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THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 19
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the context within which pro-child social policymaking takes place is important for considering the trends in improvements in child welfare and the limitations and challenges
for such initiatives. Only when socio-political conditions are conducive to promoting pro-child social policies can such policies be implemented and have an impact.
1
This section therefore briefly reviews key social, economic, political and institutional reforms that have taken place
since the last Situation Analysis Report SITAN was conducted in 2000. It demonstrates the achievements Indonesia has made with regard to democratisation and decentralisation, as well as
the challenges it has faced. This provides the context for Section 3, which discusses the national- level trends in child welfare in Indonesia across education, health, and other areas. This section
also briefly reviews trends in economic indicators at the national level, and sharp disparities between provinces in terms of gross domestic product, poverty levels and the GINI measure
of income inequalities. This section also discusses improvements in the human development index HDI, the gender development index GDI and the gender empowerment measure GEM,
again demonstrating that there are significant regional disparities. Finally, this section discusses demographic changes, including fertility rates and the distribution of population by age and
gender.
2.1 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Since 2000 when the last SITAN was conducted, Indonesia has undergone large-scale institutional, social, and political reforms. The reform period commonly referred to as reformasi
has been marked most notably by a broader process of democratisation, which began after the resignation of Suharto after 32 years as president in May 1998, and the implementation of
decentralisation discussed further below, and in more detail in Section 4. Reform in Indonesia has also involved a variety of other institutional and legislative changes over the past decade,
including: instituting greater political rights and freedom of expression for citizens
2
; the ongoing process of rolling back the role of the military in politics and civilian affairs
3
; passing four sets of amendments to the 1945 Constitution, including articles relating to human rights;
4
and passing
1 See Grindle, M. S. 1980, Politics and policy implementation in the third world, Princeton University Press: New Jersey; and Mazma- nian, D. A. and Sabatier, P. A. Eds. 1981 Effective policy implementation, Lexington Books: Lexington, MA
2 Political rights were regulated through Law No. 91998 on Freedom to Express Opinions in Public Spaces. This law was revised through Law No. 222005 on Guarantees for Political and Civilian Rights. The most important change through Law No. 222005 is that the
state is mandated to protect the right to express opinion hak untuk mengemukakan pendapat, the right of association berserikat berorganisasi
such as in trade unions and other organisations, the right to vote and to be elected hak untuk memilih dan dipilih, and the right to equal treatment under the law hak sama di hadapan hukum.
3 Depoliticisation depolitisasi of the military. The separation of the police and military with the police being responsible for domestic security is regulated in the People’s Consultative Assembly MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Provision Ketetapan
No. VI2000 on the Elimination of the Dual Function of the Armed Forces. For more information on the impact of these changes see: Kontras, T.
2003 ‘Politik militer dalam transisi demokrasi Indonesia’, Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan Commission for Missing Persons and the Victims of Violent Action: Jakarta. Several authors note that this process of reform is ongoing and has yet
to be consolidated: Mietzner, M. 2009, Military politics, Islam, and the state in Indonesia: From turbulent transition to democratic consolidation, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore; Sumarkidjo, A. 2001 ‘The rise and fall of the generals: The Indonesian
military at a crossroads’, in: Lloyd, G. and Smith, S. Eds., Indonesia Today, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp136- 145; Robinson, G. 2001 ‘Indonesia on a new course?’, in: Alagappa, M. Ed., Coercion and governance: The declining political role of
the military in Asia
, Stanford University Press: Stanford, pp226-258; and Rinakit, S. 2005 The Indonesian military after the New Order, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore. Informed observers have generally noted that the ongoing removal of the military from
politics depends upon the quality of civilian governance, political stability and the consolidation of democratic reforms. 4 For a detailed discussion of Indonesia’s constitutional amendment process, see: Indrayana, D. 2007 ‘Indonesian constitutional reform,
1999-2002: An evaluation of constitution making in transition’, Kompas , 2008: Jakarta; and Ellis, A. 2007 ‘Indonesia’s constitutional
change reviewed’, in: McLeod, R. H. and MacIntyre, A. Eds., Indonesia: Democracy and the promise of good governance, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp21-40
legislation which has allowed for freer press,
5
freedom of association,
6
and freedom to form new political parties.
