Table 46 Bonding and bridging social capital
Variable Tarupa Rajuni
Kecil Rajuni
Besar Barrang
Caddi Kapoposang
Bridging social capital 0.14
0.12 0.09
0.10 0.26
1 Q1 Marketing of island’s product: outsider
0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.19
2 Q1 Marketing of island’s product: Makassar
0.24 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.17
3 Q1 Source of island’s production capital: outside patron
0.03 0 0 0 0.15
4 Q1 Source of island’s production capital: patron of Makassar
0.02 0.003 0 0.02
0.07
5 Q2 Membership of group:
neighboring islands 0.19 0.38 0.09 0.13
0.82 6 Q2 Membership of group:
outsider 0 0 0 0.04
7 Q2 Visit out
0.44 0.32
0.43 0.49
0.45
Bonding social capital 0.53 0.39 0.54 0.62
0.40 1 Horizontal
0.58 0.45 0.67 0.56 0.43
1 Q1 Marketing of island’s product: residents
0.63 0.60 0.80 0.88 0.62
2 Q1 Source of island’s production capital: oneself or parents
0.54 0.40 0.64 0.17 0.30
3 Q1 Source of island’s production capital: credit union ROSCA
0.03 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.05
4 Q2 Membership in local group 0.89
0.55 0.79
0.81 1.00
5 Q2 Membership of group: residents
0.81 0.62 0.91 0.83 0.18
2 Vertical 0.42 0.23 0.21 0.79
0.35
6 Q1 Source of island’s production capital: island’s patron
0.27 0.28 0 0.64 0.33
7 Q2 Membership in
fishing patron-client network
0.56 0.18 0.43 0.95 0.36
Note: Patron is also trader. ROSCA is abbreviated from rotating saving credit associations.
0.14 0.12
0.09 0.10
0.53 0.39
0.54 0.62
0.40 0.26
0.00 0.20
0.40 0.60
0.80
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi
Kapoposang
Bridging Bonding
Figure 22 Index of bonding and bridging social capital.
Bonding Social Capital The products of island’s economy are fish, namely live fish, fresh fish or
processed fish i.e. salted and dried. Also, there are small home industries such as kiosk, food stall, fuel selling, roof making and bricks producing. These
products are typically sold to the collectors resided in the island, as well as for domestic consumption. This generates bonding trading networks.
Bonding networks are also formed from the relationships for production capital, that mostly come from island residents, parents, or local credit union.
Likewise, members of local group are mostly residents. Bridging Social Capital
Bridging trading networks are particularly high in Tarupa, Kapoposang, and Rajuni Kecil. Tarupa is a destination for a number of fish trading ships from many
areas of Sulawesi to acquire live, fresh and processed fish; the same with Kapoposang where many small fish traders came from Makassar to purchase
fresh fish. The third highest index of bridging social capital is Rajuni Kecil, where many Buginese people operate cargo shipping business between Makassar and
Nusa Tenggara that sell island products such as processed fish.
Interests of Distinctive Networks
Bonding and bridging trading networks established in each island must be differentiated on their interests with respect to fishing practices. Tarupa and
Kapoposang have both dense bridging marketing networks. In Kapoposang its network is largely not on blast fishing. On the other hand, high bridging network in
Tarupa is on blast fishing. Destructive fishing has distinct networks, extending from fishers, tools providers, backing officers, island patrons, mainland patrons to
exporters. A fisherman never works alone. He normally has agreements with a patron as capital owner and trader who finance and support fishing activities and
in turn claim for the harvest. This characterizes vertical bonding social capital. The vertical bonding social capital in Barrang Caddi is exceptionally high.
Fish harvested from a fisher is mostly sold to an island patron. Fishing patrons and traders have connections with mainland exporters and capital owners in
Makassar, thus possess strong financial capital. This island is characterized by high vertical bonding social capital, and it is predominantly supporting to poison
fishing. Apart from that, high bonding social capital is also due to high membership of local groups.
