24
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 To sum up, the post-Cold War contexts created the dilemma
of democracy-promotion versus neoliberal economic interest- promotion, in which the Clinton Administration appeared to
prioritize economic interests and consequently democracy- promotion became a tool rather than an objective. In other
words, instead of seizing the momentum to promote genuine democracy, the Administration exacerbated economic inequality
in many countries in the pursuit of its economic interests. This situation partly explains the persisting skepticism towards
democracy-promotion, particularly from the Global South Gills, 2000, despite the “optimism” and “consensus” previously
mentioned.
b. The Post-911 Bush Period
The 911 terrorist attack changed the international contexts for democracy-promotion from “consensus” and “optimism”
to “full of security fears” Whitehead 2008, p.180-194. The Bush Administration, coming into office with little democracy-
promotion rhetoric, drastically changed its policy after the attack, employing democracy-promotion to combat terrorism,
based on the belief that democracy is a “long-term antidote for terrorism” Epstein et al. 2007, p.8. The democracy-promotion
‘theme’ shifted from ‘democracy and open market’ to ‘democracy and war on terror’. At a glance, this policy response seemed to
be an opportunity to minimize the gap between “responsible international policy” and U.S. security through democracy-
promotion: finally the superpower had a genuine reason to promote democracy rather than merely using it as a policy
instrument for pursuing its economic interests. Additionally, post- 911 contexts brought the assertion of democracy-promotion as
an international norm McFaul 2003, p.148; Teixeira 2008, p.1, as was observable from the European Union’s E.U. sudden increase
in support for a democracy-promotion agenda Youngs, 2004 and the strengthening of the notion in various international institutions
McFaul 2004-05, p.155-157. However, the situation appeared to become more complicated, as a different type of FP dilemma
came into prominence, which juxtaposed promotion of genuine democracy with the urgent need for security. Democracy is a “long-
term” and “complex” process Whitehead 2002, cited in Epstein et al. 2007, p.5, whereas protecting citizens from terrorist threats is
an immediate need.
In response to the situation, Bush’s democracy-promotion policies ranged from foundation of the Middle East
Partnership Initiative MEPI to increasing aid to the Middle East, and notably the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Although
various explanations were given, including links to Al Qaeda and existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD, the
Administration repeatedly justified the invasion as an attempt to bring democracy to Iraq. Carothers 2003 argues that the
U.S. democracy-promotion policy showed inconsistencies and “overkill rhetoric”, as the U.S. strengthened ties with non-
democratic regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia in combating the terrorists, yet justified the toppling of Saddam
Hussein. Brumberg 2005 also notes that the U.S. maintained friendship with “liberalized autocrats” in several Middle Eastern
countries due to its fear of the potential for Islamist uprisings in a democratic system. The Administration later responded to
Carothers’s criticism, assuring the public of balance in its policy between democracy and security Dobriansky, 2006.
In dealing with a very complex dilemma, it was apparent that the Bush Administration prioritized security over democracy-
promotion through policy that admittedly improved security to U.S. citizens in the immediate term. On the other hand, the
“responsible international policy” criteria were unfulfilled, as the policy created more clear-cut ‘winners and losers’ compared to the
Clinton period. The U.S., in its attempts at democracy-promotion, violated the United Nations Security Council UNSC resolution,
violated another country’s sovereignty, and killed thousands of people. Hill 2003, p.252 categorizes the invasion of Iraq as a
“crusade”, something that Doyle 2008, p.62 strongly warns against due to the costly consequences. The democracy-promotion
agenda was unsurprisingly perceived as being ‘sacrificed’ for the sake of ‘security’. To sum up, in dealing with the dilemma of
immediate security and long-term genuine democracy, the Bush Administration was unable to produce the balanced solution
expected from a FP or to “cope collectively” with the international environment, as prescribed by Hill 2003, p.239.
