43
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 share is measured by the number of youth workers aged 20
to 24 divided by the number of all workers aged 15 to 65 multiplied by 100.
Using fixed effect regression model, this study only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that vary over period
time. Another assumption of the fixed effect regression model is that those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the
provinces and should not be correlated with other provinces’ characteristics.
Table 1. Youth Employment Share 2005-2009
13.30 12.31
11.28 12.52
13.12 15.05
13.66 13.16
11.79
7.13 8.23
9.16 5.48
8.69 9.01
8.66
13.45 14.01
13.01 12.45
12.57 10.69
9.48 12.39
10.75 14.09
13.27 13.50
13.40 13.26
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 29
30
No.
Aceh Sumatera Utara
Sumatera Barat Riau
Jambi Sumatera Selatan
Bengkulu Lampung
Bangka Belitung DKI Jakarta
Jawa Barat Jawa Tengah
DI Yogyakarta Jawa Timur
Banten Bali
NTB NTT
Kalimantan Barat Kalimantan Tengah
Kalimantan Selatan Kalimantan Timur
Sulawesi Utara Sulawesi Tengah
Sulawesi Selatan Sulawesi Tenggara
Gorontalo Maluku
Maluku Utara Papua
Province 2005
11.90 13.95
12.40 14.96
12.38 14.50
12.51 13.27
15.24 12.92
10.04 10.19
7.41 9.23
13.92 11.25
13.25 14.30
13.48 13.96
13.01 11.37
10.22 11.12
11.92 13.21
11.12 10.52
12.52 10.99
2006
12.69 13.78
12.81 14.80
13.18 14.18
13.44 12.70
14.90 13.41
10.70 10.08
8.57 9.43
13.02 10.76
12.59 13.65
13.42 12.34
12.62 13.34
8.92 13.10
12.92 12.96
12.61 11.12
13.48 11.00
2007
11.55 13.48
10.98 12.97
12.83 13.93
12.28 12.92
14.31 13.64
10.76 10.60
8.57 8.48
12.31 9.92
11.90 12.91
13.14 12.46
11.46 11.41
8.96 12.54
11.25 12.23
11.49 11.81
13.68 11.06
2008
11.69 11.98
9.72 11.25
11.90 12.02
11.11 11.21
13.36 11.42
9.06 9.07
6.22 8.56
11.37 8.43
11.42 12.86
12.51 11.58
10.55 10.78
9.07 11.66
10.85 11.82
11.28 11.59
11.44 12.51
2009
Source: CBS, author’s calculation.
4.2 Analysis and Discussion
In this study, youth employment share is a dependent variable, while provincial minimum wage, GRDP and provincial
minimum wage on one year before are independent variables. This study focuses on evaluating the impact of provincial
minimum wage on youth employment share in Indonesia. The econometric models are given as following
1 logyouth
it
= β + β
1
logmw
it
+ β
2
logmw
it-1
+ c
i
+ ε
it
2 logyouth
it
= β + β
1
logmw
it
+ β
2
logmw
it-1
+ β
3
logGRDP
it
+ c
i +
ε
it
3 logyouth
it
= β +β
1
logmw
it
+β
2
logmw
it-1
+β
3
Y
2007
+β
4
Y
2008
+β
5
Y
2009
+ c
i+
ε
it
4 logyouth
it
= β + β
1
logmw
it
+ β
2
logmw
it-1
+ β
3
logGRDP
it
+ β
4
Y
2007
+ β
5
Y
2008
+ β
6
Y
2009
+ c
i
+ ε
it
Where i and t denote each province and year respectively, logyouth
it
represents youth employment share, logmw
it
is provincial minimum wage, logmw
it-1
is provincial minimum wage on one year before, logGRDP
it
is Gross Domestic Regional Product in constant price of 2000. Y
2007
, Y
2008
, Y
2009
are year dummy variables, and
it
indicates the error term. The model is basically based on Neumark and Wascher 1992 with
modification by adding GRDP variable. Theterm c
i
is the unobserved province fixed effects. As described already, each province has the autonomy to decide
the level of minimum wage. Therefore, it is possible that the province fixed effect is correlated with the level of minimum
wage. For example, a province with greater economic activities may set higher minimum wage. If the level of economic activity
is not properly captured by GRDP, then this would cause an upward bias in the coefficient for minimum wage. In other
words, we may mistakenly find minimum wage to increase employment rate. Thus, we apply fixed effect estimation.