7
It has also involved changing the form and number of seats in legislatures at each level of government, implementing the direct popular elections of the president and vice
president, governors, district heads and mayors,
8
and creating the General Elections Commission KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum for elections oversight, no member of which may simultaneously
be a member of any political party.
9
Indonesia has also sought to reduce corruption within the framework of improving overall governance, including transparency and accountability.
10
It ratified Law No. 401999 on Anti-corruption and created the National Anti-Corruption Commission KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi in 2003. Bessell 2007 also argues that along
with these legislative and institutional changes, there have been improvements in terms of child protection and welfare laws during this period, which were discussed in the previous section.
11
Overall, Imawan 2004 argues that the reform period has been marked by four key changes to the political economy of Indonesia.
12
First, initiatives to shift the control over political decision-making by the executive to the citizenry, through freer elections first held in 1999,
and subsequently in 2004 and 2009, with each set of elections being less marred by violence. Centralisation of political power and domination of decision-making were key features of the
preceding Suharto government. Second, initiatives during the reform period have included creating greater checks and balances on the distribution and use of power between the legislative
and executive arms of government, as well as between central and local governments. Third, rule over the populace has shifted from ‘rule through using the law’ that characterised Soeharto’s
New Order government, to building the ‘rule of law’. Fourth, reform has also involved efforts to reduce opportunities for corruption and collusive practices within government.
13
Improving accountability and transparency is important, not only for delivering public services that benefit
children, but also for effective child budgeting, the delivery of social protection schemes, and for more broadly achieving social equity and cohesion.
5 Law No. 401999 on Freedom of the Press guarantees freedom of the press, as mentioned in Article 4: 1 Freedom of the press is guaranteed as a basic right of citizens; 2 There is no censorship, bans or broadcasting restrictions of the national press; 3 To ensure
freedom of the press, the national press has the right to search for, obtain and distribute ideas and information; and 4 To be responsible for reporting, journalists have the right of refusal in court Hak Tolak
6 Law No. 251997 on Manpower 7 Law No. 312002 on Political Parties
8 Law No. 222003 on General Elections and revised by Law No. 102008 on General Election of Members of National Parliament DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Local Parliament DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, and Regional Representatives Council DPD,
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah. For a brief review of the successes and challenges with direct elections, see case studies covering former separatist areas, regions heavily impacted by communal conflicts, national and local legislatures and parliamentary performance:
Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. Eds. 2010 Problems of democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore; Schulte Nordholdt, H. and van Klinken, G. Eds. 2007 Politik lokal di Indonesia, KITLV and
Yayasan Obor Indonesia: Jakarta; Erb, M. and Sulistiyanto, P. Eds. 2009 Deepening democracy in Indonesia? Direct elections for local leaders Pilkada
, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 9 Law No. 312002 on Political Parties, Law No. 122003 on General Election of Members of the National Parliament DPR, Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat, Regional Representatives Assembly DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah and Local Parliament DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, and Law No. 232003 on General Election of the President and Vice President. The Ministry of Home Affairs
is now considering directly appointing provincial governors, which some observers argue will ‘roll back’ some of the democratic reforms that have taken place over the past decade.
10 Synnerstrom, S. 2007 ‘The civil service: Towards eficiency, effectiveness and honesty’, in McLeod, R. H. and MacIntyre, A. Eds., Indonesia: Democracy and the promise of good governance, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp159-177; Goodpaster, G.
2002 ‘Relections on corruption in Indonesia’, in Lindsey, T. and Dick, H. Eds. Corruption in Asia: Rethinking the governance paradigm, The Federation Press: Sydney, pp87-108; Supeno, H. 2009 Korupsi di daerah: Kesaksian, pengalaman, dan pengakuan, Kreasi Total
Media: Jakarta. Though improving its global corruption index ranking, the general consensus among observers is that much work remains to address issues of corruption in Indonesia.
