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he Relation of Corporate governance to Firm Performance and Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
JURNAL VISIONER STRATEgIS
Volume 1, Nomor 2, September 2012 ISSN: 2338-2864
p. 159-169
he Relation of Corporate governance to Firm Performance and Management
Compensation as Mediating Variable
endang Surasetyo ningsih
Dosen pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Syiah Kuala,
Banda Aceh
Wida Fadhlia
Dosen pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Syiah Kuala,
Banda Aceh
rahmawaty
Dosen pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Syiah Kuala,
Banda Aceh
The objective of this research is to investigate inluence of corporate governance to management compensation and subsequent irm performance.
This study uses data from manufacture companies that listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange for the inancial reporting in 2003 – 2005 periods. The sample
consists of 198 observations over a three-year period for 66 publicly traded irms. The mechanism of corporate governance is to be proxy by managerial
ownership and number of commissioner proportion board. Management compensation is measured using sum of remuneration that reported in audited
inancial reporting. Firm performance is to be proxy by return on assets ROA and return on equity ROE after compensation is awarded. The result was
showed that managerial ownership and number of commissioner proportion board giving signiicant positive impact to management compensation. Even
though, managerial ownership as one of mechanism of corporate governance has negative coeficient to management compensation. This study was ind
that corporate governance and management compensation was not impact to subsequent irm performance. This result was indicated that compensation did
not designed optimally and corporate governance did not work effectively.
Keywords: Corporate governance, management compensation, subsequent irm performance
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Jurnal Visioner Strategis Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia Rahmawaty
BACkgrounD
The Indonesian for Corporate Governance IICG together with SWA Magazine were
leading a rate survey to companies applying good corporate governance GCG for corporate
governance perception index 2005 CGPI. Good corporate governance GCG application success
in a company could not be separated from the stakeholders’ role, especially the primary
ones such as the employees and managers. The stakeholders were motivated to work actively
and cooperate with the company to increase the performance, job opportunity and the company
continually. This closely related to the employees and managers and might created balanced value
between the company owner and the stakeholders. The company would professionally give some
kinds of compensation based on their performance and integrity. The torch participant number in the
last 5 active years would create a question; if the good corporate governance GCG application in
the company value creation had no relation with optimal compensation value?
Indonesian monetary crisis directly affected in conviction and inancial crisis in trading world.
The inancial crisis was once caused by the less transparency and accountability, and this made
the information manipulation possibly done by a company. Later, this created a good arrangement
concept known as good corporate governance GCG mechanism. The important matter often
become a debate in corporate governance was the chosen compensation contract. The main point
of the debate was the existence and function of the remuneration committee. According to
the corporate governance and corporate ethics published by the BUMN State Ministry ofice
in 1999, a duty of the remuneration committee function was to examine and recommend the
remuneration system changes of the management, commissaries, and employees in order to show
the relationship between the irm performance target achievement and accepted compensation
rate. Later, the decrease of the torch participant number annually would also create a question,
whether the decision to apply the corporate governance and optimal compensation were not
closely related to the company occupation in the following year?
Eisenhardt 1989 stated three assumptions related to the agency theory as the based theory
in the owner and management contract. They were: 1 human nature behavior generally
put personal importance above the others’ self interest; 2 man basically had limited
imagination to the future perception bounded rationality and 3 man always avoided the risk
over him though there were others to sacriice risk averse. Gibbon and Murphy 1992
showed that the optimal compensation contract was an incentive combination implicitly related
to the compensation contract which was capable to motivate and give direction to the company
manager to a maximal company occupation.
Some people realized the importance of the application of the good corporate governance
GCG principal convinced to be able to create conducive condition and irm base to perform
the company operational right, eficient, and proitable; to increase and create balanced value
between the shareholders and stakeholders. This study was attractive because of several reasons.
First, Indonesian economic condition disturbed by a multidimensional crisis, made the good
governance reading more become a benchmark in recovered and stability in the economic
condition especially in corporation management. Second, the good corporate governance GCG
pressuring was more aimed to protect the minority stockholders’ right and importance. In
the other side, the good corporate governance GCG application success could not be separated
from all company stakeholders’ role, so that the compensation to the achievement was needed to
increase the conviction and also the company value and a value creation to the shareholders.