Although economic activity may not be properly seen as time invariant, we consider that it would, in part, control for
biases caused by the correlation between unobserved province characteristics and the level of minimum wage.
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and R
2
for the econometric model without year dummy variables. The regression result for the first equation is given by:
logyouth = 10.926 – 0.316logmw – 0.335lag_logmw Provincial minimum wage has significant impact on youth
employment share at 1 level of significance. The results indicate that a 1 increase in provincial minimum wage will
decrease youth employment share by 0.316. The provincial minimum wage at one year before has also significant impact on
dependent variable with elasticity value -0.335. This indicates that 1 increase in provincial minimum wage at one year before
will decrease youth employment share by 0.335 assuming another variable is constant which is larger than the effect of
current minimum wages.
For the second equation, we obtain the regression result as follows:
logyouth = 21.767 – 0.157logmw – 0.202lag_logmw – 0.473logGRDP
The increase of 1 in provincial minimum wage is associated with 0.157 decrease of youth employment share. However,
it is not statistically significant at conventional level. On the other hand, provincial minimum wage at one year before has
significant impact on youth employment share at 1 level of significance. This indicates that 1 increase in provincial
minimum wage at one year before will decrease youth employment share by 0.202. The impact is more than that of
44
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 current minimum wages. GRDP has also significant impact on
dependent variable with elasticity value -0.473. It means that 1 increase in GRDP will decrease 0.473 youth employment
share.
Table 2. The Impact of Provincial Minimum Wage on Youth Employment Share without year dummy variables
Independent variables logminimum wage
t
logminimum wage
t-1
logGRDP
t
Constant
R_squared Number of observations
-0.316 0.098
-0.335 0.098
– 10.926
1.779 0.195
120 -0.157
0.098 -0.202
0.085 -0.473
0.115 21.767
3.251 0.357
120
1 2
Note: All variables use provincial data, where , , indicate statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 respectively. Standard Errors are in parentheses.
The coefficient estimates, standard errors, and R
2
for the econometric model with year dummy variables are provided in
Table 4.3. The inclusion of year dummy variables is intended to take care of the common trend of the youth employment share
across the 30 provinces with reference year is 2006.
The result for the third equation is as following: logyouth = 5.753 – 0.114logmw – 0.137lag_logmw +
0.020Y
2007
– 0.018Y
2008
– 0.095 Y
2009
An increase of 1 provincial minimum wage is associated with 0.114 decrease of youth employment share. However,
it is not statistically significant at conventional level. Similarly, provincial minimum wage on one year before has negative
impact on youth employment share, but it is not statistically significant at conventional level. The result indicates that 1
increase in provincial minimum wage at one year before will decrease youth employment share by 0.137 and has larger
effect than recent minimum wages. The coefficient estimate of year dummy variable for 2007 is positive, while those for 2008
and 2009 are negative. It implies that youth employment share in 2007 is 2.02 higher than in 2006. On the other hand, its
share in 2008 and 2009 is 1.82 and 9.97 lesser than in 2006 accordingly
1
. Nevertheless, only is the coefficient estimate in 2009 significant at conventional level.
The regression result for the fourth equation is stated below: logyouth = –10.428 – 0.097logmw – 0.119lag_logmw +
1 This calculation value is obtained by using formula: e
coefficient estimate
-1100.
0.510logGRDP – 0.011Y
2007
– 0.079Y
2008
– 0.188 Y
2009
From the last equation above, 1 increase in provincial minimum wage is associated with 0.097 decrease of youth
employment share, but it is not statistically significant at conventional level. The provincial minimum wage on one year
before has negative impact on youth employment share even though it is not statistically significant at conventional level.
The result indicates that 1 increase in provincial minimum wage at one year before will decrease youth employment share
by 0.119. This effect is more than current minimum wages. GRDP has positive impact on youth employment share, but
it is also not statistically significant at conventional level. The coefficient estimates of year dummy variables for 2007, 2008
and 2009 are negative. The youth employment share in 2007, 2008, and 2009 are, respectively, 1.01, 8.22, and 20.56
smaller than in 2006. However, only is the coefficient estimate in 2009 significant at 1.