11 Bessel, S. 2007 ‘Children, welfare and protection’, in McLeod, R. H. and MacIntyre, A. Eds, Indonesian democracy and the promise of good governance
, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 12 Imawan, R. 2004 ‘Political parties in Indonesia: The half-hearted struggle to look for an identity’ Partai politik di Indonesia: Pergulatan
setengah hari mencari jati diri , Inauguration speech for professors in Political Science at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 4 September, p3 13 For an overview of patterns and practices of corruption in Indonesia, see: Wilson, I. 2009 ‘The rise and fall of political gangsters in
Indonesian democracy’, in Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. Eds., Problems of democratisation in Indonesia pp199-218; Abdullah, T. 2009 Indonesia: Towards democracy
, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies: Singapore, pp429-526; Lindsey, T. 2001 ‘The criminal state: Premanism and the new Indonesia’, in: Lloyd, G. and Smith, S. Eds, Indonesia today: Challenges of history, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies: Singapore, pp283-297
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THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 21
Implementing reform over the past decade, however, has not been without its challenges. For the first part of the decade, the country was recovering from the multiple fiscal, economic and
political crises of the late 1990s, which were in part triggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This left unstable exchange rates, escalating levels of poverty, massive unemployment, and
economic instability, all of which affected the welfare and rights of children, as discussed later in this section.
As Indonesia overhauled its political system, reduced the subsidies for fuel and food, and sought to simultaneously recover from the financial crisis, social unrest and outbreaks of
violence occurred in some places in the archipelago, as is common in countries transitioning from authoritarian to more democratic rule.
14
Beginning in late 1998, communal conflicts broke out in various regions such as Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central and West
Kalimantan, while tensions continued from the previous decades around demands for self-rule in the restive provinces of Aceh and Papua.
15
Such violence has not only directly been experienced by children caught up in the conflicts and through displacement, but it has also been detrimental
to the safeguarding of children’s rights to live safely and securely and to access public services since education, health and other facilities have been destroyed.
16
Elections were also coloured by violence, both in and outside of the communal conflict regions.
17
This was particularly the case in the first rounds of the different elections held in Indonesia, such as the general elections
pemilu in 1999 and, to a lesser extent, in 2004, and more infrequently in the later presidential elections pilpres, and local head elections pilkada. In some instances, the more fanatical
members of the support groups for different candidates mobilised using violence, sometimes driven by financial incentives.
18
However, by the time the 2004 general elections were held, many of the inter-group tensions in the communal conflict regions, which characterised the first half of the decade, had begun
to dissipate, although this was less the case in Papua and Aceh. Yet, as the country began to stabilise politically and financially, it was hit by a wave of natural disasters. The most serious of
these included the devastating tsunami in December 2004, which in Indonesia mainly affected Aceh province discussed further in Section 4, and the earthquakes in Yogyakarta province in
2006 and in Padang West Sumatera in 2009. Similar to the complex emergencies experienced in
14 See Bertrand, J. 2004 Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. For a brief review on the extent of social unrest during the fall of Suharto, see Lane, M. 2008 Unfinished nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto, Talisman
Publishing Pte Ltd: New York, pp140-176, and Forrester, G. Ed. 1999 Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or chaos?, Crawford House Publishing: Bathurst
15 For example: conflict in Poso Central Sulawesi, which broke out in late 1998, began to de-escalate in 2003, see: Sianturi, E. M. T. 2005 ‘Konlik Poso dan resolusinya’, Buletin Balitbang Pertahanan, Vol.8 No.14, pp1-2; the Maluku conlict, which broke out in 1999,
began to deescalate in 2000, and the conlict in North Maluku began to deescalate in 2004, see: Malik, I. 2005 ‘Diplomasi perdamaian Malino dalam penyelesaian konlik di Poso dan Maluku’, in: Anwar, D. F., Bouvier, H., Smith, G. and Tol R. Eds. Konflik kekerasan
internal: Tinjauan sejarah, ekonomi-politik, dan kebijakan di Asia Pasifik . Yayasan Obor Indonesia: Jakarta, pp317-323; and peace began
to take hold in Aceh with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government, which took place on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland, see: Badan Inisiatif Manajemen Krisis Crisis Management
Initiative 2006 Proses perdamaian Aceh: Keterlibatan perempuan, UNIFEM and CCDE Pusat Pengembangan Masyarakat dan Pendidikan: Banda Aceh.
