6 To say that natural language is its own best descriptor is not to say that all parts of natural language
are equally well-suited for the task. Not all words are equally useful in clarifying or simplifying meanings. NSM uses a subset of natural language, a maximally simple one, containing lexemes and
combinations of lexemes common to all natural languages. Since NSM works are generally published in English, NSM is generally specified in English. NSM is
not however based on any particular language
2
, but is abstracted from a variety of languages. To this limited extent then, NSM may be regarded as artificial. The elimination of polysemy, ambiguity, and
language-specific features is, of course, a desirable trait for a metalanguage. Nevertheless, it is surprising how far NSM has been able to push the paradigm of natural language representation.
2.1.2 Substitutability
The Substitutability Constraint states that a definition must substitutable for its definiens in all contexts. This constraint transforms semantics from a philosophical exercise to an empirical science. Since both
definition and definiens are specified in natural language, both can be verified against the intuitions of a native speaker. The father of this principle, is once again, Leibniz. As W 1980:20 acknowledges,
The crucial criterion of empirical validity in semantics was proposed by Leibniz. This criterion is substitutability not the celebrated substitutability salva veritate
3
, but the linguistically much more relevant substitutability salve significatione.
In other words, substitution must not only preserve truth values, but also meanings. All that is required to falsify a definition, then, is to find a context where definition and definiens are
not substitutable. I have yet to explain, however, what is meant by substitutable. 2.1.2.1 Semantic equivalence in substitutability
The term substitutability however requires more explanation. In principle, definiens and definition should be interchangeable. However, obviously, definiens and definition are not interchangeable with respect to
rhythm, rhyme, punning, alliteration, word play, and other linguistic phenomena which are closely linked to phonological form. Other external nonsemantic factors affect strict substitutability. Not
surprisingly, for example, NSM definitions at least the English ones often sound like motherese, rendering them marked stylistically.
4
Pragmatic factors may also color intuitions about semantic equivalence. For example, the proposed Japanese exponents for YOU and I, ore and kimi, are primarily used in informal adult male peer
interactions. W 1991c:12–14 argues that since references to I or You in Japanese are generally
2
So for example, the NSM primitive THINK has many language-specific names: in English, it is think; in Japanese, it is omou.
3
The phrase salva veritate is frequently used in connection with Leibniz’s logical works: two equal terms may be substituted for one another in an expression if the result preserves truth-value of the expression. This version is
popularly known as ‘Leibniz’s law’ in many semantic theories.
4
The awkwardness of NSM explications gives rise to the following interesting question: “How bad can an NSM explication sound before it is rejected as ungrammatical?” I will not give a definitive answer here, but will only
point out what I believe is the right direction to answer that question. First, at minimum, an NSM explication should be understandable, keeping in mind that understanding an NSM
explication could easily involve a certain amount of effort. Second, one needs to recognize that a semantically meaningful expression is not necessarily well-formed in all
speech contexts. If a sentence sounds odd, but is understandable, I believe it is better to ask ourselves “Is there any context where it is good?” rather than “Is is bad enough to be ungrammatical?”. For example, NSM sentences often
sound like how a mother might talk to her infant. That is to say, they sound odd in normal adult-to-adult speech, but they are acceptable in mother-to-infant speech. So if one cannot find a felicitous context for an NSM explication, it
should be rejected as ungrammatical.
7 accompanied with expressions of deference or respect, the plain I or YOU are pragmatically marked.
Likewise, there appears to be a semantic difference between HAPPEN and its proposed Mandarin counterpart Chappell 1994 f¯ash¯eng. When used in a sentence such as something happened to someone,
there is an implication that it was something bad that happened. W 1994:474–5 argues, however, that the difference is pragmatic in nature, since on closer inspection we find that this implication is
neutralized with nonhuman or omitted patients. Needless to say, such pragmatic influences cannot be automatically assumed but must be argued on a case by case basis and justified on language internal
grounds.
5
Such pragmatic factors need to be factored out of our semantic calculations.
6
2.1.2.2 Using the principle of substitutivity I would like to demonstrate the principle of substitutivity through a sample analysis of two predicates,
satisfied and bitter. For readability, I am explicating these predicates in a first person, present tense frame.
7
First of all, being satisfied assumes that there is some kind of a desire to satisfy: 1 ?? I lost my appetite, but I was satisfied with dinner.
2 ?? I was satisfied with his answer, although I really didn’t care. We can formulate this component as follows:
3 a. Before now
b. I wanted something Secondly, I think it is relatively uncontroversial to assert that being satisfied is a good feeling and
contains the component: 4 this person feels something good
I believe it is also relatively uncontroversial to assert that the good feelings are the result of having obtained that which one desired:
5
This is a potentially confusing statement since Pragmatics and Semantics are often treated as a single domain in NSM. They are treated as a single domain because both kinds of knowledge may be represented in a uniform fashion
using NSM. The above context however, contrasts the two. In this context, semantic differences are differences in word definitions and pragmatic differences are differences in the encyclopedic knowledge associated with a word.
Encyclopedic knowledge is as much part of the linguistic system as definitions, and in certain complex domains, such as the names of species and human artifacts, the two overlap. It is easier, however, to distinguish between
encyclopedic knowledge and definition for primitive or near-primitive words such as I than it is for words such as cat.
6
I suggest that there are at least two different ways in which one could “factor out outside influences from one’s semantic calculations”.
First of all, in comparing the substituted expression for the original, one could simply ask oneself whether the difference between these two expressions is only the result of the nonsemantic external factors which I have isolated.
So, for example, one could ask oneself, “Is the pragmatically induced rudeness the only difference between ore kore ga hoshii and I want this?”. Secondly, one could attempt to nullify the pragmatic effects. So, if one was trying to
verify a definition with a Japanese speaker, one could replace the occurrences of the vulgar ore and kimi with the nonprimitive, but more neutral pragmatically speaking terms watakushi and anata.