Third, this study was a reaction to the surveyed year by year member decrease phenomenon.
The research was aimed to investigate if there was a positive relationship in the good corporate
governance GCG application to the management compensation. More over, this research wanted
to investigate if there were a relationship between the good corporate governance GCG application
and the management compensation to the next
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he Relation of Corporate governance to Firm Performance and Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
company occupation.
tHeorY eXAMinAtion Agency theory and compensation contract
Agency relationship perspective was a base used to view corporate governance. The
main point of the agency relationship was the existence of the separation between the owned
in principal investor side and control in agent manager side. Investor had their expectation to
earn return from their invested money. Therefore, a good contract between the investor and the
management was a contract which was able to explain detail speciications should be performed
by the manager in managing the investor’s fund, and speciication related to the return distribution
between the manager and the investor. Agency relationship was a contract between the principal
and agent developed by Jensen and Meckling 1976; and Fama and Jensen 1983.
Agency relationship was emphasized to overcome two main problems occasionally
appear in the agency relationship. According to Eisenhardt 1989, the irst problem was
a problem appeared when: a the desire and purpose of the principal and agent were opposite
and b it was a hard or expensive to the principal to verify the agent real tasks. The problem appears
when the principal could not verify the agent real tasks precisely. The second problem was the risk
sharing problem appeared when the principal and agent had different action preference caused by
their different preference toward the risks.
Shleiver and Vishny 1997 stated that the corporate governance concept based on the
agency theory was expected to be functioned as the tools to solve all agency problems and also
give the conviction to the investor that they would gain the appropriate return of the fund invested.
Entity theory viewed the company as an entity apart from its owner and creditor. The relationship
between the management and the company owner was a principal-agent relationship paradigm, in
which the company owner as the principal gave the conviction to the management who gave its
managerial service. Compensation was a human resource management strategy to create a job
harmonious which had different importance for different person. Some took compensation as
a return from the service given by the human resources gained as an organization, or a value
addicted by the company to the human resource competence and ability, or, an appreciation given
by the company to dedicated person Simamora, 1995.
Jensen and Meckling 1976 stated that compensation was a service value given by
the owner to the management. Compensation contract showed the service response value given
by the principal to the management. Formally, the compensation contract was a bundle between the
manager and principal to perform some activities in the name of the principal, aimed to maximally
the company value in order to increase the shareholders prosperity at the end. Therefore,
the management compensation contract was designed to motivate the management to fulill
the job occupation determined previously by the principal.
Corporate governance and Compensation
Among the mentioned factor to motivate the creation of the effective company management
creation, the commissaries council management structure was a main factor affected the manager
behavior in the company management. In a modern corporation, compensation policy was
delegated to the commissaries council. When the compensation designed optimally, the
compensation contract could be a motivation tools to maximally all stakeholders’ prosperity.
Jensen 1993 stated that several problems appeared in the internal mechanism system
management structure was started with the existence of the commissaries council possessing
inal responsibility in the company. The commissaries council possessed the authority
to make rules to the manager in managing the company, employing, iring, and creating
compensation policy and also giving some strategic advices. More number of commissaries
would increase the service and control function because there were more skilful persons and
more valuable advices in the company strategy and management. According to Kusumawati and
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Riyanto 2005, the relationship between the number of commissaries council member and
the company value were supported by control and service function perspective given by the
commissaries council. Consultation and advice given were valuable services to the management
never been given by the market. Their research also found that the investor’s will to give more
premiums was supported by the service and control given by the commissaries.
Several researches showed that the council structure would be able to explain cross-sectional
variation in management compensation. Hallock 1997 in his research on 500 companies in 1992
discovered that the council with interlocking relationship and council measurement had an
effect to the higher management compensation. Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999 observed
the compensation rate to 205 companies and discovered that the council composition variable
council head variable was CEO, council number, council came from the internal company, council
came from the external company, council with interlock relationship, council member with
age above 69, and busy council had positive and signiicant relationship to the company
compensation level.
