Directionality An overview of Natural Semantic Metalanguage

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2.2 Directionality

The principle of directionality requires that an expression be defined in terms simpler than itself. W 1980 credits Aristotle Topica.141a, quoted in W 1980:13 with the formulation of this principle: First of all, see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated, and we make things known by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more intelligible ... ; accordingly, it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all. Under this principle, circularity, rampant in popular dictionaries, is strictly forbidden. Consider the following dictionary definitions taken from Webster’s third collegiate dictionary Merriam-Webster 1990: ACCUSE: to BLAME BLAME: to ACCUSE of being at FAULT DENOUNCE: to ACCUSE publicly FAULT N.: BLAME for something wrong BLAME N.: responsibility for a FAULT REPROVE: to REBUKE SCOLD: to find FAULT with angrily; to REBUKE REPRIMAND: a severe or formal REBUKE REBUKE: to SCOLD in a sharp way; REPRIMAND Definitions of this kind do not serve to clarify meanings. Unfortunately, as W 1980:13 points out, it is not just popular dictionaries which suffer from circularity: Contemporary semantic analysis in terms of features and markers violate Aristotle’s crucial principle. A feature analyst feels free from the obligation of establishing the relative semantic simplicity of different expressions. He is not afraid of vicious circles, either: he thinks that since all his definitions are written in capital letters and, possibly, decorated with pluses and minuses they do not have to be compared with the definienda. Thus, to define “see” as “perceive visually” may be circular, but to define it as “PERCEIVE VISUALLY” is irreproachable. It could be objected that circular definitions at least, in popular dictionaries do seem to serve some purpose. For example, it is not hard to imagine someone who does not know the meaning of the word accuse but does know the meaning of the word blame. By consulting a definition such as the one given above, he could learn accuse’s meaning. But in fact, this is my very point. If the above definitions are correct, one cannot know the meaning of accuse without also knowing the meaning of blame and vice- versa. If someone has acquired the concept of blame without knowing the meaning accuse, then something must be wrong with the definition. As W p.c. asks, how it would be possible for the second language speaker to acquire the meanings of these English words if he had only definitions such as these to rely upon? I might also point out the definitions quoted are just plain wrong. They overlook gross differences between blame, accuse, and the rest of the words, as is often the case when circular definitions are employed. They may be good enough for the linguistically unsophisticated lexicographer, but the semanticist has no excuse for uncritically accepting them. As W 1987:153–54 argues, one accuses someone of bad actions but blames someone or something for bad situations. Thus, we can say: 40  They blamed Mary for the mess. 41  The bad weather was blamed for the rise in grain prices. 14 but not: 42 They accused Mary of the mess. 43 The bad weather was accused of the rise in grain prices. Again, one might object that perhaps I am using the most viciously circular definitions to make my point. Perhaps less viciously circular definitions might be acceptable. To some extent, I grant this. Perhaps it might be possible to introduce some kind of nondestructive circularity into NSM. In fact, one could say that NSM allows for a certain kind of circular definition. In NSM, primitives can have contextual variants called allolexes. I think it is possible to regard these as a limited kind of circular definition, i.e., I means the same as me; person means the same as someone and so forth. Presumably however, allolexes have a predictable distribution and can therefore be distinguished from ordinary circular terms. Allolexy aside then, circular definitions should be avoided at all costs. As W 1980:12 points out, the act of defining is inherently reductionistic: Replacing a word by its synonym or a number of more or less exact synonyms has nothing to do with defining. A definition is an act of analysis – it must replace one word with a group of words corresponding to particular components of its meaning. NSM’s reductionism might seem merciless to some, but it is really no more than reducing one’s analysis into terms as simple as possible. Unlike many theories however, NSM puts a limit as to how far reduction can proceed. A difference in meaning must be statable in words. It does not allow for subatomic units of analysis. Primitives must be full-fledged lexemes which cannot be further defined without obscuring their meaning.

2.3 The search for semantic primitives