SUMMARY CONCLUSION PAPUA: A PROVINCE WITH HIGH LEVELS OF POVERTY,

THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 266 THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 267 of 4,223,833. 345 The province of Aceh comprises 23 administrative units 5 municipalities and 18 districts, 10 of which were created after 2000. The province is one of the two Indonesian Special Autonomy provinces the other is Papua, see the previous subsection. 346 The majority of the population lives in rural areas 71.2 per cent versus 28.8 per cent living in urban areas in 2008 and 41 per cent of the population is under the age of 20 years. 347 Two devastating events have shaped contemporary Aceh and have had an important bearing on the situation of women and children in the province: a prolonged armed conflict and the tsunami of 2004. The historian Anthony Reid described the long history of tense and often violent relations between Aceh and Jakarta in the period preceding independence. 4 In total, Aceh has spent 86 of the past 132 years in armed resistance against Jakarta, and sustainable peace has proven to be elusive. 348 Tensions with Jakarta in the post-colonial period have revolved around three deeply interrelated issues: • The Special Autonomy status of Aceh, which started as an unfulilled promise from Jakarta but which ultimately fell short of the secessionist ambitions of the rebel Acehnese leadership. • Religion and the creation of an Islamic state. 349 • The management and sharing of revenue from gas and oil, after these natural resources were discovered in the province during the 1970s. Issues of autonomy and governance have featured highly in the conflict-ridden relations between Aceh and Jakarta, with natural resources adding to contentions and grievances. The contrast between the abundance of natural resources oil and gas and the disappointing performance in terms of poverty reduction have played an important role in fuelling discontent and ultimately armed conflict in Aceh. For instance, poverty levels fell by 47 per cent in Indonesia between 1980 and 2002 but increased in Aceh by 239 per cent over the same period. 350 Armed conflict returned to Aceh in 1976 when the Free Aceh Movement GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka proclaimed Aceh’s Independence and was met by extensive counterinsurgency campaigns by the Indonesian security forces. The impact of the armed conflict, which lasted until 2005, was devastating. Over 30,000 persons lost their lives, over 400,000 people were displaced by the conflict and approximately 1.5 million people - or 39 per cent of the population - consider themselves to have been victims of the conflict. 351 The infrastructure damage left by the conflict was devastating, particularly in rural areas where over 50 per cent of infrastructure was damaged, and agriculture and enterprise were severely affected. Education and the school system were deeply affected too, as both GAM combatants and the Indonesian security forces accused each other of using schools as temporary bases or shelters, and schools became a target for both parties. 352 This led to repeated closures of the school system and just under 4,000 schools were damaged or destroyed during the conflict, affecting two thirds of the total number of schools in rural areas. 353 Many children were unable to 345 Badan Pusat Statistik BPS - Statistics Indonesia - Aceh Province 2009, available at: http:aceh.bps.go.id Last accessed 25 May 2010 346 The five municipalities are Banda Aceh, Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Sabang and Subulussalam 347 Estimates are projections based on the Intercensal survey 2005, processed by BPS - Statistics Indonesia 2009, BPS: Jakarta 348 Reid, INITIAL. cited in: Multi-Stakeholder Review MSR, 2009 Multi-stakeholder review of post-conflict programming in Aceh: Identifying the foundations for sustainable development in Aceh , GoI: Jakarta, p4 348 Ibid. 349 The demand for an independent Islamic state stemmed from the influence of Acehnese religious leaders ulama who led the anti- colonial struggles in Aceh. Their views clashed with those of the urban based, Dutch-educated elite in Java, who sought to build an independent modern secular state. See: Reid, A. 2005 An Indonesian frontier: Acehnese other histories of Sumatra, Singapore University Press: Singapore 350 Brown, G. 2005 Horizontal inequalities, ethnic separatism, and violent conflict: The case of Aceh, Indonesia. UNDP: Jakarta. 351 MSR 2009 Multi-stakeholder review, pxvi 352 Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias 2009 Pendidikan, kesehatan, peran perempuan: Menyiapkan generasi bermutu, BRR: Banda Aceh 353 MSR 2009, Multi-stakeholder review, pxvii Figure 4.4.1: Map of Aceh Source: Center for Population and Policy Studies, Gajah Mada University, 2010 THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 268 THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 269 attend school or undertake the national exams under such circumstances. The tsunami and the armed conflict left dual legacies of devastating infrastructure damage as well as displacement, loss of close relatives and, more generally speaking, violence-related trauma. Children in Aceh were often caught up in the middle of gunfire exchanges in schools, in many cases witnessing the killings of teachers or friends. 354 In all, it is estimated that the prolonged conflict caused US10.7 billion in loss and damages - far more than the 2004 tsunami see below. 355 Finally, countless human rights violations and acts of violence, e.g., killings, rapes, looting, unlawful imprisonmentstrials and evictions, were perpetrated both by the Indonesian security forces and GAM combatants, leaving a legacy of trauma, fear and distrust in the population. 356 By the early 2000s, the prospects for peace in Aceh were unclear. On one hand, the broader process of decentralisation meant that Aceh was granted Special Autonomy through Law No. 182001. However, the Special Autonomy status proved controversial and was rejected by GAM leaders. Between 2001-2004, negotiations were interspersed with periods of intense violence between GAM and the security forces that led to heavy losses on both sides. A new uncertain round of negotiation between the protagonists had been initiated in Helsinki when the tsunami of 26 December 2004 struck. 