Cyert, Kang, and Kumar 2002 in their research about compensation determinant in
public companies in the beginning of 1990, stated that CEO or also the head of the council, and the
number of the council, had positive relationship to the compensation. Grinstein and Hribar 2004
stated that CEO would affect the new council member election process, CEO was also the head
of the council and the number of the council would signiicantly affect the compensation.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2006 in their observation result found that the council structure
was a signiicant determinant to the measure and structure of the CEO compensation.
H1: there was a positive relationship between the
number of the commissaries and management compensation.
Different importance in a company was caused by different ownership characteristics, such
as: 1 dispersed ownership. Gilberg and Idson 1995, Husnan 2000 in Hastuti 2005 found
that the company with more dispersed ownership gave more payment to the management compared
to the company with concentrated ownership. In this type of company ownership we could ind
two categories of stockholders named controlling interest and minority interest shareholders. 3
BUMN ownership.
Core, Haolthausen and Larcker 1999 in their research found that management ownership
structure had a substantive cross-sectional relationship to the management compensation.
Empiric research led by Xu and Wang 1999 in Hastuti 2005 explained more the research
result as followed: 1 There was signiicantly a positive relationship between the concentrated
ownership and productivity as a proxy of the company occupation. 2 The concentrated
ownership affection was stronger for companies dominated by legal person shareholders
compared to those dominated by company. 3 The company proitability positively related to
the stock ownership proxy by a legal person but negatively related to the stock ownership by the
company. 4 Employee productivity tended to decrease when the stock ownership proportion
by the company was increased. Stock ownership by legal person shareholders could monitor the
management effectively through the supervision of the board of directors, the company employee
election and the compensation award to the chief corporate oficer.
H2: there was a positive relationship between the
ownership structure and management com- pensation.
Corporate governance, Compensation and Firm Performance
The distinction deinition of good corporate governance GCG did not affect the distinction
of meaning and purpose. Forum for corporate governance in Indonesia 2001 used the deinition
of Cadbury Committees named: a set of rules arrange the relationship among the stockholders,
company management manager, creditor, government, employee, and other internal and
external interest holder related to their rights and also responsibilities. In the other word, a system
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he Relation of Corporate governance to Firm Performance and Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
arranged and controlled the company. More details, the good corporate governance GCG
terminology could be used in order to explain the role and behavior of the direction council,
commissaries council, the company manager and the stockholders.
Empirically, result of the observation of corporate governance applied in a company
related to the company occupation was remained inconsistent. Several others researches showed
that there were no relationship between the corporate governance and the company
occupation, such as Daily and friends 1998 and CBI survey result, Deloitte and Touche 1996,
as copied in Darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu research 2004.
McKinsey research, as copied by Lukuhay 2002 and Raick 2002, had proved that
investor in the advanced countries willing to give a quite high premium, nearly take the average of
28 to the company consistently applying the corporate governance principal. As an addition,
evidences proved that the stocks of the companies enjoyed the market valuation among 10 to 12
were founded. Gompers and friends 2003 in their observation found a positive relationship
between the corporate governance index and long-term company occupation. Darmawati
and friends 2004 in their analysis showed that corporate governance would statistically and
signiicantly affect the return on equity. This proved the hypothesis that corporate governance
would affect the company internal occupation.
Klapper and Love 2002 founded the positive relationship between the corporate governance
and company occupation measured using the return in assets ROA and Tobin’s Q. Other
important result gained from their observation was that the corporate governance application in
the company level had more importance in the development countries that those in the advanced
countries.
This research would use the company speciic internal mechanism as a proxy from good corporate
governance named the ownership structure and management structure. Xu and Wang 1999
successfully proved that the ownership structure mix and concentrated signiicantly affect the
company occupation. Demztz and Lehn 1985 in Hastuti 2005 discovered that there was no
signiicant relationship between the concentrated ownership with accounting proit level for 511
largest companies in United States.
Holderness and Sheehan 1988 analyzed 144 listed companies in NYSE with stocks ownership
more than 50,1 and found that Tobin’s Q result was higher when the company was owned by
majority stockholders. Tobin’s Q was signiicantly lower for companies with individual majority
stockholders. McConnell and Servaes 1990 took samples of more that 1000 companies discovered
that Tobin’s Q positively related to the stocks ownership proxy by individual investor.
