Chapter 7 Institutions, Rules, and Collective Action:
Reducing Destructive Fishing
This chapter assesses collective action of fisher’s in managing coral reef resources. Collective action represents an outcome of social capital Grafton
2005; Grootaert et al. 2003. Likewise, it is one type of indicators to measure social capital, in addition to local associations and networks, and trust Grootaert
et al. 2003. To begin with, theories on collective action to manage commons resources are explained. Afterwards, empirical findings are assessed, which
starts on formal institution, and later on fishers’ collective action and institutions.
7.1 Managing Sustainable Resource: Role of Institution and Collective Action
Commons and Institutions
Ocean and its entrenched resources such as fishery and coral reefs are categorized as commons. This resource shares two characteristics: 1 it is highly
costly or impossible to exclude potential users from access to and appropriate the resource; and 2 the resource unit appropriation will subtract the resource stock
available. Due to these characteristics, commons is confronted with problems of free-rider and of overuse. This situation is called “tragedy of the commons” by
Hardin 1968, which occur when the resource is characterized by open access. As a result, all efforts to organize collective action, whether by external
rulers or fishers themselves, and wish to gain collective benefits, must address a common set of problems. These problems have to do with coping with free-riding,
solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules Ostrom 1990. Therefore,
regardless of who governs a particular common-pool resource, it is essential to regulate at least two broad aspects: access to the resources and rules governing
resource use Ostrom 1990; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003.
Rules on access and on resource use are imposed by formal as well as informal institution. Formal institution generally relies on command-and-control
policy, in which government determines property rights over resources and promotes fishing license for resource users Weisbuch 2000; Pet-Soede et al.
1999. These rules are enforced by an external mechanism through sea patrols. The command and control approach suffers from problems such as imperfect
information, expensive coordination costs, and weak supervision over free riding and rent seeking behavior, lack of responsibility to the constituents, and
unsustainable program and policy implementation Nugroho 2004. However, empirical studies shows that informal rules that maintained by
resource users can promote sustainable common-pool resources Berkes 1985; Ostrom 1990. In fact, in tropical developing countries, where formal institutions
may be relatively weak, social networks remain important for controlling opportunism and solving social dilemmas in the inshore fisheries Rudd 2001;
Bavinck 2001. Nevertheless, resource users devise informal institution that maintains de facto rights of fishing grounds and promotes endogenous
sanctioning systems Ostrom et al. 1994. These institutions are societal responses environmental issues that are characterized by uncertainty and
problems of cooperation, and take form of beliefs, norms, relationships, property rights, agencies, etc. Weisbuch 2000.
Collective Action and Self-Governance
Collective action is defined as voluntary action taken by a group to achieve common interests, which can be done directly or through an organization
Meizen-Dick and Di Gregorio 2004. Collective action or cooperation represents outcome of social capital, while social networks or membership in local
associations represent causal factors in its determination Grafton 2005: 754; Grootaert et al. 2003.
The likelihood of fishers to resolve dilemmas associated with common-pool resources and promote collective action on resource use are increasing when at
least three criteria are met, namely: 1 repeated encounters in which opportunistic individual behavior is seen to destroy the possibilities for collective
gain; 2 an information network that arises from trading, competition, or other interactions and forms the basis for the identification and negotiation of possible
rules; and 3 a collective means for the enforcement of these rules Wilson 1982: 420 in Schlager 1994: 251.
With regard to self-organized resource governance, Ostrom 2000: 150- 152 proposed the following eight design principles:
1. The presence of clear boundary rules, shared norms, clear members and non-members.
2. Rules that restrict the amount, timing and technology of harvesting the resource; allocate benefits proportional to required inputs; and crafted to take
local conditions into account. 3. Participation of most individuals affected by a resource regime in making and
modifying their rules. 4. Monitoring, in which the monitors are accountable to the users or are users
themselves and who keep an eye on resource conditions as well as on user behavior.