c. The Post-Iraq Obama Period
The Bush Administration contributed to the changing perception of the international community on democracy-
promotion and the increasing tension between promoting genuine democracy and establishing immediate security. The
failures of Iraq resulted in mounting skepticism toward U.S. democracy-promotion worldwide McFaul and Fukuyama
2007-08, p.23-24, whilst domestic public support declined to 37 in a 2007 poll, down from 45 in 2006 German Marshall
Fund 2008, cited in Fukuyama and McFaul 2007-08, p.24. The E.U. attempted to distance itself from U.S. democracy-
promotion policy by resisting U.S. partnership initiatives for a democracy fund in the Middle East Youngs 2004, p.121.
Carothers and Ottaway 2004, p.24 argue that the Iraq case has caused increasing numbers of Arabs to perceive democracy
itself as a synonym for U.S. regional domination. Voices calling for the U.S. to pull back from democracy-promotion ‘abroad’
are emerging, vis-à-vis those supporting U.S. engagement Carothers, 2009. The urgency to protect citizens from
terrorism persists Obama, 2011, yet, it has become more difficult for the U.S. to justify their actions under the banner
of democracy-promotion. The U.S also needs to deal with the image of ‘instrumentalization’ Carothers 2003, p.94 and
‘tainted’ democracy-promotion McFaul 2004-05, p.152. As a result, there was “weakening consensus on democratic values”
Whitehead 2008, p.180-194. Bush’s policy has complicated the nature of the dilemma and consequently the Obama
Administration faces greater constraints and more complex situations.
25
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 The Administration came to office with a modest voice on
democracy-promotion. It has spoken and acted carefully, as exemplified in Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech wherein he
acknowledged that “there has been controversy of democracy- promotion connected to Iraq”, and emphasized that “No system
of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other”. However, Obama subtly underlined the importance of
democratic reform, using more ‘neutral’ terms such as “consent”, “respect to rights”, “participation”, and “legitimate” Obama,
2009. It is arguable that the U.S. response to recent democratic awakening across the Middle East was an attempt to balance
policy in relation to the discussed dilemma and constraints. In the Egyptian revolution, the U.S. avoided becoming involved “too
early”, in order to avoid accusations of interventionism, although acting “a bit late”, to help Mubarak step down Diamond,
2011. In Libya, the U.S. has shown similar caution, engaging in military intervention only with United Nation Security Council
authorization and the Arab League’s support. Obama, in a speech following the intervention, tried to justify the action to the
skeptics by stressing U.S. “interests”, “values” and “responsibility”, whilst emphasizing that the U.S. only “do our part to help”,
and as the Libyan people themselves were more important in the process, Libya would not be another ‘Iraq’ Obama, 2011.
Diamond 2011, commenting on Obama’s speech, said that the U.S. have to be “patient, reserved, and disciplined enough” to
let the society take ownership of the struggle for freedom, but “assertive enough to stand behind them” at the same time.
The three periods illustrate the key changes, through events and actions. It is observable that different international contexts
result in different ‘key dilemmas’. Additionally, the way the actors cope with the contexts in terms of policy response is also
influential in shaping the dynamics of the dilemmas, reinforcing the argument that FP implementation is a “form of strategic
and dialectic interplay between actors and environment” Brighi and Hill 2008, p.118. The U.S. experience also illustrates that it
is not only the policy on how to promote democracy that shapes the dilemma, but also the policy on what kind of democracy is
being promoted. The Bush period shows that the ‘how’ provides more obvious consequences, as aggressive strategy provokes
unfavourable reactions from the international environment and leads to greater future constraints. However, the Clinton
administration’s non-aggressive strategy did not completely resolve the dilemma of democracy-promotion as its promotion
of a specific type of democracy, as discussed previously, reduced its credibility as a “responsible international policy”.