16 UNDP June 2006 Access to justice in Aceh: Making the transition to sustainable peace and development in Aceh, UNDPBAPPENAS: Jakarta, available at: http:www.undp.or.idprogrammegovernance Last accessed 1 October 2010
17 See Darwin, M. 2003 ‘Freedom from fear: Social disruption and systems of violence in Indonesia’, in: Ananta, A. Ed. The Indonesian crisis: A Human development perspective
. Institutute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp105-158. See also, Mishra, S. C. February 2001 History in the making: A systemic transition in Indonesia
, UNSFIR: Jakarta. For international discussion on the relationship between democratization and escalation of violence, see Snyder, J. 2000 From voting to violence: Democratization and
nationalist conflict , W.W. Norton Company: New York. On violence in Poso and its relation to regional head elections, see Sianturi, E.
M. T., 2005 ‘Konflik Poso dan resolusinya’; see also, Malik, I. 2005 ‘Diplomasi perdamaian Malino dalam penyelesaian konflik di Poso dan Maluku’;
on conflict in Maluku and its relationship with elections, see Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Litbang Departemen Pertahanan 11 August 2009 Penanggulangan konflik Maluku, Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Litbang Departemen Pertahanan:
Jakarta 18 Darwin, M. 2009 ‘How participation shapes local development’, Background paper for Human Development Report 2010, UNDP:
Jakarta; Ramdansyah, R. 2009 Sisi gelap Pemilu 2009: Potret aksesori, demokrasi Indonesia, Rumah Demokrasi: Jakarta; see also the case studies in Section 4 of this report
the conflict zones, children are dramatically affected by the impact of such disasters; they may be injured, lose family members, experience displacement, lose access to basic services particularly
health and education, and experience psycho-social distress.
19
2.1.1 DECENTRALISATION
While grappling with these complex emergencies and various forms of instability since the last SITAN was conducted, the country set about decentralising the political system. Indonesia,
under President Suharto, had a unitary, centralised system of government, in which policies, laws, regulations and directives were issued by the central government. These were then
administered by provincial governments, which represented the central government throughout the archipelago. The district level of government further administered the top-down policies and
programmes as directed by the provincial administrations. This system was radically reformed when the decentralisation laws No. 22 and 25 were passed in 1999. Under decentralisation,
the decision- and policymaking powers for many key sectors of governance were transferred to the district level in response to the demands for closer governance and greater self-rule for
the diverse regions throughout the country. This presented a challenge for Indonesia, where the capacity to design and create policies and programmes at the district level was uneven in such
a large country accustomed to top-down directives see Section 4 for further discussion of these challenges.
Decentralisation in Indonesia required not only creating the political will to pass the necessary revisions to legal instruments, but also to achieve consensus across a wide range of stakeholders
from increasing numbers of political parties, and from various political, ethnic, religious and other social groups, in the large and diverse nation. Since independence was declared in 1945, there
has been sustained public debate about the relative merits of a centralised versus a federal state structure, as well as decentralisation. Indonesia has consequently changed its political structures
at several key points. While Indonesia had a very short experience as a federal state in 1950, it then shifted to a ‘unitary state’ with a parliamentary democracy until 1959 when the executive
took on greater powers under President Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’, with a return to the 1945 Constitution which had and still retains a highly ‘special’ and romantic position in the minds of
many of Indonesia’s political elite, including conservative military figures.
Following the economic and political instability of the final years of the Sukarno administration and the anti-communist violence in 1965-1966, Suharto assumed power and implemented a more
authoritarian form of military rule through his New Order government until 1998. This period was marked by the establishment of numerous mechanisms and regulations to create a highly
centralised bureaucratic state with significant military involvement via its institutional policy of dwi fungsi dual function, which legitimated military participation in society, the economy and
civilian politics, together with its responsibility for defence.
20
The system of governance involved centralised authority being administered through a hierarchy of decision-making, from the centre
to provincial, district, sub-district and then village level five tiers of government.
