Furthermore, trust is negatively associated with bomb fishing, with Spearman’s correlation coefficient is -0.242 and test of significance p 0.05 two-
tailed. Rajuni Kecil has high bomb fishing, while at the same time has the lowest level of trust. Rajuni Besar and Kapoposang where destructive fishing is minimal
or not existed, the percentage of trust is higher than other islands. However, the highest trust is in Barrang Caddi, where poison fishers are
prevalent Figure 25. This shows that the community trust is not necessarily related to the low level of destructive fishing. On the other hand, trust is also
needed for practicing blast or poison fishing.
Trust and Social Capital Investment
Given that trust is important for cooperation and compliance, it is also critical for the community’s cooperation with the external assistants and the
community’s compliance towards norms or objectives brought by the external assistance. The island community has increasingly questioned the transparency
of project’s budget that was beyond their knowledge, as well as the promises that were not realized. The community’s distrust with the external assistance and field
facilitators contributed to low compliance or cooperation with project’s objectives or activities.
6.6 Destructive Fishing and Bonding, Bridging and Linking Social Capital
If a comparison is made to the index of bomb and poison fishing in 2004 and 2005 Figure 16, it is noted that the fishing practices of resident fishers are
to some extent shaped by the presence of the external assistance. During the period of external assistance in 2004, number of blast or poison fishers
decreased in most studied islands, even though not eliminated. Thus, at least two aspects signify the existence of blast or poison fishing,
namely: 1 the trading networks of blast or poison fishing as well as the vertical bonding social capital, and 2 the bonding, bridging and linking social capital with
interest in promoting sustainable use of fishing resources. These different networks influence the level of local collective action towards sustainable fishing
practices, and tension among them is dynamic in nature. An island community that has frequent arrivals of stakeholders with interest
in promoting sustainable use of fishing resources and low engagement with blast and poison networks has lower incidence of coral reef destruction. Nevertheless,
in most islands the blast and poison networks present and these practices only lessen when the external assistance takes charge.
Thus, it is challenged to examine the local fishing rules or institutions, and to what extent social capital investment has shaped local rules or institutions,
which influence resource use including the degree of destructive fishing. This is to analyze in the following chapters.
Chapter 7 Institutions, Rules, and Collective Action:
Reducing Destructive Fishing
This chapter assesses collective action of fisher’s in managing coral reef resources. Collective action represents an outcome of social capital Grafton
2005; Grootaert et al. 2003. Likewise, it is one type of indicators to measure social capital, in addition to local associations and networks, and trust Grootaert
et al. 2003. To begin with, theories on collective action to manage commons resources are explained. Afterwards, empirical findings are assessed, which
starts on formal institution, and later on fishers’ collective action and institutions.
7.1 Managing Sustainable Resource: Role of Institution and Collective Action
Commons and Institutions
Ocean and its entrenched resources such as fishery and coral reefs are categorized as commons. This resource shares two characteristics: 1 it is highly
costly or impossible to exclude potential users from access to and appropriate the resource; and 2 the resource unit appropriation will subtract the resource stock
available. Due to these characteristics, commons is confronted with problems of free-rider and of overuse. This situation is called “tragedy of the commons” by
Hardin 1968, which occur when the resource is characterized by open access. As a result, all efforts to organize collective action, whether by external
rulers or fishers themselves, and wish to gain collective benefits, must address a common set of problems. These problems have to do with coping with free-riding,
solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules Ostrom 1990. Therefore,
regardless of who governs a particular common-pool resource, it is essential to regulate at least two broad aspects: access to the resources and rules governing
resource use Ostrom 1990; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003.
Rules on access and on resource use are imposed by formal as well as informal institution. Formal institution generally relies on command-and-control
