo, bottom gill net lanra, and bottom lampara rere are regarded as modern-type gears and incompatible with other more traditional gears, such as hand lining and nets. These rules were likely imposed on marine area adjacent to their island of resident or regular fishing grounds. The rights that local fishers exercised are de facto rights that enforced among themselves as well as outsider as if they have de jure rights. Types of property rights for the use of common-pool resources are differentiated into four: withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights Schlager and Ostrom 1993. Based on this classification, the rights that framed in Table 53 are “access” and “withdrawal” rights. Access rights are “the right to enter a defined physical property”, while withdrawal rights are defined as “the right to obtain the “products” of a resource” Schlager and Ostrom 1992: 250. Table 53 Fisher rules addressing technological and assignment problems. Rajuni Tarupa Kapoposang Barrang Caddi ƒ Fishing grounds for poisoning shall be far from hand line fishers. ƒ Bottom gill net operated by external fishers can fish in locations outside the fishing grounds of hand line fishers. ƒ Purse seine operated by external fishers can fish starting from the reef edge towards the sea. ƒ Fishing grounds adjacent to the island are open for outside fishers, as long as using specific gears. ƒ Blast and poison fishing are located far from hand line fishing. ƒ Purse seine is to fish not in the fishing grounds of hand line fishers. ƒ Outside fishers can come to fish as long as their fishing locations are far from resident fishers. ƒ Blast and poison fishers are not allowed to fish adjacent to Kapoposang Island. ƒ Trammel fishers coming from outside is unwelcome to fish adjacent to Kapoposang island. ƒ Outside fishers cannot fish using nets adjacent to island. ƒ Fishing grounds of poison and hand line fishing should be far apart. ƒ Bottom lampara is sometimes rejected to fish adjacent to Barrang Caddi Island. ƒ Poison fishing is not allowed adjacent to Barrang Caddi island. The exercise of withdrawal rights corresponds to operational activities that are constrained and made predictable by operational-level rules. Outside fishers and authorities may acknowledge the operational-level rules exercised by local fishers. However, they often challenge the sources of these rules. The ability to devise or change operational-level rules is related to collective-choice rights Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001. The collective-choice actions of local fishers have largely not been acknowledged by outside fisher and authorities, because the collective-choice level is governed by the constitutional-choice level that largely articulated in government’s laws and rules. As has been analyzed in part 7.2 that the formal property rights of the sea is quasi open access, which implies that any marine area can be accessed by any fishers come from any part of Indonesia. It does not explicitly acknowledge the ability of local institutions or local groups towards collective-choice or constitutional-choice actions. Impact of Social Capital Investment: Collective Action in Conservation Collective action is defined as voluntary action taken by a group to achieve common interests, which can be done directly or through an organization Meizen-Dick and Di Gregorio 2004. Fishers community in all studied islands were not operated in a specific organization, but had collectively acted to safeguard local fishers’ common interests. Collective actions by fishers were initiated to resolve externalities as pointed on the preceding section, and devise rules-in-use. Solutions and formulation of certain rules were arranged when fishers had the opportunity and media for interactions with the respective actors involved. Moreover, when rules are in place, they require further collective action to enforce and defend them. It is a cyclic process as shown in Figure 27. Figure 27 A cycle of collective action by fishers. The informal fishing rules and collective action are significant to lessen fishers practicing blast and poison fishing in localities where traditional fishers present. This in turn has had contributed to the conservation efforts. This practice had already been commenced in some areas even before the external assistance arrived, in which fishers were devising rules to overcome fishery externalities. Moreover, community capacity in safeguard resource use had been improved by the facilitation of external assistance had facilitated stakeholder meetings, training of community leaders, and support for fishing organizations. The objective was to improve environmental awareness towards marine and Problems and externalities in fishery Collective action to devise rules Rules in place Collective action to enforce rules coral reef ecosystem and to promote self-governance and local institution by community members. Informal rules that existed Table 53 had been collectively devised and enforced by local fishers. Through the facilitation of field facilitators, the maintenance of the rules had produced several notable collective actions as shown in Table 54. Local rules that had been established included prohibiting destructive resource use i.e. poison fishing, blast fishing, and coral taking. The social capital investment has enhanced fishers’ capacity on establishing access, withdrawal and exclusion rights by creating and enforcing local rules. Furthermore, increased monitoring and prohibition of destructive fishing had been, to some extent, influenced by the external assistance. Previously, even though destructive fishing gears interfered with traditional fishers, the latter rarely opposed it; while the former are usually richer fishermen and posses better financial and technological support similar findings see Jufri 2006. The external assistance promoted that such practices are destructive to marine environment including fish stock, which will detriment to fisher’s harvest. Therefore, traditional local fishers were more courageous to prohibit illegal fishing. Enforcement of rules that included local social sanctions were imposed to rule breakers, such as warning, make statement, hand over offenders to police, or even expulsion from the village. Table 54 Fishers’ collective action in resource use Year Community’s collective action Sanction solution Supporting factors Rajuni Islands 1993 Captured some resident fishers who utilized destructive fishing gears, and brought them to district judiciary. Punishment by district judiciary, even though the evidence was only photograph. - Cooperation between local leaders, community members, field facilitators and park rangers. - Only limited resident fishers used destructive fishing gears; majority was outside fishers. 