14 but not:
42 They accused Mary of the mess. 43 The bad weather was accused of the rise in grain prices.
Again, one might object that perhaps I am using the most viciously circular definitions to make my point. Perhaps less viciously circular definitions might be acceptable. To some extent, I grant this.
Perhaps it might be possible to introduce some kind of nondestructive circularity into NSM. In fact, one could say that NSM allows for a certain kind of circular definition. In NSM, primitives can have
contextual variants called allolexes. I think it is possible to regard these as a limited kind of circular definition, i.e., I means the same as me; person means the same as someone and so forth. Presumably
however, allolexes have a predictable distribution and can therefore be distinguished from ordinary circular terms. Allolexy aside then, circular definitions should be avoided at all costs.
As W 1980:12 points out, the act of defining is inherently reductionistic: Replacing a word by its synonym or a number of more or less exact synonyms has nothing to
do with defining. A definition is an act of analysis – it must replace one word with a group of words corresponding to particular components of its meaning.
NSM’s reductionism might seem merciless to some, but it is really no more than reducing one’s analysis into terms as simple as possible. Unlike many theories however, NSM puts a limit as to how far
reduction can proceed. A difference in meaning must be statable in words. It does not allow for subatomic units of analysis. Primitives must be full-fledged lexemes which cannot be further defined
without obscuring their meaning.
2.3 The search for semantic primitives
The existence of primitives follows logically from the paradigm of natural language paraphrase. As Leibniz noted from Leibniz 1903:430 as quoted in W 1980, W’s translation:
[I]f nothing could be comprehended in itself nothing at all could ever be comprehended. If we applied this reductionistic paradigm to all expressions in a language, we would eventually
reach a level where words can no longer be defined, i.e., the level of primitives. Leibniz had, in fact, attempted this purely inductive approach but during the course of his
investigation, he found it difficult to negotiate his way through the web of redundancy and synonymy in natural language. He soon came to the conclusion that the best solution was to approach the problem
from the bottom up, that is, to first adopt a hypothetical set of primitives, test it in definitions, and continually refine that set. Ultimately a candidate can never be PROVE N to be primitive. It can be
proven to be non-primitive simply by decomposing it. It is only after repeated failures to decompose a primitive candidate that it becomes relatively established as a primitive. In fact, some 17 years passed
before GOOD was received into the NSM set.
12
Leibniz also required that potential primitives prove themselves useful in explication. The NSM set has, in fact been, tested in scores of definitions across wide variety of domains. To name a few: speech
act verbs W 1987, color terms W 1996, simple artifacts W 1985, complex objects ibid., biological taxa ibid., kinship W 1992b, emotions W 1992a, body parts W 1980, syntax W 1988, evidentials
W 1996, cultural-specific terms W 1991b, speech genres W 1991a, proper names W 1992b, gestures W 1995b, facial expressions W 1995a, and conversational analysis W 1991a.
12
GOOD had not been included in the set of primitives because W believed it was closely related to the primitive WANT. After years of failing to produce a paraphrase for good in terms of want, it became recognized that although
there is a relationship between these two words, this relationship was not compositional in nature. Other primitives which apparently related in non-compositional ways include YOU, I, SOMEONE and PEOPLE.
15 W and her colleagues have recently added an additional requirement to Leibniz’s program: a
primitive must prove itself cross-linguistically. That is, these primitives must have exact lexical equivalents in a wide variety of unrelated languages. The potential primitives world and imagine were
dropped from NSM because they were not found in a number of languages.
2.4 About the forms of primitives