The commissaries council service and control function as corporate governance mechanism
could be seen as a signal to the investor that the company had managed as its required positive
signal. Investors were expected to accept this signal and willingly paid higher premium for
well-governed companies in Indonesia. Thus, the good corporate governance GCG application
would relate positively with the company occupation in the investors’ view Labelle, 2002
in Kusumawati and Riyanto, 2005.
Executive manager skills and ability were closely related to the inancial performance in an
organization. Therefore, a good understanding was needed between the executive compensation
level and monetary success measurement. The stockholders used the company compensation
scheme as a tool to monitor and or to motivate the manager. Jensen and Murphy 1990 stated
that the stockholders demanded the executive to act maximally the organization value to the
owner and other stockholders in the company. The stockholders and other stakeholders needed
to ind out if the executive salary at present commonly related to the company occupation
and if there was a possibility to motivate the executive to make some decisions in order to
increase the organization value.
Some researches showed signiicant relationship among the managerial compensation
and the monetary occupation, the market occupation and the company measurement.
Leonard 1990 tested the executive
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compensation and organization structure policy inluence to the company occupation. The
result showed that the companies with long- term incentive plan signiicantly enjoyed larger
return of equity, compared to the companies without long-term incentive plan. Abowd 1990
tested the managerial compensation sensitively to the company occupation in a year positive
relationship with the company occupation in the following year. The occupation measure based
on the accounting resulted in a weak relationship while the occupation based on the economy and
market created stronger support.
Ely 1990 analyzed the relationship between the compensation and occupation of four major
industries utility, bank, oil and gas, and retail and discovered that the CEO compensation to bank
industry was directly related to the accountant variable. Shim, Lee and Corrigan 1999
observed the CEO compensation determiner in monetary institute by testing the relationship
between the CEO compensation and occupation based on the accounting and based on the market.
The result showed that the CEO compensation would signiicantly and positively related to
the ROA with lower degree and related to the ROE and market-to-book assets. The company
measurement showed a positive relationship with CEO compensation total and cash compensation
salary and bonus. Magnan and St-Onge 1997 tested how the relationship between the bank
occupation and executive compensation tended to be related to the bank occupation in higher
managerial policy context. H3: there was a positive relationship between
the management compensation and corporate governance with the following company oc-
cupation.
oBSerVAtion MetHoD the sample
of the observation was taken from the population based on the purposive
sampling. The ending numbers of the sample were 66 companies and 198 observations. The
data used in this research was second data. The corporate governance data used was the data of
the ownership structure and commissaries number taken from monetary report gained from UGM
modal market database. Firm Performance data was the market and monetary data gained from
Indonesian Capital Market Directory 2003-2005. The company management compensation was the
numeric data of commissaries and management stated in the annual report of the audit monetary
report note 2003-2005.
Variable and measurement
Management compensation was a return of the service given by human resources for
the organization, or value closely put by the company to the ability and human resources
talent. Management compensation was measured by the level of remuneration achieved by the
commissaries and management in a year of observation. The remuneration number listed
covered total salary and bonus achieved.
Corporate governance was a relationship, system and process pattern led by the company
organs management, commissaries council, RUPS in order to give additional value to the
stockholders as a long term period continuously, which also considering the other stakeholders
importance based on the governmental rules and valid norms. Corporate governance was proxy
using the ownership structure variable and the number of the commissaries.
Firm Performance was a company ability sketch to produce its proit in the past and could be
projected to the future to see the company ability to gain more in the present period, so that the
investor might read the part of total proitability that could be allocated to the stockholders’
hands. In this research, the irm performance was measured using both the ROA Net Proit Total
Assets and ROE Net Proit Total Equity.
The company assets composition was measured using the ratio between the constant
assets to the total sales Klapper and Love, 2002. The growth opportunity was proxy used
IOS counted with MVBV. Hartono 2005 stated that when the MVBV value was above 1,
the company would be classiied prospected or developed, oppositely when the MVBV value
was less than or equal to 1, the company would be classiied unprospected or undeveloped. The
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he Relation of Corporate governance to Firm Performance and Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
company measurement was measured from the natural log of the sales. Incentive was given to the
management based on its capability in increasing the sales, which was the key to cost the company
activities Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970.
