31 culture, which is claimed to inhibit his cognitive development. This was initially presented as a more
politically acceptable alternative to the genetic deficit model. But Harkins 1994:110 warns us that both models essentially amount to the same thing: racial prejudice.
A restrictive or restricted code, according to Bernstein 1964:259, limitsundermines the speaker’s ability to both to express himself and organize his thinking, by the considerably reduced inventory of
linguistic options it makes available to its speakers.
3
Hess and Shipman 1965:871 explain that “restrictive” codes are “stereotyped, limited, condensed, lacking in specificity and the exactness needed for precise conceptualization and differentiation”.
Bereiter and Siegfried 1966 refer to Black English as a restricted code and by implication the label also applies to other nonstandard varieties. In fact, Bierman et al. 1971:60 specifically apply the term
to HCE, claiming: It [i.e., HCE] has a primitive grammar and word structure, uses simple, concrete verb-noun,
verb-pronoun combinations, is repetitive, and makes extensive use of expressive vocal features.
and furthermore: Early and consistent exposure to this type of language can lead to less abstraction and more
simple relational responses, ...
For Bierman et al. 1971:60, growing up in a HCE-speaking home is tantamount to language deprivation. Thus, they are in hearty agreement with Hess and Shipman’s position 1965 that “the
meaning of deprivation [i.e., language deprivation] is the deprivation of meaning”. These are strong words. Their conclusion that is the semantically-challenged HCE speaker has no or
limited access to complex, logical, or abstract sorts of meanings. The HCE speaker is thus deprived both verbally the ability to express these meanings in words and cognitively the ability to think using these
concepts.
3.4 Standard English and cognitive development
Perlman 1973:9 calls our attention to the “widely-held and persistent belief that learning standard English will somehow improve the thinking powers of Pidgin-speakers [i.e., HCE speakers].”
The following statement from local personality Sammy Amalu
4
exemplifies this attitude: quoted in Perlman 1973:19:
[A]ny damned fool can learn Pidgin; he does not have to go to school to learn it ... Still, English is not a difficult language to learn. Its syntax is intrinsically logical...
3
Although the terms restrictive or restricted code are attributed to Bernstein, there seems to be some disagreement about how much blame Bernstein deserves for deficit theory. Gumperz and Hymes 1972:31 assert that others
naively applied his idea of restricted codes to contexts he had never intended. Harkins 1994:109–19, however, insists that the application was correctly made and despite his attempts to cover up, Bernstein has not substantially
modified his position.
4
The late Sammy Amalu was a colorful character, to say the least. He was a scam artist who posed as Hawaiian royalty. After serving time, he became a featured writer for a major Honolulu newspaper with his own regular
column.
32 Labov 1990:1–3 identifies three separate claims of those favoring early training in Standard
English. The third claim, what Labov calls its “logical claim”, should sound familiar to us. It asserts that Labov 1990:2:
[S]tandard grammar [i.e., English grammar] is necessary or helpful in attaining the concepts of equality and inequality, assertion and negation, or for the logical analysis of complex
propositions using primitives, or for the formation of other conjunctively defined concepts like animate, concrete, human, and so on.
It is this “logical claim” which the present study will challenge. Apart from its socioeconomic benefits, does Standard English indeed occupy a privileged position among languages?
3.5 Linguists on the equality of languages
Linguists have spoken with one voice on this issue. The idea of labeling a language inferior is reprehensible to the overwhelming majority of linguists. For linguists, the explicit study of language has
inspired a profound respect and appreciation for the complexity and subtlety of all human languages. Prejudicial attitudes against HCE can only arise from either the lack of intimate knowledge of HCE in
particular or the lack of knowledge about languages in general.
If a certain language lacks a particular grammatical category, a particular grammatical structure, or a particular word of English, this does not entail that the language has no means of expressing the same
idea. It was Sapir 1931 cited from Mandelbaum 1960:48–9 who suggested that: Perhaps the speakers of a national language are under profound illusions as to the logical
character of its structure. Perhaps they confuse the comfort of habit with logical necessity. Although Sapir hedges these statements with a noncommittal “perhaps”, it is evident from the
remaining content of his article that these statements do, in fact, reflect his own convictions. As linguists, we could point out that there is a vast range of mechanisms that languages could use to
realize the same meaning. But, have we really proven the equality of languages? Labov 1990:3 warned us that “it is easy enough to reject the logical claim on an emotional or ideological basis.” The question
is, however, do we have actual evidence to base our rejection of the “logical claim”? Do we linguists have nothing more to offer than, “we hold these truths to be self-evident, ... that all languages are
created equal.”?
It is true the proponents of the “logical claim” can offer no positive evidence in their favor other than English-based tests Labov 1972 and it would seem that they should bear the burden of proof in this
matter, but if we can offer nothing more substantial than emotional or ideological appeals, despite our supposedly vast knowledge of language, we are no better. In fact, one might be tempted to regard our
inability to produce concrete evidence as evidence for the contrary position. Old prejudices die hard. Without hard evidence, this issue will never be laid to rest. Surely, if anyone can introduce some concrete
evidence into this debate, it should be the linguist.
Unfortunately, we linguists have done our share to undermine our own efforts. By implicitly accepting the terms of debate from the opposition, linguists have in effect put creoles and low-prestige
languages on the defensive. That is, people argue about whether non-standard varieties are inferior or equal to “real” languages, but are never asked to consider the possibility that non-standard varieties
could be superior to “real” languages, a possibility which is certainly at least as likely as the inferiority hypothesis. Strictly speaking, this study only proves that HCE has at least the same expressive capacity as
33 “real” languages. It leaves open the logical possibility that HCE could have meanings not accessible to
“real” languages.
5
3.6 Conclusion