Table 3. The Impact of Provincial Minimum Wage on Youth Employment Share with year dummies variables
Independent variables logminimum wage
t
logminimum wage
t-1
logGRDP
t
Y
2007
Y
2008
Y
2009
Constant
R_squared Number of observations
-0.114 0.092
-0.137 0.096
– 0.020
0.015 -0.018
0.016 -0.095
0.017 5.753
1.661 0.514
120 -0.097
0.093 -0.119
0.097 0.510
0.379 -0.011
0.028 -0.079
0.048 -0.187
0.070 -10.427
12.120 0.524
120
3 4
Dependent variable :
Note: All variables use provincial data, where , , indicate statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 respectively. Standard Errors are in parentheses.
In sum, by using fixed effect regression models, this study finds in general that the minimum wage has negative effects
on youth employment rate. However, the effect is sensitive to the inclusion of year dummies, though the coefficients are
still negative. Where the effects are significant, we found that the impact of provincial minimum wage at one year before is
larger than that of current minimum wages. It may be plausible as it takes several months for companies to implement the
new provincial minimum wage. Based on empirical research conducted by Smeru in Jabodetabek and Bandung 2003, a
45
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 number of companies need two until six months to implement
it, particularly small and medium enterprises, due to financial difficulties. Besides, companies may defer to adjust with the
new provincial minimum wage policy for maximum of one year after obtaining approval from the local government.
CONCLUSION
In brief, provincial minimum wage had a significant impact on the youth employment share. Increasing in provincial minimum
wage will decrease the youth employment share. This is due to company policy if they raise the minimum wage, they will be
selective about the young workers aged 20-24 years old who want to work. The main reason is the young workers aged 20 to
24 years generally have less experience in working.
An important platform for the government of Indonesia to improve the lives of workers is through a policy of minimum
wage. The rates of minimum wage determined by each region, the governor presented information on the minimum
wage. The protection and social welfare directorate at the ministry of manpower and transmigration is responsible for
the implementation of wage policy. Some of the tasks of this directorate are to facilitate the setting of minimum wage, to review
the components for formulating minimum wage, and to socialize minimum wage application in enterprises. The Directorate is to
determine the new minimum wage level and then to distribute to the trade unions, workers and employers gradually.
Under law No. 13 of 2003 stipulates that the minimum wage should be based on the needs of a decent life and the rule
should be known to stakeholders. For this purpose, a number of socialization to the regions has been carried out. Socialization
of the increases in the minimum wage was being made to disseminate information to the social partners, without the
need for a special campaign. Information on the increases in the minimum wage was known to the public through radio, press,
television or other cracks. The workers receive information about the wage increase comes from the management of their
workplaces that are members of trade the unions otherwise they would either get such information from the radio or from the
newspaper, or from work mates.
The government through the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration and the social partners shall disseminate
information about the decisions the new minimum wage increases. Labor bureaus at provincial and district shall deliver
the information along with their social partners from mass media. Unsatisfactory responses toward such new rates are often
expressed by both employers and labor unions with such reasons of wither the new wage level is set too high or too low. As an
46
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 association of employers and trade unions, social partners play
an active role in spreading information about the minimum wage. It is because they are obliged to inform changes in
minimum wage.
Access to productive and decent work is the best way young people can realize their aspirations, improve their living
conditions and actively participate in society. To create productive employment opportunities are vast, various policy
tools that affect the prices of factors of production shall be directed as such so that the level and price structure will best
explain the situation of shortage and excess of production factors of the community.
The policy shall be directed to adjust wages to economic development and that there should be a harmonious balance
between wages as an element of production costs and wages as income for workers with due regard to wage rates contained in
the economy. The wisdom of wage increases will give priority to groups of workers with very low income towards a decent
wage. This is subject to the conditions of each region and business sectors. The principle of wage that must be met is the
excitement of working that can increase production and living standards, while improving the employees. This principle will
be achieved in ways that work rationally and efficiently, without leaving the atmosphere of cooperativeness in the company.
n
Tejaningsih adalah Staf Perencana pada Biro Sumber Daya Manusia, Bappenas
REFERENCES
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Azam, J.P. 1994. Effects of Minimum Wages in Developing Countries: An Exploration. Background Paper for the
1995 World Development Report. Washington DC: World Bank.
Bappenas National Development Planning Agency. 1999. Looking to the Future of the Indonesian Economy,
Jakarta: BAPPENAS. Bell, L. 1995. The Impact of Minimum Wages in Mexico and
Colombia. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. S102-S135.