357 Prior to the tsunami, the conflict in Aceh had received relatively little international attention, not least because access to the province was severely constrained. But the magnitude of the natural disaster brought Aceh to the centre of the world’s attention. Both the devastation and the reconstruction efforts that ensued were unprecedented. Over 132,000 casualties far more than during the armed conflict were confirmed, but many more have not been accounted for and the total number of people who lost their lives in the disaster and its aftermath is not known. According to a 2006 World Bank expenditure analysis, the total recovery cost in Aceh and North Sumatera stood at US4.5 billion, 97 per cent of Aceh’s Gross Regional Domestic Product GRDP. 358 The Office of the United Nations Secretary-General Special Envoy for the Tsunami Recovery reported that the funds pledged for the tsunami recovery by multi- and bilateral donors, non-government organisations NGOs and the Indonesian government amounted to US6.1 billion. 359 The death and destruction wrought by the tsunami, as well as the highly visible national and international responses to the disaster, assisted in creating a new momentum for peace negotiations. A memorandum of understanding MOU between the GoI and GAM was signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki. The MOU included a clarifying and broadening of Aceh’s Special Autonomy status, and was implemented through Law No. 112006 on Governing Aceh. The main points of the agreement included broader autonomy in governance see below, the dissolution of the rebel movement, and the reintegration of combatants into civilian life. 360 354 Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias 2009 Pendidikan, kesehatan, peran perempuan 355 Ibid., p104 356 MSR 2009 Multi-stakeholder review, p4 357 Barron, P. and Clark, S. 2006 ‘Decentralizing inequality? Center-periphery relations, local governance, and conlict in Aceh’, in Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction . Paper No. 39, World Bank: Jakarta 358 MSR 2009 Multi-stakeholder review, pp103-104 359 Approximately US3.6 billion from multi- and bilateral donors and international financial institutions, US2.5 billion from NGOs and the International Federation of Red Cross IFRC and US2.75 billion from the GoI. Office of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005 Tsunami recovery: Taking stock after 12 Months, United Nations: New York 360 MSR 2009 Multi-stakeholder review, pp3-4 Law No. 112006 on Governing Aceh establishes some key political and fiscal institutional arrangements for Aceh. These include the freedom to set up local political parties, the adoption of Islamic shariah law and the setting up of a distinctive social and political administrative system. The Special Autonomy status, in conjunction with post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction efforts see Box 4.5.1 below, have put Aceh in something of a unique position in Indonesia. Funds and revenues have become available at an unprecedented level to meet the multiple reconstruction challenges, all within the rather untried and untested institutional context of decentralisation and Special Autonomy. Between 1999-2006, the total regional revenues in Aceh, mostly derived from central government transfers, increased more than five times from IDR 2.4 trillion to IDR 11.2 trillion. 361 There are distinct sources of central government transfers, as follows: 1. The shares in oil and gas revenue in Aceh have been set at 55 and 40 per cent, respectively, since 2001 compared to 15 and 30 per cent in other provinces. Although the shares of revenue have increased, it is worth noting that the depletion of oil and gas resources in Aceh means that overall revenues are decreasing and are set to decrease further in the future. This has important implications for medium- to long-term development planning in the province. Finally, the Law on Governing Aceh Law No. 112006 has established that 30 per cent of the oil and gas revenues in Aceh must be allocated to education. 2. Between the years 2008-2023, Aceh receives a Special Autonomy Fund Dana Otsus, or Dana Otonomi Khusus which consists of an additional 2 per cent from the national general allocation budget fund DAU, Dana Alokasi Umum. This is a temporary transfer, which will reduce to 1 per cent between 2023 and 2028, after which it will be terminated. According to World Bank estimates, this additional DAU allocation increased Aceh’s revenues from IDR 10.4 trillion in 2006 to more than IDR 14 trillion in 2009. 362 The Dana Otsus is a block grant to be used to finance infrastructure development, including community empowerment, poverty alleviation, education, health and other social expenditures. 3. Finally, Aceh receives funds from the Special Allocation Fund DAK, Dana Alokasi Khusus for financing specific expenditures not covered by the general allocation fund formula. The DAK is earmarked for national priorities in programming and is transferred to Aceh Province, which is then responsible for distributing it to local governments districts and municipalities. Since 2003, DAK funds have covered several sectors such as education, health and infrastructure, as well as the setting up of facilities for the new local governments that have been created during the decentralisation process. In addition, throughout the rehabilitation period, Aceh is receiving ‘deconcentration’ funds designated by the central government to address non- routine or recurrent development spending. 363 The flow of funds from the central government to Aceh Province is different from other provinces, where most funds are allocated directly to districts. In Aceh the transfers are generally made to the provincial government, which is responsible for the administration and district allocation of the funds. Intra-provincial funds allocation is operated through qanun regulations. 364 For instance, 361 World Bank 2006 Aceh public expenditure analysis: Spending for reconstruction and poverty reduction, World Bank: Jakarta 362 Ibid. 363 Law No. 332004 specifies that provinces can request emergency funds from the central government to finance extraordinary and urgent needs, such as natural disasters, which cannot be covered by regional government budget APBD. Although the programme is implemented by the province and local government, deconcentration funds are not recorded in the provincial and local government budgets. Instead, they are recorded in the national budget APBN. 364 Qanun refers to the regulations that are passed by provincial, municipal or district legislative bodies, such as the provincial House of Representatives DPRA, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh. See Law No. 182001, Article 1.