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E D I S I 0 2 T A H U N X V I I 2 0 1 1 To sum up, the post-Cold War contexts created the dilemma
of democracy-promotion versus neoliberal economic interest- promotion, in which the Clinton Administration appeared to
prioritize economic interests and consequently democracy- promotion became a tool rather than an objective. In other
words, instead of seizing the momentum to promote genuine democracy, the Administration exacerbated economic inequality
in many countries in the pursuit of its economic interests. This situation partly explains the persisting skepticism towards
democracy-promotion, particularly from the Global South Gills, 2000, despite the “optimism” and “consensus” previously
mentioned.
b. The Post-911 Bush Period
The 911 terrorist attack changed the international contexts for democracy-promotion from “consensus” and “optimism”
to “full of security fears” Whitehead 2008, p.180-194. The Bush Administration, coming into office with little democracy-
promotion rhetoric, drastically changed its policy after the attack, employing democracy-promotion to combat terrorism,
based on the belief that democracy is a “long-term antidote for terrorism” Epstein et al. 2007, p.8. The democracy-promotion
‘theme’ shifted from ‘democracy and open market’ to ‘democracy and war on terror’. At a glance, this policy response seemed to
be an opportunity to minimize the gap between “responsible international policy” and U.S. security through democracy-
promotion: finally the superpower had a genuine reason to promote democracy rather than merely using it as a policy
instrument for pursuing its economic interests. Additionally, post- 911 contexts brought the assertion of democracy-promotion as
an international norm McFaul 2003, p.148; Teixeira 2008, p.1, as was observable from the European Union’s E.U. sudden increase
in support for a democracy-promotion agenda Youngs, 2004 and the strengthening of the notion in various international institutions
McFaul 2004-05, p.155-157. However, the situation appeared to become more complicated, as a different type of FP dilemma
came into prominence, which juxtaposed promotion of genuine democracy with the urgent need for security. Democracy is a “long-
term” and “complex” process Whitehead 2002, cited in Epstein et al. 2007, p.5, whereas protecting citizens from terrorist threats is
an immediate need.
In response to the situation, Bush’s democracy-promotion policies ranged from foundation of the Middle East
Partnership Initiative MEPI to increasing aid to the Middle East, and notably the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Although
various explanations were given, including links to Al Qaeda and existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD, the
Administration repeatedly justified the invasion as an attempt to bring democracy to Iraq. Carothers 2003 argues that the
U.S. democracy-promotion policy showed inconsistencies and “overkill rhetoric”, as the U.S. strengthened ties with non-
democratic regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia in combating the terrorists, yet justified the toppling of Saddam
Hussein. Brumberg 2005 also notes that the U.S. maintained friendship with “liberalized autocrats” in several Middle Eastern
countries due to its fear of the potential for Islamist uprisings in a democratic system. The Administration later responded to
Carothers’s criticism, assuring the public of balance in its policy between democracy and security Dobriansky, 2006.
In dealing with a very complex dilemma, it was apparent that the Bush Administration prioritized security over democracy-
promotion through policy that admittedly improved security to U.S. citizens in the immediate term. On the other hand, the
“responsible international policy” criteria were unfulfilled, as the policy created more clear-cut ‘winners and losers’ compared to the
Clinton period. The U.S., in its attempts at democracy-promotion, violated the United Nations Security Council UNSC resolution,
violated another country’s sovereignty, and killed thousands of people. Hill 2003, p.252 categorizes the invasion of Iraq as a
“crusade”, something that Doyle 2008, p.62 strongly warns against due to the costly consequences. The democracy-promotion
agenda was unsurprisingly perceived as being ‘sacrificed’ for the sake of ‘security’. To sum up, in dealing with the dilemma of
immediate security and long-term genuine democracy, the Bush Administration was unable to produce the balanced solution
expected from a FP or to “cope collectively” with the international environment, as prescribed by Hill 2003, p.239.
c. The Post-Iraq Obama Period