Bird,Kelly and Manning. 2002. Impact of Minimum Wage Policy on Employment and Earning in the Informal
Sector: The Case of Indonesia. Paper presented at the 8th Convention of the East Asian Economic Association,
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Employment and Unemployment. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 20, pp 487-528
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pp.133-147. Card, D. 1992. Using Regional Variations in Wages to Measure
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Labor Relations Review, vol. 47, pp.487-97. Central Bureau Statistics CBS. National Labor Survey data
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www.ilo.org. Islam, Iyanatul and Nazara, Suahasil. 2000. Minimum wage
and the welfare of Indonesian workers. Occasional Discussion Paper Series No 3. International Labor
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depnakertrans.go.id Neumark, D, and Wascher, W. 1992. Employment Effects of
Minimum Wage and Subminimum Wage: Panel data on state minimum wage laws. Industrial and Labor
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Wittenburg, 2000. Who minimum wage increases bite: an analysis using monthly data from the SIPP
and the CPS. Southern Economic Journal Vol.67 No.1:16-40.
Rama, M. 1996. The Consequences of Doubling the Minimum Wage: The Case of Indonesia. Washington DC: World
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SMERU Research Institute. 2001. Wage and Employment Effects of Minimum Wage Policy in the Indonesian
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Legislation. American Economic Review 36, June 1946, pp. 358-65.
47
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1
Arief Wiroyudo
INTRODUCTION
Since 2000, Indonesia has been undergoing a massive transformation from centralized to decentralized government
and regional autonomy. This new governmental system is fundamentally reshaping the political, economic and social
structure of the country. The big-bang decentralization leads to the less role of central government in the regional development.
Therefore, there are new tasks and responsibilities in terms of function assignment and financing to local government as
consequences of decentralization.
Underlying the national policy on performance monitoring and evaluation MONEV is accomplishment of government
efforts in implementing development programs that improve the capability of departments and agencies to allocate limited
resources appropriately and to manage them efficiently. The successful implementation of performance evaluation is seen as
an institutional development that is needed to provide better information as an input for the next planning process.
The importance of the MONEV quality awareness implies that those suppliers line-ministries andor government officials in
local levels of evaluation reports are responsible for the provision of good MONEV information demanded by decision-makers.
However, the activities of MONEV in Indonesia still face some
48
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 problems, such as many rules that are required by sector and
local government to make reports to central government, there was less impact of MONEV activities to the next plan, lack of
synchronization and overlapping issue, and many evaluation activities are very costly in terms of money and time. Integrated
MONEV of wholly national development performance becomes a big challenge for Indonesia. It is essential to link and
synchronize both information on monitoring and evaluation activities between central and regional government in order to
formulate the next national development plan.
The purpose of this paper is to emphasis the need of Integrated Development Performance MONEV System in Indonesia to
support national and regional development planning process efficiently.
This paper has some points as main discussions to introduce that can be shown as follows:
1. To give a theoretical framework of MONEV development system
2. To Analyze the national development MONEV system in Indonesia case
3. To recommend some key points in order to develop an integrated development MONEV system in Indonesia
MONITORING AND EVALUATION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM OVERVIEW:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
From time to time, there has been a global change in public sector management as consequences of public forces to make government
to be more accountable to their stakeholders. These are some concerns and questions being raised by internal and external
stakeholders, and many governments are struggling in addressing and answering them. The public citizens are really caring about
the services delivered by the government. For examples questions are, Have policies, programs, and projects led to the desired results
and outcomes? How do we know we are on the right track? How do we know if there are problems along the way? How can we
correct them at any given point in time? How do we measure progress? How can we tell success from failure? The public services
production can be illustrated on the following figure.
Production of Public Services
Resource Input
Output Outcome
Economy Economy
Economy
Examples a. Police Service
b. Customs Service c. Child Care SService
External Factors
Process
Source: Hideaki Tanaka, 2009
Monitoring and Evaluation: What Is It All About? Evaluation is very important phase in policy analysis. As one
of the procedures of the policy analysis integrated framework, it cannot be separated with other procedures. Monitoring as
the previous procedure provides the fact and information that will be assessed by evaluation action. The policy performance
information produced through evaluation will be used as a feedback for next procedure in policy analysis framework.
According to Dunn 1994, the relationships of monitoring and evaluation activities on a cycle of an integrated framework of
policy analysis can be described as following figure.