The local institutional arrangements that structure the interactions of resource users and substantial leadership are some critical aspects in assessing
local-level conservation in order to promote institution for long-endure self- governance of common-pool resources Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001. Fishing
patrons are normally leaders in the community and affect a decision-making process. An establishment of institution of prohibiting blast and poison fishing in
Barrang Caddi and Tarupa faces immense constraint. In these islands, one part of fishers uses blast or poison fishing, while another part does not. In Rajuni Kecil
the number of fishers using blast or poison fishing is minimal. Thus, conservation rules were quite strongly maintained during the period of external assistance.
Leadership in Rajuni Besar and Kapoposang has been involved and strongly supported conservation efforts brought into by the external assistance. There are
no patrons in Kapoposang who promote blast or poison fishing.
Vertical Bonding Social Capital: Punggawa-Sawi
When the overall bonding social capital is distinguished between vertical and horizontal bonding social capital, it is shown that Tarupa and Barrang Caddi
have higher vertical bonding networks than other islands Figure 23. The vertical bonding social capital composes of patron-client relationship variables on the
source of capital, the group membership in a patron-client relationship, and the existence of fishing patron Table 46. A vertical or hierarchical relationship
generally posses power and information imbalances, which is argued as not served to build trust and cooperation Putnam 1993 and not correlated with good
governance Longo 1999. Nevertheless, fishermen are bond to and dependent upon their patrons in economic and social aspects Meereboer 1998, and it is
difficult to break Satria 2002. Data collected in 2004 shows that the association between a variable of
source of production capital and a variable of bomb or poison fishing is significant, which Spearman’s correlation coefficient is 0.216 and test of
significance 0.001 two-tailed. This shows that the fishing production networks of bridging social capital or vertical bonding social capital is correlated with bomb or
poison fishing, as demonstrated in Tarupa and Barrang Caddi Figure 23.
0.00 0.20
0.40 0.60
0.80
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi Kapoposang Island
Index of
v e
rt ic
al b onding
s o
c ial c
apit a
l
Figure 23 Index of vertical bonding social capital.
Economic prominence becomes the basis of patronage. A punggawa maintains his following by keeping them in debt bond to him Meereboer 1998.
This relationship not only proves to support small-scale fishers to cope with vulnerability of marine resources and fishing livelihoods, but also influences the
modes of exploitation of marine resources. Fishermen depend on their livelihood upon an island punggawa, and will eventually ask for assistance and financial
capital in any need to the punggawa. In short, the patron-client relationships ‘have an ambiguous character because they can also be seen as a form of
benevolent exploitation, masked by the idiom of mutual benefit’ Robinson 1987 in Meereboer 1998.
However, the existing credit system based on the punggawa-sawi relationship makes island residents susceptible to being trapped in a poverty
cycle, because of high interest rate and unequal distribution of profits Meereboer 1998; Coremap Socioeconomic Team 2001. Receiving low profits drive
fishermen to fish more to increase their income by any means possible, including destructive fishing methods Alder and Christianty 1998. Further, due to their
patronage position and wealth compare with ordinary residents or fishermen, most of punggawa are positioned as local leaders and have a status as members
of village representative body, religious leaders and traditional leaders. Generally, the debt and trading relations between an island punggawa to a
fisherman is an extended relation between the island punggawa and the mainland punggawa. It means that the island punggawa receives capital from the
mainland punggawa to finance the fishing activities of island fishermen Nazruddin 1997. A punggawa maintains a stable supply of fish from its
fisherman members, then trades these fishes to the island punggawa or a trader in the cities, and receives profits from this undertaking. The profit is received by
punggawa from this undertaking. A fisherman who indebted and attached to a punggawa would receive a lower price for the fish they sold. The price of fish is
set by punggawa, and the fishermen normally do not have a bargaining position. There are reasons why a punggawa-sawi institution has been sustained.