Possible Implications
Having observed the cases and drawn some lessons, several theoretical and policy implications need to be underlined. Firstly,
in dealing with dilemmas of democracy-promotion, policy makers must carefully consider the contexts, their own strategy,
as well the problematic concept of ‘democracy’ itself. As Brighi and Hill 2003, p.118 argue, the success of foreign policy is
influenced by “sound choice of instrument” and “interplay between actor’s strategy and the context”. In addition, foreign
policy makers need to focus especially on understanding what democracy is and how it should relate to their foreign policy.
Secondly, regarding the U.S. case, it is arguable that its democracy-promotion dynamics have implications beyond the
U.S. government’s scope, as demonstrated by the attitude of the Global South in the Clinton period and that of the E.U. after
Iraq. This situation is inseparable from the U.S.’s “capacity”, “philosophy” and “tradition” regarding democracy-promotion, to
use Hill’s 2003, p.240 concise terms for factors that influence states’ “international responsibilities”. The changing contexts
and policy, and dynamics of dilemma will likely influence the potential and effectiveness of non-U.S. actors worldwide. In
the current situation, with the U.S. more constrained to act unilaterally in the name of ‘democracy-promotion’, actors such
as the E.U. may have opportunities to establish their roles as democracy promoters more clearly, but should learn from the
complications created by past U.S. policy.
Thirdly, in the longer term, if a consistently-balanced democracy-promotion policy could be successfully maintained,
the dilemma that is Bush’s legacy might become more resolvable. Ensuing legitimization of democracy-promotion
could allow the U.S. to gain more international support and share the burden for policies believed to benefit its long-term
interests, whilst enabling people worldwide to pursue their fundamental rights. Consequently, the U.S. will become less
constrained in formulating policy with regard to democracy- promotion ‘abroad’.
Counter Arguments and Their Importance
My conception of ‘key dilemmas’ may cause to disagreement with my arguments. It might be suggested that my definition
lacks rationality or consideration of the interests of the foreign
26
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 policy makers. To some extent, this objection is plausible.
However, as I mentioned earlier, my position, for relatively clear reasons, is based on the ‘pluralist’ standpoint, and has, I would
argue, a sound grounding. Of course, there is scope for different standpoints with different conceptions of ‘key dilemmas’.
Disagreement may also arise on the ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions. Carothers 2009, for instance, argues that Obama needs only
to change the ‘how’ of democracy-promotion. It is true that Bush’s aggressive strategy caused more obvious tension between
‘winners and losers’ than that of Clinton, yet, the Clinton period demonstrated that the U.S. cannot ignore the tension
potentially caused by their selection of type or substance of democracy, regardless of the level of aggressiveness of the
strategy. Therefore, taking into account both the ‘how’ and the ‘what’, make more sense for long-term policy.
Objections also may come from those who argue that democracy-promotion, despite what happened in Iraq, is now a
“stronger than ever” international norm and provides “growing legitimacy” of intervention abroad McFaul 2004-05, p.155.
These scholars encourage the U.S. to maintain its activism and proposed strategies include institutionalization of democracy-
promotion intervention McFaul and Fukuyama 2006-07, p.41- 43. However, it is likely that the persisting dilemma and its
proneness to exacerbation by policy could be counterproductive to the current Administration’s careful approach. Domestic
security will always be the U.S. priority, yet intervention and democracy-promotion in relation to security objectives ‘abroad’
will not be as easily justifiable as in the pre-Iraq era. Time is needed to repair the tarnished image of the notion, and the
U.S. plays a pivotal role here. Additionally, attempts to justify intervention on the grounds of erosion of state sovereignty have
become less relevant, and will potentially backfire. Caution and skepticism regarding interventionby the U.S. and the
West in general is still high, even among liberal, Western- friendly democracies like India, which abstained from the U.N.
resolution 1973 on Libya Global Post, 2011, or Indonesia, which recently urged the U.N. to stop the air-strikes in Libya
Media Indonesia, 2011. However, despite my positions, I want to underline that these counter-arguments provokes healthy
debate in the discussion.
III. Conclusion