An Integrated Framework of Policy Analysis
Monitoring
POLICY PERFORMANCE
Evaluation
POLICY OUTCOMES
Problem Structuring
Problem Structuring
P roblem
Struc tur
ing P
roblem Struc
tur ing
POLICY PROBLEM
POLICY ACTIONS
Recommendation Forecasting
POLICY FUTURES
The OECD 2002 defines monitoring and evaluation as follows:
Monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and
the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives
and progress in the use of allocated funds.
Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program, or policy, including its design,
implementation, and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness,
impact, and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation
of lessons learned into the decision making process of both recipients and donors.
According to these two definitions, it is confirmed there are some different activities but monitoring and evaluation are
complementary each other on a planning and budgeting cycle process. Monitoring gives information on where a policy,
program, or project is at any given time and over time relative to respective targets and outcomes, while evaluation gives evidence
of why targets and outcomes are or are not being achieved.
Why We Do Evaluation? Evaluation is a complement to monitoring in a condition when
a monitoring system sends information that the efforts are not
49
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 in the track, and then good evaluative information can help
clarifying the realities and trends noted with that monitoring system. Patton Sawicki 1986 explained that the policy
analysis process does not stop with the implementation of the apparently superior policy. Even after a policy has been
implemented, doubt may remain as to whether the proper problem was identified, whether an important aspect of the
problem was ignored, or whether the policy conclusion or recommendation might been wrong. These concerns require
us to monitor and evaluate policies and programs to see that the correct alternative is implemented, to assure that it does
not irregularly change form, and to determine whether it is having the preferred impact, whether it should be redesigned or
modified, or whether it should be terminated.
Mandated by certain regulations, the government central and local governments is responsible for programs and activities
which contribute as a basis for budget establishment. Each program and activity produces outputs immediate results
and outcomes medium term results. Over the longer terms outcomes lead to impact long term results. Logical framework
of development process can be described as following figure.
Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, May 2007
IMPACTS OUTCOMES
OUTPUTS ACTIVITIES
INPUTS
The resources that contribute to the production and delivery of outputs
The Processes or actions the that use a range of inputs to produce the desired outputs
The final products or goods and services produced for delivery
The medium term results for specific beneficiaries that are the consequence of achieving specific outputs
The developmental results of achieving specific outcomes
What we aim to change What we wish to
achieve What we produce or
deliver
What we use to do the work
What we do
Furthermore, focusing on evaluation system, it contributes to three basic functions Mackay, 1998:
• Accountability: making sure that public institutions, and their staff, are held accountable for their performance.
• Allocation: making sure that resources are allocated to those activities which contribute most effectively to
achieving the basic objectives of the institution. • Learning: making sure we learn from our successes and
failures, to do things better in future.
ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION
SYSTEMIN INDONESIA CASE
The economic crisis in the late 1990’s became to catalyst that prompted the Government of Indonesian to give high efforts to
reform the public sector starting in the early 2000. Furthermore, in this era, Indonesia has been undergoing a massive
transformation from centralized to decentralized government and regional autonomy. One of the main focuses of the reforms
was in the area of public financial management, with the goal of promoting good governance, greater transparency and
accountability in the conduct of government affairs.
Despite having traditionally a strong statistical system, monitoring and evaluation is a major weakness of the
Indonesian government planning system. Feedback of progress and results achieved is rarely provided, despite the numerous
requirements for filling out forms and lodging them. Most of those forms are for recording purposes only, not for monitoring
progress and evaluating results. At the present time, there are so many regulations related with MONEV activities, therefore
this condition increases the working units workload due to the multiplicity of evaluation. Moreover this condition also made
the ambiguity of responsible on evaluation result.
MONEV plays a key role in the existing integrated planning, budgeting and implementation development activities. This
circumstance has reflected that state ministries must evaluate performance of programs according to the regulation standards.
However, it is generally recognized that MONEV mechanism and reporting systems in Indonesia are not very efficient and
effective as can be seen from following problems:
Legal Aspect Problem Legal aspects for MONEV of development activities in Indonesia
mainly are derived from 3 laws. Firstly, Law No. 252004 on National Development Planning System which related with
national development plan from all sectors as a whole. Secondly, Law No. 172003 on National Finance which related with budget
disbursement, and thirdly, Law No. 322004 on Local Government which related with regional or sub national development plan.
These laws provide a new framework for financial management in the public sector, and establish the basic principles of transparency
and accountability, as well as regulate the planning, budgeting and the accounting systems. The relationships of those development
activities can be seen as follows.