19 Pederson, D. July 2002 ‘Political violence, ethnic conlict, and contemporary wars: broad implications for health and social well-being’, Social Science and Medicine
, Vol.55 2, pp175-190; see also the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Psychosocial care and protection of Tsunami affected children
, available at: http:www.icva.chdoc00001316.html Last accessed 10 October 2010 20 See Guinness, P. 1994 ‘Local society and culture’, in: Hill H. Ed., Indonesia’s New Order, Allen Unwin: St. Leonards, N.S.W, pp267-
304. For example, the Law on Village Government, passed in 1979, standardized the village administration and made village heads paid bureaucrats, upwardly accountable. See: Kahin, A. R. 2009 ‘Problems of integration: West Sumatra’s place in Indonesia’, in: Sakai, M.,
Banks, G. and Walker, J. H. Eds., The Politics of the Periphery in Indonesia: Social and Geographic Perspectives, National University of Singapore Press: Singapore, pp101-116.
THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 22
THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN INDONESIA 2000-2010 23
The passing of the decentralisation laws in 1999 was no easy task, given the long history of debate outlined above. In 2001, however, the new decentralised system began to be
implemented. This system essentially reduced the system to three tiers of government: national, provincial and district. District government became autonomous, with decision-making powers
equal to provincial level.
21
Implementing decentralisation has not been without its challenges. Indonesia has endeavoured to build the uneven capacity of the district- and provincial-level executive and legislative arms of
government and the civil service across the country, to enable design and administration of local- level policies and regulations. Nevertheless, some authors argue that the promises of improved
governance at local level have, on the whole, not materialised.
22
For example, Buehler 2010 has observed that:
“The few successful reform efforts at the local level have largely been driven by a handful of exceptionally well-performing administrators and are therefore not a reflection of broader
trends.”
23
Many local governments have often encountered difficulties in utilizing resources allocated through increased budget allocations, due to “their inability to develop coherent and effective
projects [or strategic plans that can be translated effectively into annual work-plans].”
24
At the same time, and perhaps a strongly related point, is that the civil service “continue[s] to provide
distorted performance incentives…that preserve old behaviour in defiance of new legislation and new democratic system of government.”
25
One further challenge for governance in Indonesia in a decentralised context is improving bureaucratic eficiency and performance. ‘Bureaucratisation’ has been common in Indonesia
since the 1970s, when it was most extensive in Southeast Asia. By way of comparison, between 1970 and 1980, the number of government officers in Malaysia grew from 293,000 to 550,000 87
per cent, in Thailand, from 235,000 to 354,600 50 per cent, and in Indonesia, from 515,000 to 2,047,000 297 per cent.
26
Tjokroamodjojo 1988 described the bureaucracy of the time as rich in structure but poor in function.
27
That is, the extensive bureaucratic structure the number of government units and the number of government officers was not in line with the role and function of government.
28
This had various implications. First, it hid unemployment, as many government officers were unproductive and had little to do.
29
Second, there was ineffective control of the bureaucracy, which allowed in some cases for the payment of ‘illegal fees’ to oficials pungli = pungutan
21 Holtzappel, C. J. G. 2009 ‘Introduction: The regional governance reform in Indonesia, 1999-2004’, in Holtzappel, C. J. G. and Ramstedt, M. Eds., Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Implementation and Challenges, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies:
Singapore, pp1-58 22 Buehler, M. 2010 ‘Decentralisation and local democracy in Indonesia: The marginalisation of the public sphere”, in: Aspinall, E. and
Mietzner, M. Eds., Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp267-285
23 Ibid., p281 24 Ibid., p282
25 Synnerstrom, S. 2007 ‘The civil service’, in: McLeod, R. H. and MacIntyre, A., Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance
, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp160-174. Synnerstrom goes on to note that this includes the manner in which public institutions are structured, operate and are financed as well as human resource management practices. As of 2007 the
number of civil servants was 3.6 million excluding military and policy, with 2.5 million located in regional governments provincial and district but mostly district, with the bulk of these comprised of teachers. These igures do not include those working on ‘honorarium’
positions, most of whom are also found among the ranks of teachers in both madrasah and state schools below district level. 26 Ever, H.-D. and Schiel, T. 1992 Kelompok-kelompok strategis: Studi perbandingan tentang negara, birokrasi, dan pembentukan kelas
di dunia ketiga , Yayasan Obor Indonesia: Jakarta, p226. On bureaucratization in Indonesia, see also: Thoha, M. 28 January 2010
‘Birokrasi Presiden yang tambun’, Kompas27 Tjokroamidjojo, B. 1988 Manajemen Pembangunan, CV Haji Masagung: Jakarta, p116; Tjokroamidjojo, B. 1986 Pengembangan sistem dan penyempurnaan administrasi negara dalam pembangunan nasional
, Yayasan Penerbit Administrasi: Jakarta, p50
28 Ibid.
liar.
