community’s ability to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the sanctuary. This effort has been proposed in many part of world and categorized as Marine
Protected Areas MPA program. The process of sanctuary establishment included community meetings to
inform the benefits of sanctuaries, determine the location of sanctuaries, discuss monitoring efforts, and develop rules and sanctions. In all cases, the sanctuary
was selected based on the following criteria: it is easy to monitor, located in the vicinity of the island, not disturb daily fishermen and community activities, and
has a good condition of coral reefs and fishes LP3M 2002; PSTK-Unhas 2004.
Table 59 Community marine sanctuaries
Taka Bonerate Atoll
Rajuni Kecil Rajuni Besar
Tarupa Barrang
Caddi Area of sanctuary
42.7 Ha unknown in
precise 48.125 Ha
3 and 9 Ha Year of
establishment 1999 2001 1999 2004
Facilitating agent Coremap
LP3M Coremap
LP3M Coremap
LP3M CCRS
Facilitation frequency
Live-in Live-in Live-in Regular visit
Source: Laude and Azis 2002; PSTK-UNHAS 2004; Surveys 2004, 2005.
8.3 Rules Compliance
In all four islands, fishers responded that 43 frequently fish in sanctuary, but 42 never fish in sanctuary Figure 34. Fishing frequently in community
sanctuary is high Rajuni Kecil 64, compared with other islands. On the contrary, high responses on “never” fishing in sanctuaries are found in other
islands.
Figure 34 Fishing in community sanctuaries in all islands A and each island B.
Total N = 100.
Rules compliance on marine sanctuary is associated with the level of trust in the community, even though the association is not statistically significant
A
Frequent 43
Rare 15
Never 42
B
20 40
60 80
100
Tarupa Rajuni Kecil
Rajuni Besar Barrang Caddi
Island P
er c
en tage of
res p
ons e
Frequent Rare
Never
Table 60. Rare or never fish in sanctuary is associated with the level of trust within the community. Frequent fishing in sanctuary is due to high proportion of
moderate trust. Table 60 Fishing in sanctuary and level of trust
Level of trust Fish in sanctuary
No In-between
Trust
Total Frequent
44 56 38 43 Rare
13 12 16 14 Never
44 32 46 42 Total 100
100 100
100 Note: Gamma 0.15 P0.05, Pearson Chi-square P0.05. N = 97.
8.4 Barrang Caddi
A couple of community marine sanctuaries had been enacted since February 2004. The Center for Coral Reef Study CCRS has been facilitating the
process starting October 2003. Further, artificial reefs were installed in the sanctuary, in order to improve reefs in this area. The establishment of
sanctuaries and their rules did not continue even during the period of external assistance Figure 35.
Figure 35 Establishment and protection of community marine sanctuaries in
Barrang Caddi.
Rules
Through the facilitation of CCRS, community of Barrang Caddi agreed on a coordinated strategy to maintain sanctuaries. Rules on the sanctuaries were
established jointly by CCRS and community during the community meetings in 2003 and early 2004. Fishermen are not allowed to fish in the sanctuaries, except
in the buffer zone where fishers can fish with hook and line. The compliance of the rules was attained in the beginning, as most fishers
know about the rules. The key to compliance is because the determination and
monitoring of sanctuaries was discussed and acknowledged by key community members, such as local leaders and punggawa. Fishers know about sanctuaries
from information dissemination made in the mosque and from their punggawa. On another instance, they know about sanctuaries from the mooring buoys
placed around them. These signs were tangible for fishers and made them aware. Some simply understand that the area is protected without further
knowing its rationale. Others aware that the area is a place where fish and other biota breed and thus fish stock will increase.
There is no exact sanction that will be imposed to the rules breaker. A warning is given to resident and non-resident fishermen if they breach the rules.
The CCRS was drafted a village decree containing rules and graduated sanctions for rule breaker. At the first place, a rule breaker will receive a warning. If
continue breaking the rule, he will receive a sanction that is agreed by the community members and leaders. No exact sanction is ever formulated and there
were no cases where community had to impose sanction. Another sanction is to bring the rule breaker to the police if he breaks law, for example by using illegal
fishing gears. Rules are never self-enforcing. Temptations to break them always exist.
Thus, designing and maintaining monitoring is important, especially monitoring arrangement which sustain over time. But monitoring posses another dilemma
faced by community members Ostrom et al. 1994.
Monitoring
The CCRS facilitated the determination a monitoring group for the sanctuaries. It consisted of local leaders and punggawa. There was no regular
monitoring program designed by the monitoring group, but since the location of sanctuaries are not far from the island, monitors can observe them from the
coast. An incidence of rule breaking occurred after four months of their enactment.
A blast fisher from a neighboring island conducted blast fishing in the sanctuary. A monitor observed this action, seized the offender, and called police who were
then captured him. Nevertheless, this incident becomes a significant milestone for the community effort on sanctuaries. It affected the rules compliance by
community member, because they could see that offenders get captured when breaking the rules.
On the other hand, they were eager to see that the offender received proper punishment from the police and formal law enforcement, because he
broke rules on sanctuaries made by the community. The CCRS pressed the law enforcement institutions to enforce the law rightfully. However, the community
then recognized that the offender was released after paying some money. This is one among many reasons that made community halted their
protection towards the sanctuaries. They perceived that monitoring could not enforce their rules, even though the monitor who seized the offender was a
prominent local leader. This leader seized the offender, but the offender could go free by paying some money in the police. Formal law enforcement must be
followed, and they could not impose sanction. If they could not enforce their rules with sanction that they regarded as fair, then there is no reason for them to
continue enforcing them.
Distribution of Cost
Monitoring activities depend on the assessment of cost and benefits perceived by the monitors. Monitoring is a higher-order dilemma. It entails costs
that only be bear by the monitor, and will only continue if the monitors receive rewards Ostrom et al. 1994. Monitoring is similar to supplying public goods,
where the cost of monitoring is only provided by the monitor and the benefit is accrued by the island community.
There was no reward, or resources, for monitors to carrying out monitoring in a regular basis, neither from the community nor from the external assistance.
The external assistance expected that the benefits of sanctuaries will be reaped by the community, thus monitoring and its costs are part of their responsibility.
This is an issue of distribution of costs, who shall bear the costs of maintaining sanctuaries and its monitoring.
Another issue of distribution of costs occurred on the supply of mooring buoys. Mooring buoys were used to border the area of sanctuaries, and some of
them were frequently missing and needed to be replaced. The community considered that sanctuaries were introduced by the external assistance that
organized the project and controlled the financial resources. However, the external assistance perceived that the project was a community-based concept
and expected that community contribute to its maintenance. The element of trust and transparency is apparent, because community was unaware of the sum of
financial resources that was maintained by the external assistance to carry out the project.
This issue of distribution of costs is not resolved. It promotes ignorance by the monitoring group to not carrying out monitoring activities. The existence of
monitoring group was only when the project is still active. The sanctuary is perceived only as a project of a certain period.
Benefit
Promoting rules and monitoring on sanctuaries implies supplying public goods that involve costs. This is a dilemma faced by the community. Only when
the benefits are higher than costs of maintaining and monitoring the sanctuaries, then this effort will sustain.
The benefits of such measures are seriously questioned by the community. It involves ecological benefits in terms of fish stock, which in turn affect economic
benefit with regard to income from fishing. Many do not fully understand the function and benefits of sanctuaries, which are valued by CCRS. However, no
concrete ecological monitoring was done to show the community the changes due to the protection of sanctuaries.
8.5 Rajuni and Tarupa