Development Budget and Planning Process in Central and Regional Level
20 years 20 years
Ministries Strategic
Plan National
Midterm Plan
National Longterm
Plan Regional
Longterm Plan
Regional Mid Term
Plan
Regional Work Unit
Strategic Plan
Regional Work Plan
Regional Work Unit
Work Plan Regional
Budget Detailed
Regional Budget
Ministries Work Plan
Ministries’ Budget
Work Plan Detailed
State Budget
C en
tr
al G
o v
ernmen t
L oc
al
G o
v ernmen
t
Gov’t Work Plan
Draft State
Budget State
Budget
Annual
Law of Dev,t Plan Law of Finance
Draft Reg Budget
Synchronized in the National Farum on DDev’t Plan
Reg Budget
Work Plan
Source: Directorate Allocation of Development Funding, Bappenas
50
E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 According to the Law No. 252004 on National Development
Planning System, it states that ministries, institutions and regional government work units are responsible for conducting
MONEV activities of their development plans of the previous period. This law also stipulated that the more detailed
procedures for MONEV of the implementation development plans will be issued through Government Regulations. The
prominent government regulation of those regarding MONEV activities of national development plan implementation was
issued in 2006. This regulation No. 39 Year 2006 provides specific table formats for the line-ministries, institutions
and regional government work units to report on program implementation, and formats for the consolidation of such
information.
The second government regulation, relating to MONEV of regional development plan implementation is Government
Regulation No.8 Year 2008. Interestingly, this regulation does not refer to any article of Law 252004 as the legal basis for
issuing the regulation, but it takes Article No. 154 of another Law Law No.322004 as its legal basis. The linkage between
national and regional development planning is acknowledged in article 150 of Law 322004, which states that regional
planning is part of the national development planning. This government regulation refers to the need for issuance of several
Ministerial Regulations Minister of Home Affairs to regulate the National Development Plan ForumConsultation process,
integrated planning and budgeting, and MONEV of regional development plans.
In sort, according to those examples above, we can see that there are many regulations on MONEV activities. Each regulation
asked for the specific forms as mandates, however many of them seem not correlated each other on an integrated MONEV
development system.
Lack of synchronization and Overlapping issue
Initially, there were many definitions of MONEV activities of national and regional development in Indonesia. Many
government institutions had evaluation specified in their mandates, but often meaning different things. This
circumstance also made the ambiguity condition about who would be responsible for MONEV supervision or coordinator.
Furthermore, this MONEV activity often occur overlaps condition in implementation. In fact, MONEV reporting is an
additional burden to already busy of responsible-staffs. In some experiences regarding MONEV activities, there are so many
reports that should be prepared by the MONEV providers planning bureau, so they cannot do anything but just fill-up
the MONEV tables rather than make strategic plans.
Lack of feedback from MONEV reports
According to the theories and concepts explained earlier, MONEV results feedback actually used as a valuable input
for the next planning process. However, in Indonesia case this MONEV report is not fully used as input for the next planning.
The poor quality of the MONEV documents, un-measurable information, and there were no institutions that capable to
develop MONEV reports with integrating cross-sector issues are some critical problems for creating a good MONEV report
as an input for decision makers at the top level for the next strategic development plan activities.
In many chances most of the reports are only focus on aid disbursement and physical progress, instead of program or
activity performance indicators. As a consequence, the impact of development, especially for social aspects, was often lacking
in monitoring and evaluation. So, it is difficult condition for Bappenas as a planning institution to come up with such good
development planning with those limited information provided by line ministries.
Lack of resources to carry out MONEV
In many cases, monitoring activities of development performance in Indonesia are carried out by junior staffs of
government officials. Typically, the activities of data input, table formatting, and recording are some main activities within this
monitoring phase. However, for the evaluation, this advanced activity still carried out by the lower staffs rather than more
advanced and skilled staffs. This circumstance made the decision makers reluctant to use current MONEV information
because monitoring and evaluation results and reports are often not well compiled and poorly information. For example,
project implementers still have to report progress using a wide range of formats, which indicates a lack of streamlining and
rationalization in reporting. Up to now, many top level decision makers have realized the importance of MONEV. They want to
have staffs whose capability to carry out the MONEV activity and can provide them useful information to develop policies.