30
This resulted in lengthy and complicated procedures for providing services, and extensive red-tape. Third, this created inefficiencies in the bureaucracy that, in the end, negatively affected
investment, production and trade.
31
The problem of the number of civil servants remains today; despite efforts to control the rising number of government officers, numbers continue to increase. In 2010, the number of
government officers reached 4,732,472.
32
While decentralisation has reduced the number of civil servants employed at the national level, the number has increased rapidly at the local level,
particularly with the proliferation of new districts and municipalities.
33
In 1993, only 14 per cent of government officers were employed at the local level
34
, but in 2003, this proportion had increased to 68 per cent.
35
While the number of national level civil servants fell 70 per cent from 3,505,970 in 1993 to 840,007 in 2003, the number of local government officers in provinces, districts or
municipalities increased sixfold from 503,374 to 2,807,998.
36
The number of civil servants creates challenges in improving the quality of human resources. Among all civil servants employed at national and local level, only 47 per cent are considered to
have professional skills.
37
Large numbers of civil servants mean that 80 per cent of the budget is allocated for routine government expenses, mainly for civil servants, with only 20 per cent for
development expenditure.
38
Additionally, the complex processes of designing and passing the necessary government regulations, directives and guidelines at the provincial and district level, to provide the supporting
regulatory framework, are still ongoing. Indonesia has also sought to work towards achieving an effective and efficient balance between each level of government through several sets of revisions
to the 1999 decentralisation laws, including through Law No. 32 and 332004 on local governance, and through Government Regulation No. 192010 on Regulations for Implementing the Role and
Authority and Finance for Governors as Representatives of the Government in the Provinces. To some extent, Government Regulation No. 192010 has reinstituted a ‘vertical’ form of governance
from provincial to district level, in contrast to the ‘horizontal’ and autonomous relationship introduced by the fiscal and administrative decentralisation laws of 1999.
39
Such a large-scale undertaking of political institutional change has also been coloured by political tensions and competition in some areas. Decentralisation has not only created opportunities for
the realignment of local power structures, but has also triggered demands for the creation of new provinces, districts and sub-districts commonly referred to as pemekaran, literally meaning
‘blossoming’. In December 2009, the number of districts and municipalities reached a total of 497 399 districts and 98 municipalities, as well as 77,012 villagesurban villages desakelurahan
29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. 32 Pusat Kajian Manajemen Pelayanan, Lembaga Administrasi NegaraPKMP-LAN Centre for the Study of Service Management in State
Administration 2010 Civil servant statistics 2010, PKMP-LAN: Jakarta
33 Kumorotomo, W. and Widaningrum, A. 2010 Reformasi Aparatur Negara Ditinjau Kembali, Jurusan Manajemen dan Administrasi Kebijakan Publik dan Magister Administrasi Publik Department of Management and Public Policy and Magister Programmes in Public
Administration , Gajah Mada University, Gava Media: Yogyakarta, p85 34 See attachment of the President’s Speech on the ceremony of Indonesia’s Independence Day, 17 August 1993
35 Data from Pendataan Ulang Pegawai Negeri Sipil, Badan Kepegawaian Negara, PUPNS-BKN State Officers Board, Re-registration of Civil Servants 2003 Internal report, Mimeo: Jakarta
36 Data taken from the President’s Speech in 1993, and from BKN-PUPNS, Ibid. 37 Pusat Kajian Manajemen Pelayanan, Lembaga Administrasi Negara PKMP-LAN 2010 Civil servant statistics 2010
38 Kumorotomo, W. and Widaningrum, A. 2010 Review of state apparatus reform, p35 39 See: Crouch, H. 2010 Political reform in Indonesia after Soeharto, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, pp87-114; and Kahin,
A. R. 2009 ‘Problems of integration: West Sumatra’s place in Indonesia’, p114