2001 Seized a local fisher of Rajuni Besar who used poison fishing, and brought him to district judiciary. - Brought the rule breaker fisher to park rangers and then to district judiciary. Punishment by district judiciary. - A conservation group of Rajuni Besar was active. - Cooperation between local leaders and park rangers. Table 54 continued Year Community’s collective action Sanction solution Supporting factors 2001 Fishers of Rajuni Besar demonstrated against local poison fishers and the use of compressor that had been utilized for poison fishing. - Establishment of rules on fishing grounds that were differentiated between fishing grounds for hook and line fishers and that of for poison fishers. - Formulation of village decree of prohibition of compressor in Rajuni village. The rules formulation process was facilitated by field facilitators. - The presence of field facilitators who raised awareness on the impact of blast and poison fishing. - Cooperation between local leaders, community members and field facilitators. 2002 Community members reported to the village representative body, three resident fishers who were using blast or poison for fishing. Three blast or poison fishers were seized and imposed social sanctions i.e., making a pledge in front of villagers that they would quit the illegal practice. Cooperation between community members, local leaders and field facilitators. 2002 Community members joined forces against a local officer from the army forces who supported poison fishing. The officer expelled from the village. Cooperation between community members, village representative body BPD and village staff. 2003 Local fishers opposed to the village chief who permitted outside fishers that used bottom gill net lanra to fish. The use of bottom gill net obstructed local fishers. - Imposed a village fee of Rp 150,000 of each boat in each fishing session, for outside fishers that use bottom gill net. - Establishment of rules on fishing grounds that were differentiated between fishing grounds for local fishers and that of for bottom gill net. Cooperation between local leaders, local fishers and outside fishers. 2005 Monitoring and enforcement of local rules on the use of particular gears on some fishing grounds. Fishers that used bottom gill net and purse seine broke these rules. Local fishers who used hook and line gave warning and drove away fishers of bottom gill net and purse seine . Tarupa Island 1993 Captured some resident fishers who utilized destructive fishing gears, and brought them to district judiciary. Punishment by district judiciary, even though the evidence was only photograph. - Cooperation between local leaders, community members, field facilitators and park rangers. - Only limited resident fishers used destructive fishing gears; majority was outside fishers. 2000 Opposition by some fisher groups against resident fishers using blast and poison. None. Conflict arisen between two opposing groups. Field facilitators raised conservation awareness to some groups of fishers. Table 54 continued Year Community’s collective action Sanction solution Supporting factors 2003 Local hook and line fishers joined forces against a local officer from the army forces who supported poison fishing. The officer expelled from the village. Cooperation between community members and local leaders. 2005 Opposition of local fishers against purse seine from outside. - Imposed a village fee of Rp 150,000 of each boat in each fishing session, for outside fishers that use bottom gill net. - Establishment of rules on fishing grounds that were differentiated between fishing grounds for local fishers and that of for bottom gill net. Agreement between purse seine fishers and village government. Barrang Caddi 2004 Local leader seized a blast fisher in community sanctuary. Offender was handed over to police, but no judiciary process was followed. Cooperation between local leaders, community members, and facilitators. Kapoposang 1998- 2004 Monitoring and drove out blast and poison fishers who caught fish in Kapoposang area. Warning and prohibition. - Presence of park ranger assistants, who are also local leaders. - Partial authority from BKSDA to park ranger assistance to monitor the area. Since 2004 Local fishers opposed to the use of blast, poison and purse seine by external fishers. Local leaders have attempted to devise local rules on local fishing grounds, especially on the allowable fishing gears to use. - Cooperation between local fishers and local leaders to devise rules. - Advocacy of field facilitators and KSDA for local villages to promote local rules. Source: Surveys 2004, 2005; Jufri 2006. Conservation Group Facilitated by the field facilitators, collective action against blast and poison fishing had increased. The island communities and fishers have built conservation groups and promoted local rules on resource use. A local conservation group in each island was formed to safeguard marine resources from detrimental resource practice such as taking coral, fishing using blast and poison fishing, andor managing marine sanctuaries. However, in Barrang Caddi, the objective of the group facilitated by external assistance was to manage marine sanctuaries and did not directly to promote prohibition in destructive fishing. During the period of community facilitation, conservation groups existed in Rajuni Besar, Rajuni Kecil and Tarupa. For example, in 2001-2004 in Rajuni Besar, a conservation group called FORMAK Forum Masyarakat Konservasi, or a community forum for conservation was established. During fishing, fishers conducted monitoring against blast and poison fishing in the fishing grounds. However, when the second survey was conducted in 2005, the external facilitators were only present in Barrang Caddi and Kapoposang. In the rest of islands facilitation was ceased. Different from Barrang Caddi, external facilitator that currently presents in Kapoposang was not an NGO or a university, but the Natural Resource Conservation Office BKSDA that manage Kapoposang TMP. The conservation group in Rajuni Besar was active during the period of external assistance, but it was ceased since the external facilitators were absent by end of 2004. The same situation occurs in Rajuni Kecil and Tarupa. This was revealed during the interviews done in 2005, the majority of responses 73 state that the conservation groups in all islands are not active, except for Kapoposang Figure 28. In Kapoposang, park rangers infrequently visited and monitored the island. Nevertheless, assistant park rangers who are local leaders are assigned by the Office to regularly monitor the area and receive monthly remuneration. Figure 28 Performance of local conservation group in all islands A and each island B. Total N = 102. B 20 40 60 80 100 Tarupa Rajuni Kecil Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi Kapoposang Island P e rc e n ta ge of r e s pons e Active Not active A Active 28 Not active 72 The existence of conservation group is associated with the low frequency of poison fishing. The relationship between both variables is negative, with Spearman’s correlation of 0.228 p 0.05. Figure 29 illustrates this situation. Barrang Caddi that had frequent poison fishing has had low percentage of responses that the conservation group was active. 20 40 60 80 100 Tarupa Rajuni Kecil Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi Kapoposang Island P e rc e nt a ge of r e s pons e Frequent poison fishing Conservation group exist Figure 29 Existence of local conservation group vis-à-vis frequent poison fishing. Total N = 102.

7.5 Monitoring Individual Compliance