Unfortunately, the capacity development for MONEV training is still limited. There are no certain trainings and courses to
carry on development MONEV activity in local level or even central level. The activity mostly is derived from senior to junior
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E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 staff without knowing the essential meaning and importance of
MONEV activity itself.
RECOMMENDATION
According to some existing problems, there are some future expectations for improvement of MONEV activities. Hence,
there are some recommendations as follows:
Establishment of National Coordination Group. In Indonesia, practically departments and agencies are responsible
for conducting MONEV activities. Departments were not prepared to hand over their control of departmental evaluation
to Bappenas. According to the respected laws, the concept framework of having Bappenas as functionally responsible to
the MONEV system and the departments to responsible for doing the actual evaluation work was the key to the acceptance
of an overall approach for performance evaluation in Indonesia.
As the current situation, Bappenas with its limited staff would never have been able to do the monitoring and evaluation
work as needed. Retaining functional responsibility, prescribing how evaluation work was to be carried out and reported, and
having departments do the evaluation work, was the only viable solution. Departments are closest to the development
work and they have access to the information needed for the MONEV activities. Unlike developed countries where there
may be many alternative sources of information possible for evaluation, in developing countries there is only one real source
of information which is the departments. It confirmed that evaluation work can only be performed well if the departments
are involved. However, without central guidance from Bappenas, departments would do poorly evaluation or would do
evaluation work using a wide range of different approaches that make the evaluation result cannot use to fulfill the requirement
as a basic input need for the next planning process. Bappenas would then be unable to fulfill its national task regarding
performance evaluation.
Considering that condition above and also many regulations related to the MONEV activities, the existence of so called
“National Coordinator Group” will be very essential part. This board would essentially more focus on coordination and
collaboration activities in the development and implementation of MONEV processes that are used by ministries at the
present time. By Giving Bappenas a role as “policy director’ of sector ministries is a best solution to have comprehensive
consideration of National program priorities. The main task of this national coordination group is to provide documents or
reports as a mandate to direct the development of performance management and indicators of national development as a whole,
and to report to the Cabinet through a designated Minister on direction, progress, issues and problems.
Establishment of Indicator Resource Group. Bappenas now has the functional responsibility for performance evaluation
in overall while departments actually carry out the evaluation work. Bappenas works closely with departments to develop and
use performance indicators for GOI developmental projects donor-assisted or not, as part of the budgeting system. The
proposed members of this group are the staffs in Bappenas who have responsibilities in MONEV activities MONEV working
unit. Recently, Bappenas has new working unit which have specific responsibilities on MONEV activities at Deputy Level
same with Directorate General Level. Together with the staffs from ministriesagencies who have similar responsibilities
in MONEV of their each ministryagency and internal organization which perform as ODA providers, this group is
expected to develop a good quality of KPIs Key Performance Indicators.
Rational selection of indicators will help to address the classic problem of too many indicators. On the other hand, the use of
hierarchy of indicators at different levels will help to focus on the national strategic outcomes through bottom-up filtration
until monitoring and evaluation information needs are met at the district, sectoral, provincial and national levels. Quantitative
indicators need to be supplemented by informed judgment and common sense. Furthermore, it is important to build a review
mechanism into the system. The various sets of indicators for all levels should be reviewed and challenged in terms of their
effectiveness, cost implications, data quality and source of data collection, and linkages among performance indicators.
The use of these performance indicators for development projects brings Bappenas and the departments closer together
through both parties using performance indicators as a common language. With this arrangement, ODA providers
now can support the national policy on performance evaluation by cooperating with related national organizations in the
development and using performance indicators for development project inputs, outputs, results and impacts. The use of the
same set of structured performance indicators for a given development project by both ODA providers and Indonesia
as recipient country should strengthen MONEV capacity development. Parallel reporting systems for recording the
achievements of ODA provider projects should be discouraged. Instead, as much as possible, ODA providers should adapt to
the evaluation systems which developed by recipient country or in this case Indonesia.