DAtA AnALYSiS Descriptive Statistic
In order to gain a common sketch of the research data sample, we could see the research descriptive
statistic as seen in table 2. Dependent variable in model 1 was management compensation in
2004 which showed approximately 9.4372 with standard deviation of 0.55370. Management
ownership had approximately 47.1855 with standard deviation of 19.79762. The commissaries
number had approximately 3.9394 with standard deviation of 1.58725.
Dependent variable in model 2 was the company occupation in 2005 measured using
ROA and ROE with average 0.5462 and 0.9874 with standard deviation of 0.59378 and 0.64947.
2004 Management Compensation independent Variable, the number of commissaries and
management ownership in 2004 had average 9.4372, 3.82 and 46.7400 with standard deviation
of 0.55370, 1.424 and 19.9516.
Hypothesis
1 and 2 Test Result showed number R square of 0.491, meant that 49.1 total
compensation in 2004 could be explained by the number of commissaries, management ownership,
company measure, growth opportunity, assets composition, and company occupation measured
by ROA and ROE in 2003, meanwhile the rest would be explained by other factors outside
the research model. F-stat value of 8.001 with signiication level of 0.000 which was less than
0.05 indicated that regression model totally explained the signiicant compensation in 2004.
The commissaries number had coeficient of 0.178 and positive signal 0.000 less than 0.05
meant that greater number of commissaries council meant greater number of management
compensation. This meant that based on the sample of the research, the commissaries number
variable positively and signiicantly affected the management compensation. Therefore, the irst
hypothesis stated that the commissaries number positively affected the management compensation
was failed to be rejected.
Managerial ownership which had coeficient of 0.001 and negative sign with signiicantly
0.825 above the average 0.05 meant that the management ownership based on the research
sample was not a variable which was able to decide the management compensation. Therefore,
the second hypothesis stated that there was a positive relationship between the managerial
ownership and management compensation was failed to be supported.
The third hypothesis test result, dependent variable measured with ROA and ROE in 2005.
In ROA test, the R square number was 0.068 meant that 6.8 ROA in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, commissaries number, management ownership, company measure,
growth opportunity and assets composition in 2004, while the others were explained by other
factors outside the research model. F-stat value was 0.715 with signiicantly level of 0.639 or
greater than 0.05 indicated that the regression model was not entirely signiicant, and this
condition would statistically explain the ROA in 2005.
R square number of ROE test was 0.168 meant that 16 ROE in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, number, management ownership,
company measure,
growth opportunity and assets composition in 2004,
while the others were explained by other factors outside the research model. F-stat value was
1.988 with signiicantly level of 0.082 or greater than 0.05 indicated that the regression model was
not entirely signiicant, and this condition would statistically explain the ROE in 2005.
Regression result showed that the compensation variable, corporate governance
and economic determiner variables of the company occupation would not statistically
affect the next company occupation. Therefore, the third hypothesis stated that compensation and
corporate governance had positive relationship with the company occupation in the following
year could not be supported. This result supported
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Core, Holthausen, Larcker 1999 research. The research tested also the company
occupation in 2004. Table 7 showed the same result with company occupation test result in the
following year 2005, that the compensation variable, corporate governance and economic
determiner variables of the company occupation would not statistically affect the company
occupation in the year of 2004.
DiSCuSSion
The commissaries number in this research was positively related to the management
compensation. This indicated that the management compensation was able to catch their
duties, authority, and strategic decisions created by the commissaries council. Viewed from the
perspective of agency, the positive relationship would show us that the principal and agent
relationship had a contract to bundle the agent to service based on their knowledge, experiences,
skill and ability. Watts and Zimmerman 1986 in their positive accounting theory stated that the
owner and management relationship, commonly hypnotized in bonus plans was a bundle between
the owner and management shaped in a contract.
Walker 1992 stated that compensation was a strategic key to human resource management
purposed to create job harmony to achieve the objective and target decided at the irst place.
Therefore, the management compensation contract was designed to motivate the management to
achieve the occupation target decided previously by the principal.
Ownership structure measured by managerial ownership negatively related to the management
compensation. This condition showed that the management compensation was not affected
by the importance of management possesses company stocks. The entity theory viewed the
company as an entity separated from the owner and creditor, separated management from the
company owner. This condition showed that there was a function separation between the managerial
as owner and as agent.