5. Graduated sanctions that depend on the seriousness and context of the offense.
6. Rapid and low-cost conflict resolutions at local arenas. 7. Recognition by national or local government towards the rights of local users
to organize. 8. The presence of governance activities organized in multiple layers, each with
its own distinct set of rules. The evolution of social norms and collective action among resource users
is shaped by the presence of input social capital, namely trust and norms of reciprocity Ostrom 2000. Mutual trust is necessary for communication and
continued interaction. However, even when trust and reciprocity exist, the likelihood of self-organized resource governance is limited, when resource users
are lack authority to create their own self-governing institutions Ostrom et al. 1994: 328.
Self-regulation performs better in traditional societies in which economic activities are embedded in social relationships within the community, and are
regulated by common values and rules ‘the culture’ of the people who live in the community. However, fishery self-regulation is constrained with the problems of
scale Berkes 2006. For example, rules of self-regulation are effective to implement towards community members who live within the community, but not
with outsiders. Moreover, external economic and political conditions influence the effectiveness of local rules, such as the loss of community control over the
resource; the commercialization of subsistence fisheries; rapid population-growth; and rapid technology-change Berkes 1985.
Two to Tango: Formal and Community Institutional Capacity
As the preceding section concludes that community self-regulation is not the solution to sustainable use resources, nor is an enforcement program by
itself. Thus, cooperation between government and resource users are viewed to be able to overcome the limitations of each approach. The state capability and
the capacity of communities for collective action are important for natural resources management. It is difficult to organize natural resource management
when both capacities are low Table 49.
Table 49 Influence of state capability and social capital on institutional choice
Community capacity for collective action State
capability Low High
Low Undetermined Community-based
management High
Public sector management Hybrid: co-management involving state
agencies and local communities based on contract or regulation.
Source: Birner and Wittmer 2004.
An arrangement in which the responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user groups is normally identified as co-
management Sen and Nielsen 1996: 406. The arrangement varies according to the extent of power-sharing and integration of local and government systems
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997. The success implementation of co-management can be found in Norway
and Japan. A number of prerequisites supports to this success. First, government recognizes and legitimizes the traditional or informal local-level management.
Second, fishers have the ability to organize for collective action, by means of maintaining local institution and rules. Third, the communication channels
between government officials and fishers must be continued and promoted. In this way, fishers have access to government and government officials to express
their concerns and ideas ibid. Finally, government institutional capacity is shaped by “the strength of the legal system, property rights, the degree of
government corruption, research and extension capacity, and the awareness of fisheries problems by bureaucrats and elected officials” Rudd 2001: 12.
Thus, collaboration between community and institutional capacity is important. The importance of collaboration is termed as “two to tango” by
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997. Comparative policy analysis of community and institutional capacity were analyzed in some countries Rudd 2001. It shows that
community-based marine protected areas MPA can only work in a fisher community where there exist both community and institutional capacity, like in
Belize. However, it will not work in a situation where only community or institutional capacity exists Table 50.
Table 50 Comparative policy analysis of community and institutional capacity
Institutional capacity Community
capacity Strong Weak
Strong Northern Belize
Caribbean: Fishers have high social capital and
institutional capital. Fishers formed the Northern fishery cooperative in
1960. Government is supportive of cooperatives.
Source: Sutherland 1986, King 1997, Mascia 2000.
Fiji: Strong traditional fisheries management. Limited input or
support from government.
Source: Veitayaki 1998, Cooke et al. 2000, World Bank 2000.
Weak Turks and Caicos Islands:
Community capacity is low. Limited effective enforcement of top-down
rules and low compliance. Government fisheries management
of total allowable catch, size limits, seasonal closures, etc.
Source: Bene and Tewfik 2001, Rudd et al. 2001.
Kenya: Traditional fisheries management systems are eroded.
Limited resource of government. Low trust between fishers and
government. Results in: widespread destructive fishing, rent dissipation,
ecological degradation.
Source: McClanahan et al. 1997.
Source: Rudd 2001.
7.2 Formal Monitoring and Law Enforcement
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