Establishment of Integrated MONEV System Data Base. At this time, the availability of data are scattered in each ministry
institution, meanwhile there is no coordination among data providers. It is difficult to have cross-sector and cross-region
analysis and prepare a consolidated report. Not all indicators data are available regularly, especially for data that should be
obtained from sector side non-survey data. There are many data have been collected by sector institutions but some of them
are not processed properly even there should be guidance forms based on some mandated regulations. Furthermore, there is no
synchronized perception in filling the form and data processing of sector data. Therefore, the integrated MONEV system will
serve as a multi-stakeholder platform. It will foster and enhance
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E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 partnerships, collaboration, and programmatic synergies among
stakeholders. It is an opportunity to have a common agreement on indicator metadata, data collection and data processing
issues, data flow management, system support, and management of database development and maintenance. Under Bappenas
supervision, Central Statistical Board BPS can handle those activities as a source of data provision, data collection, data
sharing, and data management of documented all MONEV activities. This BPS will produce a kind of MONEV system
database that can be accessed by all stakeholders.
Development of implementation schedules for new MONEV processes. The existing condition of MONEV activities has
given the increasing number and complexity of the MONEV functions that required from the working unit staffs, along
with increasingly complex reporting requirements, it may not adequately power capacity to provide the necessary quality of
the reports. Furthermore, as the degree of preparation needed increases with complexity, it becomes necessary to ensure that
the extra time, costs, and resources are efficiently used. So, the integrated schedule for all MONEV activities should be
developed. Starting from monitoring until ex-post evaluation should be established with clearly agenda, who, what, where,
when, and how the MONEV activities be conducted are critical matter. All activities must be documented and posted to the
integrated MONEV database system.
Improving the role of Indonesia Development Evaluation Community InDEC. Knowledge from the same organization
abroad that brings new ideas and contributes in improving the MONEV policies can be expanded from the presence
of establishing community evaluator in Indonesia. It should be admitted that the MONEV policies have not started in
its optimal at this point in time. Generally, this concern is caused by the lack of skills of the people responsible in the
evaluation of the tasks towards the implementation, the limited information about the procedure in conducting work scheme
evaluation, segregation of system, and evaluation reports as well as the minimum coordination among the facilitators.
As many countries practices according to the involvement of evaluation community beside the government side, it is also
believed that intensive interaction and exchange of information as well as the thought among MONEV actors spread to
professional, academics, government officers, and NGOs both locally and internationally are urgent to create added value
and high advantage in creating better climate in the MONEV system in Indonesia.
n
Arief Wiroyudo adalah Staf Perencana pada Direktorat Perkotan
dan Perdesaan, Bappenas
REFERENCES
Barberie, A. 1998. Indonesia’s National Evaluation System. Evaluation Capacity Development Working Paper
Series No. 3. World Bank. Washington DC Dunn, W. 1994. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction.
Pearson Education, Inc. New Jersey. Kusek, J. Z. Rist, R. C. 2004.Ten Steps to a Results-Based
Monitoring and Evaluation System.World Bank. Washington, DC.
Mackay, K. 1998. Public Sector Performance-The Critical Role of Evaluation. World Bank. Washington DC.
McNamara, C.2007. Field Guide to Nonprofit Program Design, Marketing and Evaluation. Authenticity
Consulting, LLC Patton, C. and Sawicki D.S.,1986. Basic Methods of Policy
Analysis and Planning. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Solihin, D. 2008. Setting Up the Development Performance Evaluation System: Overview on Current Practices
and Future. Directorate for Regional Development Performance Evaluation, Bappenas.
Tanaka, H. 2009. Performance Measurement and Evaluation. Presentation of Public Expenditure Management:
Theory and Practice. November, 2009 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. 2002. Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. OECD
DAC, Paris Bappenas. 2004. Mid Term Development Plan Document.
Bappenas, Jakarta http:www.bappenas.go.id Bappenas and Direktorat Perekonomian Daerah. 2006.
Pengolahan dan Analisis Laporan Monitoring Pelaksanaan Dana Alokasi Khusus DAK, Jakarta,
Bappenas and Direktorat Perekonomian Daerah DepartemenKeuangan.2007. Sistem Informasi Keuangan
Daerah Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah [Regional Fiscal Information
System of the Directorate General of Central and Regional Fiscal Balance] http:www.sikd.djpk.
depkeu.go.id
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E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1
I Dewa Gde Sugihamretha
www.ifpri.org
Banyak kalangan bertanya-tanya mengapa negara kita baru dikunjungi oleh 6,4 juta wisatawan manca negara wisman,
jauh tertinggal dibandingkan negara-negara tetangga di ASEAN seperti Malaysia, Singapura, dan Thailand yang
pada tahun yang sama 2008 masing-masing dikunjungi oleh 29,8 juta; 10,5 juta; dan 14,8 juta wisman.
I. LATAR BELAKANG