Other condition was the small proportion of Indonesian managerial ownership. Major
company ownership taken by company or institution controlling the company management
was a special characteristic of concentrate ownership closely head. Gilberg and Idson
1995, Husnan 2000 research in Hastuti 2005 discovered that the company with more
spreading ownership gave greater payment to the management compared to the company with
more concentrated ownership.
The irm Performance in some researches showed the existence of positive relationship
with the compensation or corporate governance. The hypothesis test result of the research showed
different results. Observed from the statistic descriptive model 2, average ROA 2005 from
the research sample company was 0.5462 possessing positive correlation sign which was not
signiicant to the compensation 2004 and negative for both measurement of corporate governance.
This condition showed the low ability of the company to gain proit from the assets utility.
Average ROE in 2005 was 0.9874, possessing positive correlation sign which was not signiicant
to the compensation 2004 and negative for both measurement of corporate governance. This also
showed that the ability of the research sample of company to distribute the gained proit to the
stockholders was low. Therefore, compensation and corporate governance were explicitly unable
to be reserved for subsequent irm performance.
The result of model 2 was consistent with several researches showed that there was no
relationship between the corporate governance and company occupation, such as Daily and
friends 1999 result, CBI survey result, Deloitte and Touche 1996 in Darmawati, Khomsiyah
and Rahayu 2004.
According to Kakabadse and friends 2001 in Darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu 2004,
the difference result of the researches was caused by several reasons. There were: 1 Decided
perspective theoretic, 2 Research methodology, 3 Occupation measure, and 4 Opinion distinction
towards the council participation in the decision making.
The research result showed also that the compensation contract was not yet optimal to be
a motivation to the company occupation in the
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following year. Compensation in 2004 which had positive relationship with the corporate
governance showed that there was no signiicant relationship with the subsequent irm performance.
Consistent to the research, Core, Holthausen, Larcker 1999 that the compensation component
had negative association was signiicant to the ownership and council structure variable, the
management council did not actively supervised and this was an opposite interpretation with the
company request of the CEO quality.
ConCLuSion
The goal of this research was to give evidence that the corporate governance affected
the management compensation and subsequent irm performance. This research was expected
to be able to answer some research questions related to the corporate governance, management
compensation and subsequent irm performance. Based on the research result performed in the
manufacture companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange fulilled the sample election criteria,
we could take several conclusions as follow: 1. The result of this research showed that the
commissaries number would positively and signiicantly affect the management compen-
sation in 2004. This fact answered the research question that the corporate governance appli-
cation to create the company value positively related with the management compensation.
This fact showed also that compensation as a company human resource strategy gave re-
ward to the service given by the commissaries council.
2. The result of this research also gave evidence that the ownership structure measured by the
managerial ownership had no positive rela- tionship with the managerial compensation.
This condition indicated that the control func- tion of the ownership structure did not work
effectively yet. 3. The result of this research answered the re-
search question that the compensation and corporate governance did not positively relat-
ed to the subsequent irm performance. This condition showed that the compensation did
not design optimally and the corporate gover- nance did not work effectively.
LiMit AnD SuggeStion
In this research, mistake might happen eventually and caused the result could not be
generalized. Some limits in this research were: 1. Compensation data was not ready for all man-
agement in the strategic level that made this research used remuneration data for all the
commissaries and management council.
2. The samples used were manufacture compa- nies only, stated the remuneration number in
their inancial report without differentiate the company participation in the corporate gover-
nance performance survey. This fact occurred since the research did not use the perception
index of corporate governance performed by IICG together with SWA magazine.
The research was expected to give idea to develop the next researches. Based on the present
existed limits, the following researches might give several considerations as follow:
1. Surveying the management compensation to
gain the compensation data for each manage- ment level.
2. Made the good corporate governance GCG index in order to explain all good corporate
governance GCG variables so that the good corporate governance GCG application suc-
cess measure could be more measurable.
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Jurnal Visioner Strategis Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia Rahmawaty
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Pengaruh Atribut Produk dan Kepuasan Konsumen Terhadap Loyalitas Pengguna Telkomflexi di Kota Lhokseumawe
JURNAL VISIONER STRATEGIS
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