Fishermen need to deal with an institution that necessitates no collateral and no time limit for the debts they take, while acknowledges the fishermen particular
condition and still obtains respect from the fishermen. The existence of punggawa fills in this condition. Besides providing working capital, punggawa
sometimes supplies household need of the fishermen family. Even tough one fisherman has already succeeded in paying their debts of working capital, once
he needs money for the maintenance of fishing gears and other household needs, he will come and take a loan to a punggawa. At the same time, punggawa
has to sustain relationships with fishermen, in order to receive durable harvest and profits from the trade.
The relationship between fishermen and capital owners extend to networks of capital formation and trade of reef fish are involving importers, traders, capital
owners, and even rent-seeking law enforcement officials.
Fish Trading Network
Fish trading networks are apparent in all islands Table 47. Patron-client relationships prevail among Taka Bonerate residents involved in live fish trade.
The capital provided by fish merchants from outside allows the small fishers to operate. Most of the mainland punggawa punggawa darat or large capital
owners are from outside the islands, from Makassar and Selayar, and many of them are Chinese. Taka Bonerate has been hard hit by the live fish trade seeking
popular restaurant fish. In 1992-1995 there were three or four companies permanently operating at Taka Bonerate in the peak production of live fish, but in
1998 there were only one or two intermittent operations Alder and Christianty 1998.
Table 47 Fish trading network
Island First cities
Second cities Abroad
Barrang Caddi
Live fish Patron
Exporters Makassar
Exporters Jakarta, Bali
Hongkong Fresh fish
Patron Fish market or
exporters Makassar
Kapoposang
Live fish Patron
Exporters Makassar
Exporters Jakarta, Bali
Hongkong Fresh fish
Itinerant trader Patron or fish
market Makassar,
Pangkep
Tarupa, Rajuni Kecil, Rajuni Besar Live fish
Patron, trader, itinerant trader
Exporters Makassar,
Bali Exporters Bali Hongkong
Fresh fish Itinerant trader
Sinjai, Bulukumba,
Bantaeng, Makassar,
Pare-pare, Pinrang,
Polmas, Toraja, Bali, Ambon,
Bau-bau, Kupang, Flores
Dried fish Patron, trader,
cargo shipper Selayar,
Bulukuma, Sinjai,
Bantaeng, Makassar,
Flores, Maumere,
Kendari
Source: KCC 2003; PSTK Unhas 2002; Surveys 2004, 2005.
Fishermen are generally in cooperation with other resident fishermen residing in other islands in Taka Bonerate as well as with the external fishers and
traders from outside Taka Bonerate, in conducting destructive fishing in Taka Bonerate MCS 2003a. This network is apparent in Tarupa. In Tarupa, the arrival
of the fish trading ships is purchasing fishes caught by blast fishing. This island is also supplied with materials for making fishing bomb from mainland cities namely
Wacci and Bone of Southeast Sulawesi. Destructive fishing has distinct networks, extending from fishers, tools
providers, backing officers, island punggawa, and mainland punggawa to traders. A fisherman never works alone. They have contractual agreements with the
punggawa as the capital owner and the trader who finance and support fishing
activities and in turn claim for the harvest. As clarified previously, the selection of fishing gears by the fishermen largely depends on their punggawa. The supply of
raw materials of destructive fishing and tools for diving are generally provided by the traders in the mainland, such as Selayar, Sinjai and Bau-bau MCS 2003a.
Obviously it is impossible to acquire such materials in the small remote islands of Taka Bonerate, unless they are provided by a network residing in the cities in the
mainland.
Social Capital in Each Island
Characteristics of bonding and bridging social capital in each island are as follows:
Tarupa possesses quite high bridging social capital, due to fish trading ships that obtaining fishes caught by blast and poison fishing. It also possesses
vertical bonding social capital, where many of its fishers maintain a fishing patron-client relationship that support to blast or poison fishing.
Rajuni Kecil and Rajuni Besar possess bonding social capital that is generally higher than bridging social capital.
Barrang Caddi has outstandingly high on both the overall bonding and the vertical bonding social capital. This bonding network is predominantly
supporting for poison fishing. Kapoposang has high bridging social capital, which is almost as high as its
bonding social capital. This island community depends on outside actors to market fresh fish and to obtain capital for fishing.
6.3 Social Capital Investment