7
One can easily generalize this frame, by substituting the first occurrence of I with someone and subsequent occurrences of I with this person.
8 5 because now I have
8
this At this point, note that the thing which one desires and the thing with which one is satisfied may be
two different things, e.g., one may desire a steak but be satisfied with a hamburger. Our definition under construction can be easily modified to reflect this observation:
6 a. Before now b. I wanted something like this
c. feel something good d. because now I have this
There is an instructive contrast between being satisfied and being contented. While a retailer may sell an item with satisfaction guaranteed, he would never sell an item with contentment guaranteed. Of course, it is
not possible to guarantee contentment, but more importantly the contented customer is bad for business. Being satisfied and being contented are both positive experiences for the customer, but being contented is too
positive from the standpoint of the retailer. The word contented contains the component W 1992a: 7 I don’t want other things
I propose that the word satisfied expresses a more limited kind of fulfillment: 8 I don’t want more now
According to component 7, a contented customer does not feel a need for anything and despite his positive experience, he is less likely to patronize the retailer in the future. On the other hand, since
component 8 contains no such implications about the customer’s other wants or desires, a satisfied customer is likely want to repeat his positive experience and patronize the retailer in the future.
9
Consider also, the contrast between satisfaction and gratification. Observe that we may have instant gratification, but not ??instant satisfaction. Instant gratification, of course, does not mean that the
gratification lasts for an instant, but rather that one does not wait for a very long time before the gratification occurs. But why does instant seem particularly appropriate with gratification but not with
satisfaction? First of all, in a manner of speaking, gratification is a shallow kind of satisfaction, although clearly
someone who has been gratified has necessarily not been satisfied. Gratification is, in fact, so shallow, that no one strives for gratification and we cannot use gratification without speaking ill of the person who
receives it. It is therefore never a self-reported goal:
10
11 I want satisfaction. 12 ?? I want gratification.
8
Currently, have is not in the set of the NSM primitives. I am open to its inclusion because I am not happy with attempted paraphrases of have such as this thing is like a part of me; I can do what I want with this thing. In any case,
have is sufficient for the purpose of this illustration.
9
In the same vein, one may be satisfied with an answer, but one is never contented with an answer because this would imply that having all of one’s questions answered.
10
Apparently some speakers not myself can use the phrase deeply gratified without any self-deprecation. I suspect that forthese speakers this phrase is somewhat sarcastic and cannot be used in the absence of an antagonist who
would find their pleasure distasteful. If so, then this gratify would be a separate but related sense containing the components:
9 I know you will feel something bad if I feel something good 10 I feel something good because of this
9 13
Prove it to my satisfaction 14 Prove it to my gratification
Secondly, gratification implies the continuation of desire and not its cessation. One may be completely satisfied, but one cannot be completely gratified.
These aspects of gratification suggest the presence of the following components: 15 I will feel something good for a short time
16 After this I will want more
Instant is an especially appropriate companion to gratification because while one cannot achieve satisfaction or for that matter contentment in an instant, one can be gratified in an instant.
Apparently, being satisfied involves some sort of specification of duration. While gratification deals with desires which may be quickly and temporarily sated, being satisfied seems to include an expectation
of a longer term fulfillment. Incorporating this component into the rest of the definition, we arrive at the following final result:
17 I AM SATISFIED WITH THIS
a. Before now b. I wanted something like this
c. I feel something good d. because now I have this
e. I don’t want more now f. I think I will feel like this for some time after now
In the case of bitter, we start with the observation that one becomes bitter as the result of painful experiences. More specifically, we see that these are bad experiences brought on by others:
18 I was bitter about being fired so quickly.
19 ? I was bitter about the bad weather. 20 ? I was bitter about that terrible sickness.
21 ?? I was bitter about my own mistakes.
The fact that one can be bitter towards individuals further supports the contention that the negative experiences are brought about by a personal agent. This suggests the following component:
22 someone did something very bad to me
or possibly: 23 something very bad happened to me because of someone
I will adopt the latter analysis since it seems to be compatible with both negligence and intentional hurt. A person who is bitter has been deeply hurt. However, being deeply hurt is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition, for being bitter. One can be deeply hurt without becoming bitter. So apparently, one’s response to the hurtful circumstances is important to the definition of bitter.
This response is primarily characterized by a certain attitude toward the offending person:
10 24 now I feel something bad toward this person at all times
This component would help to explain why being bitter is a longer term disposition than a reactive emotion. For example, it is possible to be bitter for long periods of time, but not angry or upset:
25 I was bitter for years.
26 ? I was angry for years. 27 ?? I was upset for years.
Unlike the above emotions, it seems that bitterness cannot be formed abruptly. We are not bitter over painful situations we are currently experiencing:
28 ?? I’m bitter over this bruise on my head
The question is: “What in the formation of bitterness requires a period of time?” I would like to suggest that a certain pattern of thinking gives rise to bitterness and that as certain thoughts are
compulsively replayed over and over again in one’s mind over a period of time, one’s attitude gradually becomes affected. This suggests the following component:
29 I thought something for some time
In particular, I propose that one becomes fixated on both the severity and the avoidability of the offense:
30 a. this didn’t have to happen to me b. this is very bad
c. I don’t want this
It is easy to indulge our self-pity through these deadly combinations of thoughts. Compiling the above components into a single explication, we arrive at the following definition:
31 I AM BITTER ABOUT THIS
a. Before now b. something very bad happened to me because of someone
c. after this I thought something like this for some time: d. this didn’t have to happen to me
e. this is bad f. I don’t want this
g. now I feel something bad towards this person at all times
2.1.3 How substitution works for articles
